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Introduction
What is sociological theory? This is a question that students who enter my classes grapple with each
semester. In part, this is because the concept of “theory” itself is poorly understood, as evidenced by the
dismissive phrase “it’s just a theory” which appears in conversations regularly. So then, what is a
theory? For scholars and scientists’ theory is, at its core, and attempt to bring order to data. Rather than
being a dismissal of value, this understanding of theory places theories and theoretical frameworks at the
center of the scientific process. Which is a far cry from “just a theory.” Sociological theory then, is an
attempt to bring order to data about the social world, past and present.
In fact, sociologist use theory in multiple ways in their attempt to understand the social world.
Sociological theory can be used as a framework for inquiry that sets down principles and shapes how we
approach our research and how we interpret results. Often sociologists also engage with sociological
theory by situating themselves within, or conversely challenging and explicitly critiquing the work of
previous scholars, especially the canonical scholars that frame our understanding of the discipline.
Students of sociology however, often first encounter sociological theory as a set of readings assigned in
a class. Many of whom report to me, that such readings are at best, a bit dry and worst downright
confusing! I can appreciate the difficultly students often find in engaging with such texts because the
foundational works of sociological theory are not always easy reading. Due to age, translation issues and
level of complexity, making your way though some of our historical works can be challenging.
However, it can also be profoundly rewarding. Sociological theory gives students a framework, a
foundation, if you will, of the central ideas, past and present that have shaped the discipline that they are
learning about. It also provides, in true sociological fashion, the ability to more deeply understand the
society in which the authors of key texts lived, and perhaps even shed some light on contemporary
society.
This book is yet another entry into the wide field of sociological theory readers that are available to
students and faculty members in sociology. It is not, perhaps fundamentally innovative in its approach,
though rather than the usual timeline organization this work is organized into theoretical perspectives,
which is a bit less common. The readings within this book are organized in broader perspective
approaches, including conflict theory, functionalism and symbolic interactionism. Within this core
framework, some early American theorists are put in conversation with these classical thinkers. Some of
these thinkers are situated within the traditional frameworks, while others challenge or contest the
central claims presented within the classical traditions.
What does make it unusual, if not unique, is that it is an open access text. This means this work is both
free to students and scholars, and free to be modified and adapted. The foundation of this text is another
open access text, Classical Sociological Theory and the Foundations of American Sociology, by Allison
Hurst from Oregon State University, and like her work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. Many of the translations here are Prof. Hurst’s, though
some of been slightly modified to fit the needs of my course and teaching style. Other open access or
public domain works have been included in this reader and are attributed throughout.
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Organization
As noted above this work is organized into several broad theoretical traditions: conflict theory,
functionalism, and symbolic interactionism. While my class includes the work of many scholars in these
three fields, as well as post-structuralism this text focuses primarily on the historical works of these
three areas, due to publishing constraints.
To get us started I am going to discuss these three major frameworks. Beginning with conflict theory.
Conflict theory is one of the foundational frameworks of sociology. At its core, conflict theory considers
the history and evolution of human society society as a competition for limited resources. It is based on
the idea that individuals within a society are broken up into groups that must compete for social,
material, and political power. Conflict theory argues that social institutions, such as economics or
education reflect this competition, and in doing so create social inequality. Karl Marx and Fredrick
Engels, as well as other scholars, such as feminist and critical theorists, have a lot to say about the
ethical, practical, and intellectual meanings behind this theoretical framework.
Secondly, this book includes excerpts from the work of Emile Durkheim and other influential structural
functionalists, or simply functionalists. This framework is rooted in the idea that societies operate as a
set of interdependent social systems that exist to create solidarity among individuals and groups, and in
doing so, create stability. This framework often relies on a metaphor of mechanics or biology, and views
societies as either machines or complex organisms. The focus of this approach is to consider social
structures and social functions, in its analysis. While the work of Durkheim is central to this view, it
appears in the work of other notable social thinkers such as Herbert Spencer and Talcott Parsons.
Finally, a serious of readings address the sociological framework of symbolic interactionism. This
sociological theory looks at the symbolic and ideological meanings within society. Specifically, it
examines how people create symbolic meanings in their society through social interaction with one
another, and how those symbolic meanings shape behavior. For example, a scholar using the symbolic
interactionist approach might consider how a particular concept, such as freedom, or the common good,
comes to have a shared understanding withing a social group. Then examine how that concept and its
attendant shared meanings, shapes social behavior. Rooted in the work of Max Weber, this sociological
framework is fully articulated in the work of George Herbert Mead and has influenced the thinking of
many other social theorists.
Hopefully, if you are reading this, you are either a student, who is enjoying a little extra cash after not
having to buy a commercial textbook, or perhaps an instructor who is considering modifying this to fit
your own needs. Either way, I hope you enjoy your journey!
Professor Alecea Standlee
Gettysburg College
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Some Useful History
Allison Hurst1
All of the passages here were originally written in the nineteenth or early twentieth centuries. Although
the language has often been updated to make the meaning clearer to a contemporary reader, the
historical examples used remain. Further, the theorists were trying to make sense of the world they saw
around them – its origins and its current manifestations. So, it is important for you to know a little
history before delving into the material. In some cases, the introductory passage to a given selection may
provide relevant historical detail. A big picture understanding of major historical shifts, however, is
needed as well. This section will supply an abbreviated overview of some of the historical events you
will need to know to properly understand classical sociological theory. You may also refer to the
included “Timeline” that shows the overlap between the lives of the theorists and major historic events.
Also included are suggestions for further reading.
Ten Things Marx, Weber and Durkheim Took for Granted about the History of the World that
You Might Want to Read More about:
1. The land mass of Europe became a configuration of European “nations” only several centuries
after the Roman Empire first brought it together under a shared governance in the years in the
first centuries of the millennium. After a period of “dark ages,” from the fall of the Roman
Empire in the 5th century CE to around the 14th century, a viewer would find only scattered
instances of political authority and little evidence of the existence of “nations” as we know them.
During this time, feudalism emerged as the dominant economic system: most people (operating
in family units) were legally bound to work for a lord or master, whose power was close to
absolute over his territory.
2. Beginning with Charlemagne in the 8th century but continuing up until the 18th century CE,
European nations emerged as distinct political entities, with rulers that we would consider
“monarchs” through a system of hereditary succession. The monarch was often chief member of
the aristocracy (rule by “the best”), a group whose power was ascribed by birth and whose
property was passed on through hereditary succession. Feudalism continued to be the
predominant economic system, although trade and commercial ventures slowly brought into
being a new class, neither lord nor serf, housed in the new urban centers (“cities,” from which we
derive the term citizen).
3. For many of these years, the aristocracy shared powers with the Catholic Church, whose
presence preceded the rise of the new nations and monarchs. As the primary landowner on the
European landmass, the Church was wealthier and more powerful than local rulers. The Church
was also the primary educational institution, training young men in the arts and sciences of the
Roman civilization, as well as theology.
1

Classical Sociological Theory and Foundations of American Sociology by Alison Hurst, Oregon State
University Open Textbooks. Edited for length.
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4. There were many critiques of the power, wealth, and administration of the church, but none of
them were as threatening as that which emerged from the priest Martin Luther, who famously
nailed a list of grievances to the door of his local cathedral in 1517. Luther accused the church of
literally selling salvation and forgiveness and he argued that the Bible should be translated into
local languages so that people could read it for themselves. Lutheranism and Protestantism (those
protesting the church) became known for advocating a personal relationship with God, without
the interference or reliance on third parties (priests).
5. As nations emerged as distinct political entities with control over defined territories and wealth
derived from increased trade, some monarchs began to chafe at the power of the Pope and the
Catholic Church. King Henry VIII (Tudor) of England was the first to split from the church in
1532 when he was denied permission to divorce his first wife and remarry Anne Boleyn. As the
Protestant Reformation swept Europe, civil and national wars broke out everywhere between
monarchs and peoples who wanted to remain within the Catholic Church and those that wanted
to follow Henry VIII’s path. By 1700, most of Northern Europe was “Protestant” while most of
Southern Europe was “Catholic.”
6. All of these changes were taking place in a society that was increasingly commercial. In 1492,
Christopher Columbus had stumbled upon the West Indies in his attempt to forge a trading route
East to China and India. This precipitated a scramble by European rulers to seize land in the
Americas, precipitating the creation of a global trading system based on slave labor and
expropriation of land and goods from non-European peoples. Although initially led by Spain and
Portugal, the Protestant Netherlands and England under the Tudors (beginning with Henry VIII
but accelerating under his daughter, Elizabeth I) eventually dominated global trade.
7. As money poured in from the Americas, especially to the ports of Amsterdam and London,
large-scale industrial enterprises were constructed to put the money to work, employing workers
in large numbers to produce goods that could be sold to other global regions (such as China and
India). Thus, nations, capitalism, Protestantism, slavery, and global trade emerged at a similar
time in a similar place (15th-16th century Northern Europe). As the need for workers in these
large “factories” increased, feudalism slowly passed into capitalism. Serfs were no longer tied to
the land but moved to where they could find work. English landowners began using their land as
sites for factories or as places to raise large bodies of sheep whose wool could be processed in
the emerging factories.
8. Historians call all these changes in the 15th and 16th century the emergence of “modern society.”
Later changes, such as the industrial revolution of the late 17th and early 18th centuries merely
exacerbated the trends already in progress. There is currently some debate about whether we
have moved beyond modern society to something “post-modern”, but we have yet no identifying
name for this period. This is important to note, as Marx, Weber, and Durkheim were all seeking
to describe what we now refer to as “modern society,” which, on a grand scale, may still be what
you are living through now.
9. By the late eighteenth century, new political strains began to emerge. Monarchical rule was
suited well to feudalism, but it did not seem as suited to this new global capitalism. Capitalists
and traders were often not part of the aristocracy and did not feel represented by aristocratic
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rulers. There were many more people living in towns and cities who felt they should be
politically represented. Some colonies, such as those in North America, also felt excluded from
political representation. Hereditary succession seemed increasingly irrational, particularly in a
society in which hard work and merit was leading to possibilities of social mobility. This led to a
series of political revolutions (American in 1775, French in 1789) to create new democratic
political systems.
10. At the time Marx was writing, these democratic political revolutions had stalled, at least in
Europe. France wobbled between monarchy and republic (see more in the Eighteenth Brumaire
introduction). German princes fought back attempts at instituting a popular vote. And yet, the
writing on the wall appeared clear. Representative democracy was on the horizon. The world we
now inhabit, capitalist and democratic, was the world in which Weber and Durkheim would
grow up. Both would live to see the 1918 execution of one of the last ruling aristocratic families,
the Romanovs. Today, “noble” families are largely titular, without real power.

5

PART I

Conflict Theory
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Timeline of Marx’s Life and Work1
1818

May 5

Born in Trier, Prussia

1820

Nov. 20

Longtime collaborator, Friedreich Engels, born in Barmen, Prussia

1835

Enrolls in University of Bonn, as a law student

1836

Transfers to college in Berlin; engaged to Jenny von Westphalen

1841

PhD, University of Jena; begins writing articles for local newspaper

1843

June 19

Marries Jenny von Westphalen; they move to Paris

1844

Daughter Jenny Caroline born in Paris (May 1st); meets Engels (August
28th); spends winter writing the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts

1845

Expelled from Paris and moves to Brussels; daughter Jenny Laura born
(September 6th); writes Theses on Feuerbach and The German Ideology

1847

Participates in first congress of Communist League in London; Son Edgar
born in Brussels (December 17th)

1848

Communist Manifesto published; arrested in Brussels; works as editor of
newspaper

1849

Marxes move to London after spending some time in Cologne; Son Henry
Edward Guy (“Guido”) is born (will die within a year)

1851

Daughter Jenny Eveline Frances (“Franziska”) born (will die next year)

1852

Began writing for New York Daily Tribune, as European correspondent

1855

Daughter Jenny Julia Eleanor born in London (January 16th); Edgar dies
of gastric fever (April 6th)

1859

Publication of A Contribution of the Critique of Political Economy

1864

Became involved with International Workingmen’s Association (First
International)

1867

Sept. 14

Publication of first volume of Das Kapital

1868

Laura married Paul Lafargue, French socialist

1871
1872

Publication of The Civil War in France, a defense of the Paris Commune
Jenny married Charles Longuet, French journalist and activist

1876

Grandson Jean Laurent Frederick “Johnny” Longuet born; eventually
becomes a leader of the Socialist Party of France

1879

Grandson Edgar “Wolf” Longuet born, becomes doctor and activist

1881
1883

Dec. 2

Jenny von Westphalen dies after long illness
Jenny dies in Paris (January 11th); Marx dies (March 14th)

1

Classical Sociological Theory and Foundations of American Sociology by Alison Hurst, Oregon State University
Open Textbooks. Edited here for length.
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Biography of Marx
“Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change
it.” – Karl Marx
NOTE ON SOURCES: The first selection is a short biography written by Marx’s close friend and
lifetime-collaborator, ie i Engels. The biography was written for a German newspaper but was not
published at the time. The complete original can be found on the Marxist Archives site.1 The second
selection was written by Marx’s daughter, Eleanor, and originally published in a German newspaper in
1897 and can also be found on the Marxist Archives site.2 The third selection describes the Marx
household, and was written by a close friend and colleague, Wilhelm Liebknecht.3 The final selection
was taken from Engels’ much reprinted speech at Marx’s funeral in 1883. The complete speech can be
found online.4 Compiled by Allison Hurst5.
Karl Marx was born on May 5, 1818 in Trier, where he received an education in the classics. He
studied law at Bonn and later in Berlin, where, however, his preoccupation with philosophy soon
turned him away from law. In 1841, after spending five years in the “metropolis of intellectuals,” he
returned to Bonn to earn his PhD. Instead, he became involve in a radical newspaper venture, which
ran afoul of Prussian censorship. He resigned in protest in 1843.
During his criticism of the deliberations of the local government, Marx began focusing on questions
of material interest. He found himself confronted with points of view which neither jurisprudence
nor philosophy had taken account of. Proceeding from the Hegelian philosophy of law, Marx
concluded that it was not the state, which Hegel had described as the “top of the edifice,” but “civil
society,” which Hegel had regarded with disdain, that was the sphere in which a key to the
understanding of the process of the historical development of mankind should be looked for.
In the summer of 1843, after marrying Jenny Von Westphalen, the daughter of a government
official, Marx moved to Paris, where he devoted himself primarily to studying political economy and
the history of the great French Revolution. There he became involved in another radical newspaper
and was expelled from France for this in 1845. He moved to Brussels where he continued his
political work, writing what would become the Communist Manifesto on behest of workers
organized as “The League of the Just.”
Expelled once again, this time by the Belgian government under the influence of the panic caused by
the 1848 revolution, Marx returned to Paris at the invitation of the French provisional government.
The tidal wave of the revolution pushed all scientific pursuits into the background; what mattered
now was to become involved in the movement. Marx resurrected his radical newspaper and moved
1

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/bio/marx/eng-1869.htm
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/bio/marx/eleanor.htm
3
https://www.marxists.org/archive/liebknecht-w/1896/karl-marx.htm
4
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1883/death/burial.htm
5
Classical Sociological Theory and Foundations of American Sociology by Alison Hurst, Oregon State
University Open Textbooks
2

8

to Cologne, but this was again shut down by the government forcing him to flee to Paris, first,
then, London, where he remained the rest of his life.
In London at that time was assembled the entire fine fleur of the refugees from all the nations of the
continent. Revolutionary committees of every kind were formed. For a while, Marx continued
to produce his newspaper in the form of a monthly review but eventually he withdrew into the
British Museum and worked through the immense and as yet for the most part unexamined library
there for all that it contained on political economy. At the same time, he was a regular contributor to
the New York Tribune, acting, until the outbreak of the American Civil War, so to speak, as the
editor for European politics of this, the leading Anglo-American newspaper.
At last, in 1867, he published the first volume of his masterpiece, Capital: A Critique of
Political Economy. It is the political economy of the working class, reduced to its scientific
formulation. This work is concerned not with rabble-rousing phrase-mongering, but with strictly
scientific deductions. Whatever one’s attitude to socialism, one will at any rate have to
acknowledge that in this work it is presented for the first time in a scientific manner. Anyone still
wishing to do battle with socialism, will have to deal with Marx.
But there is another point of view from which Marx’s book is of interest. It is the first work in
which the actual relations existing between capital and labor, in their classical form such as
they have reached in England, are described in their entirety and in a clear and graphic fashion.
Then there is the history of factory legislation in England which, from its modest beginnings
with the first acts of 1802, has now reached the point of limiting working hours in nearly all
manufacturing or cottage industries to 60 hours per week for women and young people under the
age of 18, and to 39 hours per week for children under 13. From this point of view the book is of
the greatest interest for every industrialist.
As one would expect, in addition to his studies Marx is busy with the workers’ movement; he is one
of the founders of the International Working Men’s Association, which has been the center of
so much attention recently and has already shown in more than one place in Europe that it is a force
to be reckoned with.
On the Relationship between Karl and Jenny
Karl was a young man of seventeen when he became engaged to Jenny. For them, too, the path
of true love was not a smooth one. It is easy to understand that Karl’s parents opposed the
engagement of a young man of his age … The earnestness with which Karl assures his father of his
love in spite of certain contradictions is explained by the rather stormy scenes his engagement had
caused in the home. My father used to say that at that time he had been a really ferocious Roland.
But the question was soon settled and shortly before or after his eighteenth birthday the
betrothal was formally recognized. Seven years Karl waited for his beautiful Jenny, but “they
seemed but so many days to him, because he loved her so much”.
On June 19, 1843 they were wedded. Having played together as children and become engaged as a
young man and girl, the couple went hand in hand through the battle of life. And what a battle!
Years of bitter pressing need and, still worse, years of brutal suspicion, infamous calumny and icy
indifference. But through all that, in unhappiness and happiness, the two lifelong friends and
lovers never faltered, never doubted: they were faithful unto death. And death has not e
e
em i
le li e l
l l e i ie e
i l e i
e
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The Marx Household
Several children died; among them Marx’s two boys, one, born in London, very early, the other,
born in Paris, after a protracted illness. Well I remember the sad weeks of sickness without hope.
The death of this boy was a fearful blow to Marx. The boy, named Moosh (mouche, fly), really
Edgar after an uncle, was very gifted, but ailing from the day of his birth, a genuine, true child of
sorrow this boy with the magnificent eyes and the promising head that was, however, much too
heavy for the weak body. If poor Moosh could have obtained quiet, enduring nursing and a sojourn
in the country or near the sea, then, perhaps, his life might have been saved. But in the life of the
exile, in the chase from place to place, in the misery of London, it was impossible, even with the
most tender love of the parents and care of a mother, to make the tender little plant strong enough
for the struggle of existence. Moosh died; I shall never forget the scene; the mother, silently
weeping, bent over the dead child, Lenchen5 sobbing beside her, Marx in a terrible excitement
vehemently, almost angrily, rejecting all consolation, the two girls clinging to their mother crying
quietly, the mother clasping them convulsively as if to hold them and defend them against death that
had robbed her of her boy.
And two days later the burial, Lessner, Pfaender, Lochner, Conrad Schramm, the red Wolff and
myself went along, I in the carriage with Marx. He sat there dumb, holding his head in his hands. I
stroked his forehead: “Mohr,6 you still have your wife, your girls and us, and we all love you so
well!”
“You cannot give me back my boy!” he groaned, and silently we rode on to the graveyard in
Tottenham Court Road. When the coffin, singularly large, for during the sickness the formerly very
backward child had grown surprisingly, when the coffin was about to be lowered into the grave,
Marx was so excited that I stepped to his side fearing he might jump after the coffin.
Thirty years later, when his faithful mate was buried out on Highgate Cemetery, and with her half
of his own being, his own life, he would have fallen into the grave had not Engels, who later told me
about it, quickly grasped his arm.
Fifteen months later he followed her.
The Lifetime Achievements of Marx
On the 14th of March, at a quarter to three in the afternoon, the greatest living thinker ceased to
think. He had been left alone for scarcely two minutes, and when we came back we found him
in his armchair, peacefully gone to sleep — but forever.
An immeasurable loss has been sustained both by the militant proletariat of Europe and America,
and by historical science, in the death of this man. The gap that has been left by the departure of this
mighty spirit will soon enough make itself felt.
Just as Darwin discovered the law of development of organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of
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development of human history: the simple fact, hitherto concealed by an overgrowth of ideology,
that mankind must first of all eat, drink, have shelter and clothing, before it can pursue politics,
science, art, religion, etc.; that therefore the production of the immediate material means, and
consequently the degree of economic development attained by a given people or during a given
epoch, form the foundation upon which the state institutions, the legal conceptions, art, and even
the ideas on religion, of the people concerned have been evolved, and in the light of which they
must, therefore, be explained, instead of vice versa, as had hitherto been the case.
But that is not all. Marx also discovered the special law of motion governing the present-day
capitalist mode of production, and the bourgeois society that this mode of production has created.
The discovery of surplus value suddenly threw light on the problem, in trying to solve which all
previous investigations, of both bourgeois economists and socialist critics, had been groping in the
dark.
Such was the man of science. But this was not even half the man.
For Marx was before all else a revolutionist. His real mission in life was to contribute, in one way or
another, to the overthrow of capitalist society and of the state institutions which it had brought into
being, to contribute to the liberation of the modern proletariat, which he was the first to make
conscious of its own position and its needs, conscious of the conditions of its emancipation.
Fighting was his element. And he fought with a passion, a tenacity and a success such as few could
rival.
And, consequently, Marx was the best hated man of his time. Governments, both absolutist and
republican, deported him from their territories. Bourgeois, whether conservative or ultrademocratic, vied with one another in heaping slanders upon him. All this he brushed aside as though
it were a cobweb, ignoring it, answering only when extreme necessity compelled him. And he
died beloved, revered, and mourned by millions of revolutionary fellow workers — from the
mines of Siberia to California, in all parts of Europe and America — and I make bold to say that,
though he may have had many opponents, he had hardly one personal enemy.
His name will endure through the ages, and so also will his work.
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Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844:
Estranged Labour
Karl Marx
“The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces.” - Karl Marx
NOTE ON SOURCE: Years after Marx’s death, a series of notebooks were finally transcribed and
published, first in the Soviet Union in 1927 and in the US in 1959 (just in time for the turbulent ‘60’s). It
is here where Marx discusses most fully the well-known concept of alienation. The selections below are
taken from the translation freely available on the Marxist Archives website, with minor modifications
and condensation.1
Introduction – What to Look For
In the 1844 manuscripts, written when still a young man, Marx struggled to articulate what was so
problematic about the current system of capitalism. These early passages of Marx demonstrate the
fundamental problems of social relations under class rule. Rather than focus on the concept of
exploitation, or what was economically unfair about the social relationship between capitalist and
worker, Marx critiqued the historical development of hired labor and the ways in which this kind of
work dehumanizes those who take part in it. We are fully ourselves when we work, but we have socially
arranged our work so that it is alien to us, a hostile power at another’s command. Marx uses the word
alienation to describe this dehumanization. Take note of the various aspects of alienation discussed by
Marx.2
We have proceeded from the premises of political economy. We have accepted its language and its laws.
We have shown that the worker sinks to the level of a commodity and becomes indeed the most
wretched of commodities; that the wretchedness of the worker is in inverse proportion to the power and
magnitude of his production; that the necessary result of competition is the accumulation of capital in a
few hands, and that, eventually, the whole of society must fall apart into the two classes – property
owners and property-less workers.
Political economy starts with the fact of private property; it does not explain it to us. Now, therefore, we
have to grasp the intrinsic connection between private property, greed, the separation of labor, capital
and landed property; the connection of exchange and competition, of value and the devaluation of man,
of monopoly and competition, etc. – the connection between this whole estrangement and the money
system.
We proceed from an actual economic fact.
1

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/preface.htm
Classical Sociological Theory and Foundations of American Sociology by Alison Hurst, Oregon State University Open
Textbooks
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The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces, the more his production increases in
power and size. The worker becomes an ever-cheaper commodity the more commodities he creates. This
fact expresses merely that the object which labor produces – labor’s product – confronts it as something
alien, as a power independent of the producer. The product of labor is labor which has been embodied in
an object, which has become material: it is the objectification of labor. Labor’s realization is its
objectification. Under these economic conditions this realization of labor appears as loss of realization
for the workers’ objectification as loss of the object and bondage to it; appropriation as estrangement, as
alienation
Political economy conceals the estrangement inherent in the nature of labor by not considering the direct
relationship between the worker(labor) and production. It is true that labor produces for the rich
wonderful things, but for the worker it produces poverty. It produces mansions, but for the worker,
shacks. It produces beauty, but for the worker, deformity. It replaces labor by machines, but it throws
one section of the workers back into barbarous types of labor and it turns the other section into a
machine. It produces intelligence, but for the worker, stupidity, ignorance.
Until now we have been considering the alienation of the worker only in one of its aspects –
relationship to the products of
labor. But the alienation (also known as estrangement) is manifested
not only in the result but in the act of production, within the producing activity, itself.
What, then, constitutes the alienation of labor?
First, the fact that labor is external to the worker. In other words, it does not belong to
intrinsic
nature. In
work he does not affirm himself but denies h self. e does not feel content but unhappy,
does not develop freely her physical and mental energy but instead mortifies
body and ruins
mind.
The worker only feels h self outside h work, and in h work feels outside h self.
feels at home
when he is not working, and when he is working, he does not feel at home. H labor is therefore not
voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labor. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means
to satisfy needs external to it. Finally, it is not h own work, but someone else’s. It doesn’t really belong
to h but to another.
As a result, therefore, a human being (the worker) only feels h self freely active in h animal functions
– eating, drinking, reproducing, or at most in h dwelling and in dressing-up, etc.; and in h human
functions he no longer feels herself to be anything but an animal. What is animal becomes human and
what is human becomes animal.
We have now covered the first two aspects of alienation: first, alienation from the product, and second,
alienation from the process. We now have to consider two more.
Humans are a species-being. The life of the species, both in humans and in non-human animals, consists
physically in the fact that humans (like other animals) lives on organic nature. Like all animals, humans
live on nature –nature is our body, and we must remain in continuous interchange with it to stay alive.
That our physical and spiritual life is linked to nature means simply that nature is linked to itself, for we
are a part of nature. In estranging from us (1) nature, and (2) ourselves,
Our own active functions, our life activity, estranged labor estranges the species from us. It changes for
us the life of the species into a means of individual life.
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For labor, life activity, productive life itself, appears to us merely as a means of satisfying a need – the
need to maintain physical existence. Yet the productive life is the life of the species. It is lifeengendering life. The whole character of a species, its species-character, is contained in the character of
its life activity; and free, conscious activity is our species-character. Life itself appears only as a means
to life. This, too, is an aspect of alienation.
The non-human animal is immediately one with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself from it. It is
its life activity. We, however, make our life activity itself the object of our will and consciousness.
Conscious life activity distinguishes us immediately from all other animal life activity. It is just because
of this that we are the human species (that is our “species-being”). Estranged labor reverses the
relationship, what makes us human is something that is a mere means to existence rather than our very
existence itself.
In creating a world of objects by our personal activity, we prove ourselves a conscious species-being.
Admittedly animals also produce. They build themselves nests, dwellings, like the bees, beavers, ants,
etc. But an animal only produces what it immediately needs for itself or its young. It produces onesidedly, whilst we produce universally. An animal’s product belongs immediately to its physical body,
while this is not true for us.
The object of labor is, therefore, the objectification of our species-life: for we see ourselves in the world
we create. In tearing away from us the object of our production, therefore, estranged labor tears from us
our species-life, transforms our advantage over other animals into the disadvantage that our inorganic
body, nature, is taken from us.
We thus have two more aspects of alienation. The third is alienation from our species-being, that which
makes us human. Following from this is the fourth, our alienation from other human beings. The
proposition that man’s species-nature is estranged from him means that one man is estranged from the
other, as each of them is from man’s essential nature.
Our alienation is realized and expressed only in the relationship in which we stand to other humans.
Hence within the relationship of alienated labor each person views the other in accordance with the
standard and the relationship in which she finds herself as a worker.
Let us now see, further, how the concept of estranged, alienated labor must express and present itself in
real life. If the product of labor is alien to me, if it confronts me as an alien power, to whom, then, does
it belong? To a being other than myself. Who is this being? To god(s)? Perhaps back in the day, but not
now. Not the gods, not nature, but only man himself can be this alien power over us. Thus, if the product
of his labor, his labor objectified, is for him an alien, hostile, powerful object independent of him, then
his position towards it is such that someone else is master of this object, someone who is alien, hostile,
powerful, and independent of him. If he treats his own activity as an unfree activity, then he treats it as
an activity performed in the service, under the dominion, the coercion, and the yoke of another man.
Through estranged, alienated labor, then, the worker produces the relationship to this labor of a man
alien to labor and standing outside it. The relationship of the worker to labor creates the relationship to it
of the capitalist (or whatever one chooses to call the master of labor).
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man.
Wages are a direct consequence of estranged labor, and estranged labor is the direct cause of private
property. The downfall of the one must, therefore, involve the downfall of the other. From the
relationship of estranged labor to private property it follows further that the emancipation of society
from private property, etc., from servitude, is expressed in the political form of the emancipation of
the workers; not that their emancipation alone is at stake, but because the emancipation of the workers
contains universal human emancipation – and it contains this because the whole of human servitude is
involved in the relation of the worker to production, and all relations of servitude are but modifications
and consequences of this relation.

15

Wage Labour and Capital
Karl Marx
“…the interests of capitals and the interests of wage-labour are diametrically opposed to each other.”
-Karl Marx
NOTE ON SOURCES: "Wage Labour and Capital" is an economics essay by Marx, first published in
articles in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung in April 1849. It was written in 1847 and Marxist scholars
consider it an important precursor to Marx’s seminal work On Capital. The selections below are taken
from the translation freely available on the Marxist Archives website.1
Introduction: What to Look For
This essay comes early in Marx’s career and lays out key ideas that will be more comprehensively
address in his later work. He introduces the idea of labor, and labor power, commodification and
explores concepts of supply and demand. He also introduces the idea that capitalism and specifically
wage labor is exploitive.
What are Wages? How are they Determined?
If several workmen were to be asked: "How much wages do you get?", one would reply, "I get two
shillings a day", and so on. According to the different branches of industry in which they are employed,
they would mention different sums of money that they receive from their respective employers for the
completion of a certain task; for example, for weaving a yard of linen, or for setting a page of type.
Despite the variety of their statements, they would all agree upon one point: that wages are the amount
of money which the capitalist pays for a certain period of work or for a certain amount of work.
Consequently, it appears that the capitalist buys their labour with money, and that for money they sell
him their labour. But this is merely an illusion. What they actually sell to the capitalist for money is their
labour-power. This labour-power the capitalist buys for a day, a week, a month, etc. And after he has
bought it, he uses it up by letting the worker labour during the stipulated time. With the same amount of
money with which the capitalist has bought their labour-power (for example, with two shillings) he
could have bought a certain amount of sugar or of any other commodity. The two shillings with which
he bought 20 pounds of sugar is the price of the 20 pounds of sugar. The two shillings with which he
bought 12 hours' use of labour-power, is the price of 12 hours' labour. Labour-power, then, is a
commodity, no more, no less so than is the sugar. The first is measured by the clock, the other by the
scales.
Their commodity, labour-power, the workers exchange for the commodity of the capitalist, for money,
and, moreover, this exchange takes place at a certain ratio. So much money for so long a use of labourpower. For 12 hours' weaving, two shillings. And these two shillings, do they not represent all the other
commodities which I can buy for two shillings? Therefore, actually, the worker has exchanged his
1
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commodity, labour-power, for commodities of all kinds, and, moreover, at a certain ratio. By giving him
two shillings, the capitalist has given him so much meat, so much clothing, so much wood, light, etc., in
exchange for his day's work. The two shillings therefore express the relation in which labour-power is
exchanged for other commodities, the exchange-value of labour-power.
The exchange value of a commodity estimated in money is called its price. Wages therefore are only a
special name for the price of labour-power, and are usually called the price of labour; it is the special
name for the price of this peculiar commodity, which has no other repository than human flesh and
blood.
Let us take any worker; for example, a weaver. The capitalist supplies him with the loom and yarn. The
weaver applies himself to work, and the yarn is turned into cloth. The capitalist takes possession of the
cloth and sells it for 20 shillings, for example. Now are the wages of the weaver a share of the cloth, of
the 20 shillings, of the product of the work? By no means. Long before the cloth is sold, perhaps long
before it is fully woven, the weaver has received his wages. The capitalist, then, does not pay his wages
out of the money which he will obtain from the cloth, but out of money already on hand. Just as little as
loom and yarn are the product of the weaver to whom they are supplied by the employer, just so little are
the commodities which he receives in exchange for his commodity – labour-power – his product.
…With a part of his existing wealth, of his capital, the capitalist buys the labour-power of the weaver in
exactly the same manner as, with another part of his wealth, he has bought the raw material – the yarn –
and the instrument of labour – the loom. After he has made these purchases, and among them belongs
the labour-power necessary to the production of the cloth he produces only with raw materials and
instruments of labour belonging to him. For our good weaver, too, is one of the instruments of labour,
and being in this respect on a par with the loom, he has no more share in the product (the cloth), or in the
price of the product, than the loom itself has.
Wages, therefore, are not a share of the worker in the commodities produced by himself. Wages are that
part of already existing commodities with which the capitalist buys a certain amount of productive
labour-power.
Consequently, labour-power is a commodity which its possessor, the wage-worker, sells to the capitalist.
Why does he sell it? It is in order to live.
But the putting of labour-power into action – i.e., the work – is the active expression of the labourer's
own life. And this life activity he sells to another person in order to secure the necessary means of life.
His life-activity, therefore, is but a means of securing his own existence. He works that he may keep
alive. He does not count the labour itself as a part of his life; it is rather a sacrifice of his life. It is a
commodity that he has auctioned off to another. The product of his activity, therefore, is not the aim of
his activity. What he produces for himself is not the silk that he weaves, not the gold that he draws up
the mining shaft, not the palace that he builds. What he produces for himself is wages; and the silk, the
gold, and the palace are resolved for him into a certain quantity of necessaries of life, perhaps into a
cotton jacket, into copper coins, and into a basement dwelling.
And the labourer who for 12 hours long, weaves, spins, bores, turns, builds, shovels, breaks stone,
carries hods, and so on – is this 12 hours' weaving, spinning, boring, turning, building, shovelling, stone-
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breaking, regarded by him as a manifestation of life, as life? Quite the contrary. Life for him begins
where this activity ceases, at the table, at the tavern, in bed. The 12 hours' work, on the other hand, has
no meaning for him as weaving, spinning, boring, and so on, but only as earnings, which enable him to
sit down at a table, to take his seat in the tavern, and to lie down in a bed. If the silk-worm's object in
spinning were to prolong its existence as caterpillar, it would be a perfect example of a wage-worker.
Labour-power was not always a commodity (merchandise). Labour was not always wage-labour, i.e.,
free labour. The slave did not sell his labour-power to the slave-owner, any more than the ox sells his
labour to the farmer. The slave, together with his labour-power, was sold to his owner once for all. He is
a commodity that can pass from the hand of one owner to that of another. He himself is a commodity,
but his labour-power is not his commodity. The serf sells only a portion of his labour-power. It is not he
who receives wages from the owner of the land; it is rather the owner of the land who receives a tribute
from him. The serf belongs to the soil, and to the lord of the soil he brings its fruit. The free labourer, on
the other hand, sells his very self, and that by fractions. He auctions off eight, 10, 12, 15 hours of his
life, one day like the next, to the highest bidder, to the owner of raw materials, tools, and the means of
life – i.e., to the capitalist. The labourer belongs neither to an owner nor to the soil, but eight, 10, 12, 15
hours of his daily life belong to whomsoever buys them. The worker leaves the capitalist, to whom he
has sold himself, as often as he chooses, and the capitalist discharges him as often as he sees fit, as soon
as he no longer gets any use, or not the required use, out of him. But the worker, whose only source of
income is the sale of his labour-power, cannot leave the whole class of buyers, i.e., the capitalist class,
unless he gives up his own existence. He does not belong to this or that capitalist, but to the capitalist
class; and it is for him to find his man – i.e., to find a buyer in this capitalist class.
Relation of Wage-Labour to Capital
What is it that takes place in the exchange between the capitalist and the wage-labourer?
The labourer receives means of subsistence in exchange for his labour-power; the capitalist receives, in
exchange for his means of subsistence, labour, the productive activity of the labourer, the creative force
by which the worker not only replaces what he consumes, but also gives to the accumulated labour a
greater value than it previously possessed. The labourer gets from the capitalist a portion of the existing
means of subsistence. For what purpose do these means of subsistence serve him? For immediate
consumption. But as soon as I consume means of subsistence, they are irrevocably lost to me, unless I
employ the time during which these means sustain my life in producing new means of subsistence, in
creating by my labour new values in place of the values lost in consumption. But it is just this noble
reproductive power that the labourer surrenders to the capitalist in exchange for means of subsistence
received. Consequently, he has lost it for himself.
Let us take an example. For one shilling a labourer works all day long in the fields of a farmer, to whom
he thus secures a return of two shillings. The farmer not only receives the replaced value which he has
given to the day labourer, he has doubled it. Therefore, he has consumed the one shilling that he gave to
the day labourer in a fruitful, productive manner. For the one shilling he has bought the labour-power of
the day-labourer, which creates products of the soil of twice the value, and out of one shilling makes
two. The day-labourer, on the contrary, receives in the place of his productive force, whose results he
has just surrendered to the farmer, one shilling, which he exchanges for means of subsistence, which he
consumes more or less quickly. The one shilling has therefore been consumed in a double manner –
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reproductively for the capitalist, for it has been exchanged for labour-power, which brought forth two
shillings; unproductively for the worker, for it has been exchanged for means of subsistence which are
lost for ever, and whose value he can obtain again only by repeating the same exchange with the farmer.
Capital therefore presupposes wage-labour; wage-labour presupposes capital. They condition each other;
each brings the other into existence.
Does a worker in a cotton factory produce only cotton? No. He produces capital. He produces values
which serve anew to command his work and to create by means of it new values.
Capital can multiply itself only by exchanging itself for labour-power, by calling wage-labour into life.
The labour-power of the wage-labourer can exchange itself for capital only by increasing capital, by
strengthening that very power whose slave it is. Increase of capital, therefore, is increase of the
proletariat, i.e., of the working class.
And so, the bourgeoisie and its economists maintain that the interest of the capitalist and of the labourer
is the same. And in fact, so they are! The worker perishes if capital does not keep him busy. Capital
perishes if it does not exploit labour-power, which, in order to exploit, it must buy. The more quickly the
capital destined for production – the productive capital – increases, the more prosperous industry is, the
more the bourgeoisie enriches itself, the better business gets, so many more workers does the capitalist
need, so much the dearer does the worker sell himself. The fastest possible growth of productive capital
is, therefore, the indispensable condition for a tolerable life to the labourer.
But what is growth of productive capital? Growth of the power of accumulated labour over living
labour; growth of the rule of the bourgeoisie over the working class. When wage-labour produces the
alien wealth dominating it, the power hostile to it, capital, there flow back to it its means of employment
– i.e., its means of subsistence, under the condition that it again become a part of capital, that is become
again the lever whereby capital is to be forced into an accelerated expansive movement.
To say that the interests of capital and the interests of the workers are identical, signifies only this: that
capital and wage-labour are two sides of one and the same relation. The one conditions the other in the
same way that the usurer and the borrower condition each other.
As long as the wage-labourer remains a wage-labourer, his lot is dependent upon capital. That is what
the boasted community of interests between worker and capitalists amounts to.
If capital grows, the mass of wage-labour grows, the number of wage-workers increases; in a word, the
sway of capital extends over a greater mass of individuals.
Let us suppose the most favorable case: if productive capital grows, the demand for labour grows. It
therefore increases the price of labour-power, wages.
A house may be large or small; as long as the neighboring houses are likewise small, it satisfies all
social requirement for a residence. But let there arise next to the little house a palace, and the little house
shrinks to a hut. The little house now makes it clear that its inmate has no social position at all to
maintain, or but a very insignificant one; and however high it may shoot up in the course of civilization,
if the neighboring palace rises in equal or even in greater measure, the occupant of the relatively little
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house will always find himself more uncomfortable, more dissatisfied, more cramped within his four
walls.
An appreciable rise in wages presupposes a rapid growth of productive capital. Rapid growth of
productive capital calls forth just as rapid a growth of wealth, of luxury, of social needs and social
pleasures. Therefore, although the pleasures of the labourer have increased, the social gratification
which they afford has fallen in comparison with the increased pleasures of the capitalist, which are
inaccessible to the worker, in comparison with the stage of development of society in general. Our wants
and pleasures have their origin in society; we therefore measure them in relation to society; we do not
measure them in relation to the objects which serve for their gratification. Since they are of a social
nature, they are of a relative nature.
But wages are not at all determined merely by the sum of commodities for which they may be
exchanged. Other factors enter into the problem. What the workers directly receive for their labourpower is a certain sum of money. Are wages determined merely by this money price?
In the 16th century, the gold and silver circulation in Europe increased in consequence of the discovery
of richer and more easily worked mines in America. The value of gold and silver, therefore, fell in
relation to other commodities. The workers received the same amount of coined silver for their labourpower as before. The money price of their work remained the same, and yet their wages had fallen, for
in exchange for the same amount of silver they obtained a smaller amount of other commodities. This
was one of the circumstances which furthered the growth of capital, the rise of the bourgeoisie, in the
18th century.
Let us take another case. In the winter of 1847, in consequence of bad harvest, the most indispensable
means of subsistence – grains, meat, butter, cheese, etc. – rose greatly in price. Let us suppose that the
workers still received the same sum of money for their labour-power as before. Did not their wages fall?
To be sure. For the same money they received in exchange less bread, meat, etc. Their wages fell, not
because the value of silver was less, but because the value of the means of subsistence had increased.
Finally, let us suppose that the money price of labour-power remained the same, while all agricultural
and manufactured commodities had fallen in price because of the employment of new machines, of
favorable seasons, etc. For the same money the workers could now buy more commodities of all kinds.
Their wages have therefore risen, just because their money value has not changed.
The money price of labour-power, the nominal wages, do not therefore coincide with the actual or real
wages – i.e., with the amount of commodities which are actually given in exchange for the wages. If
then we speak of a rise or fall of wages, we have to keep in mind not only the money price of labourpower, the nominal wages, but also the real wages.
But neither the nominal wages – i.e., the amount of money for which the labourer sells himself to the
capitalist – nor the real wages – i.e., the amount of commodities which he can buy for this money –
exhausts the relations which are comprehended in the term wages.
Wages are determined above all by their relations to the gain, the profit, of the capitalist. In other words,
wages are a proportionate, relative quantity.
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Real wages express the price of labour-power in relation to the price of commodities; relative wages, on
the other hand, express the share of immediate labour in the value newly created by it, in relation to the
share of it which falls to accumulated labour, to capital.
Effect of Growth of Productive Capital on Wages
We thus see that, even if we keep ourselves within the relation of capital and wage-labour, the interests
of capitals and the interests of wage-labour are diametrically opposed to each other.
A rapid growth of capital is synonymous with a rapid growth of profits. Profits can grow rapidly only
when the price of labour – the relative wages – decrease just as rapidly. Relative wages may fall,
although real wages rise simultaneously with nominal wages, with the money value of labour, provided
only that the real wage does not rise in the same proportion as the profit. If, for instance, in good
business years wages rise 5 per cent, while profits rise 30 per cent, the proportional, the relative wage
has not increased, but decreased.
If, therefore, the income of the worker increased with the rapid growth of capital, there is at the same
time a widening of the social chasm that divides the worker from the capitalist, and increase in the
power of capital over labour, a greater dependence of labour upon capital.
To say that "the worker has an interest in the rapid growth of capital", means only this: that the more
speedily the worker augments the wealth of the capitalist, the larger will be the crumbs which fall to
him, the greater will be the number of workers than can be called into existence, the more can the mass
of slaves dependent upon capital be increased.
We have thus seen that even the most favorable situation for the working class, namely, the most rapid
growth of capital, however much it may improve the material life of the worker, does not abolish the
antagonism between his interests and the interests of the capitalist. Profit and wages remain as before, in
inverse proportion.
If capital grows rapidly, wages may rise, but the profit of capital rises disproportionately faster. The
material position of the worker has improved, but at the cost of his social position. The social chasm that
separates him from the capitalist has widened.
Finally, to say that "the most favorable condition for wage-labour is the fastest possible growth of
productive capital", is the same as to say: the quicker the working class multiplies and augments the
power inimical to it – the wealth of another which lords over that class – the more favorable will be the
conditions under which it will be permitted to toil anew at the multiplication of bourgeois wealth, at the
enlargement of the power of capital, content thus to forge for itself the golden chains by which the
bourgeoisie drags it in its train.
Growth of productive capital and rise of wages, are they really so indissolubly united as the bourgeois
economists maintain? We must not believe their mere words. We dare not believe them even when they
claim that the fatter capital is the more will its slave be pampered. The bourgeoisie is too much
enlightened, it keeps its accounts much too carefully, to share the prejudices of the feudal lord, who
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makes an ostentatious display of the magnificence of his retinue. The conditions of existence of the
bourgeoisie compel it to attend carefully to its bookkeeping. We must therefore examine more closely
into the following question:
In what manner does the growth of productive capital affect wages?
If as a whole, the productive capital of bourgeois society grows, there takes place a more many-sided
accumulation of labour. The individual capitals increase in number and in magnitude. The
multiplications of individual capitals increases the competition among capitalists. The increasing
magnitude of increasing capitals provides the means of leading more powerful armies of workers with
more gigantic instruments of war upon the industrial battlefield.
The one capitalist can drive the other from the field and carry off his capital only by selling more
cheaply. In order to sell more cheaply without ruining himself, he must produce more cheaply – i.e.,
increase the productive forces of labour as much as possible.
But the productive forces of labour is increased above all by a greater division of labour and by a more
general introduction and constant improvement of machinery. The larger the army of workers among
whom the labour is subdivided, the more gigantic the scale upon which machinery is introduced, the
more in proportion does the cost of production decrease, the more fruitful is the labour. And so there
arises among the capitalists a universal rivalry for the increase of the division of labour and of
machinery and for their exploitation upon the greatest possible scale.
If, now, by a greater division of labour, by the application and improvement of new machines, by a more
advantageous exploitation of the forces of nature on a larger scale, a capitalist has found the means of
producing with the same amount of labour (whether it be direct or accumulated labour) a larger amount
of products of commodities than his competitors – if, for instance, he can produce a whole yard of linen
in the same labour-time in which his competitors weave half-a-yard – how will this capitalist act?
He could keep on selling half-a-yard of linen at old market price; but this would not have the effect of
driving his opponents from the field and enlarging his own market. But his need of a market has
increased in the same measure in which his productive power has extended. The more powerful and
costly means of production that he has called into existence enable him, it is true, to sell his wares more
cheaply, but they compel him at the same time to sell more wares, to get control of a very much greater
market for his commodities; consequently, this capitalist will sell his half-yard of linen more cheaply
than his competitors.
But the capitalist will not sell the whole yard so cheaply as his competitors sell the half-yard, although
the production of the whole yard costs him no more than does that of the half-yard to the others.
Otherwise, he would make no extra profit, and would get back in exchange only the cost of production.
He might obtain a greater income from having set in motion a larger capital, but not from having made a
greater profit on his capital than the others. Moreover, he attains the object he is aiming at if he prices
his goods only a small percentage lower than his competitors. He drives them off the field, he wrests
from them at least part of their market, by underselling them.
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And finally, let us remember that the current price always stands either above or below the cost of
production, according as the sale of a commodity takes place in the favorable or unfavorable period of
the industry. According as the market price of the yard of linen stands above or below its former cost of
production, will the percentage vary at which the capitalist who has made use of the new and more
faithful means of production sell above his real cost of production.
But the privilege of our capitalist is not of long duration. Other competing capitalists introduce the same
machines, the same division of labour, and introduce them upon the same or even upon a greater scale.
And finally this introduction becomes so universal that the price of the linen is lowered not only below
its old, but even below its new cost of production.
The capitalists therefore find themselves, in their mutual relations, in the same situation in which they
were before the introduction of the new means of production; and if they are by these means enabled to
offer double the product at the old price, they are now forced to furnish double the product for less than
the old price. Having arrived at the new point, the new cost of production, the battle for supremacy in
the market has to be fought out anew. Given more division of labour and more machinery, and there
results a greater scale upon which division of labour and machinery are exploited. And competition
again brings the same reaction against this result.
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Manifesto of the Communist Party
Karl Marx and

ie i

Engels

“The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.” – Marx and Engels

NOTES ON SOURCES: This is an excerpted selection of Marx and Engels most famous and infamous
work. It is available at the Marxist.org archive.1 Originally it was published as a pamphlet, but
translations were made, and it was published all over Europe.
Introduction: What to Look For
In some ways the Manifesto is one of the easiest works by Marx to read. It covers many of his key ideas
and is written for a public audience. However, it is also written as a “call to arms” and a persuasive
essay and lacks some of the complex analysis that is evident it is late multi-volume work On Capital.
Still, it functions as an effective introduction to several key ideas within conflict theory, most notably the
idea that conflict between groups is a means for the evolution of history. Read the selections below with
a special interest on (a) the theory of class struggle; and (b) communist social policies.
A spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of communism. All the powers of old Europe have entered a
holy alliance to exorcise this spectre: Pope and Tsar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and
German police-spies.
Where is the party in opposition that has not been decried as communistic by its opponents in power?
Where is the opposition that has not hurled back the branding reproach of communism, against the more
advanced opposition parties, as well as against its reactionary adversaries?
Two things result from this fact:
I. Communism is already acknowledged by all European powers to be itself a power.
II. It is high time that Communists should openly, in the face of the whole world, publish their
views, their aims, their tendencies, and meet this nursery tale of the Spectre of Communism with
a manifesto of the party itself.
To this end, Communists of various nationalities have assembled in London and sketched the following
manifesto, to be published in the English, French, German, Italian, Flemish and Danish languages.
Bourgeois and Proletarians
The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.
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Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master‡ and journeyman, in a word,
oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now
hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at
large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.
In the earlier epochs of history, we find almost everywhere a complicated arrangement of society into
various orders, a manifold gradation of social rank. In ancient Rome we have patricians, knights,
plebeians, slaves; in the Middle Ages, feudal lords, vassals, guild-masters, journeymen, apprentices,
serfs; in almost all of these classes, again, subordinate gradations.
The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society has not done away with
class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of
struggle in place of the old ones.
Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinct feature: it has simplified class
antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two
great classes directly facing each other – Bourgeoisie and Proletariat.
From the serfs of the Middle Ages sprang the chartered burghers of the earliest towns. From these
burgesses the first elements of the bourgeoisie were developed.
The discovery of America, the rounding of the Cape, opened up fresh ground for the rising bourgeoisie.
The East-Indian and Chinese markets, the colonisation of America, trade with the colonies, the increase
in the means of exchange and in commodities generally, gave to commerce, to navigation, to industry,
an impulse never before known, and thereby, to the revolutionary element in the tottering feudal society,
a rapid development.
The feudal system of industry, in which industrial production was monopolised by closed guilds, now no
longer sufficed for the growing wants of the new markets. The manufacturing system took its place. The
guild-masters were pushed on one side by the manufacturing middle class; division of labour between
the different corporate guilds vanished in the face of division of labour in each single workshop.
Meantime the markets kept ever growing, the demand ever rising. Even manufacturer no longer
sufficed. Thereupon, steam and machinery revolutionised industrial production. The place of
manufacture was taken by the giant, Modern Industry; the place of the industrial middle class by
industrial millionaires, the leaders of the whole industrial armies, the modern bourgeois.
Modern industry has established the world market, for which the discovery of America paved the way.
This market has given an immense development to commerce, to navigation, to communication by land.
This development has, in its turn, reacted on the extension of industry; and in proportion as industry,
commerce, navigation, railways extended, in the same proportion the bourgeoisie developed, increased
its capital, and pushed into the background every class handed down from the Middle Ages.
We see, therefore, how the modern bourgeoisie is itself the product of a long course of development, of
a series of revolutions in the modes of production and of exchange.
Each step in the development of the bourgeoisie was accompanied by a corresponding political advance
of that class. An oppressed class under the sway of the feudal nobility, an armed and self-governing
association in the medieval commune*: here independent urban republic (as in Italy and Germany);
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there taxable “third estate” of the monarchy (as in France); afterwards, in the period of manufacturing
proper, serving either the semi-feudal or the absolute monarchy as a counterpoise against the nobility,
and, in fact, cornerstone of the great monarchies in general, the bourgeoisie has at last, since the
establishment of Modern Industry and of the world market, conquered for itself, in the modern
representative State, exclusive political sway. The executive of the modern state is but a committee for
managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.
The bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revolutionary part.
The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic
relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his “natural superiors”
and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous “cash
payment”. It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of
philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into
exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single,
unconscionable freedom – Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political
illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.
The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honoured and looked up to with
reverent awe. It has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its
paid wage labourers. The bourgeoisie has torn away from the family its sentimental veil and has reduced
the family relation to a mere money relation.
The bourgeoisie has disclosed how it came to pass that the brutal display of vigour in the Middle Ages,
which reactionaries so much admire, found its fitting complement in the most slothful indolence. It has
been the first to show what man’s activity can bring about. It has accomplished wonders far surpassing
Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals; it has conducted expeditions that put in
the shade all former Exoduses of nations and crusades.
The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and
thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old
modes of production in unaltered form, was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all
earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social
conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguishes the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones.
All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are
swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into
air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions
of life, and his relations with his kind.
The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire surface
of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere.
The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to
production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of Reactionists, it has drawn from
under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national industries
have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose
introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilised nations, by industries that no longer work
up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products
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are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by
the production of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant
lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have
intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in
intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property.
National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the
numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature.
The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely
facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilisation. The
cheap prices of commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with
which it forces the barbarians’ intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all
nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce
what it calls civilisation into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a
world after its own image.
The bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the rule of the towns. It has created enormous cities, has
greatly increased the urban population as compared with the rural, and has thus rescued a considerable
part of the population from the idiocy of rural life. Just as it has made the country dependent on the
towns, so it has made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on the civilised ones, nations of
peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West.
The bourgeoisie keeps more and more doing away with the scattered state of the population, of the
means of production, and of property. It has agglomerated population, centralised the means of
production, and has concentrated property in a few hands. The necessary consequence of this was
political centralisation. Independent, or but loosely connected provinces, with separate interests, laws,
governments, and systems of taxation, became lumped together into one nation, with one government,
one code of laws, one national class-interest, one frontier, and one customs-tariff.
The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more
colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of Nature’s forces to
man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways,
electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalisation of rivers, whole populations
conjured out of the ground – what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces
slumbered in the lap of social labour?
We see then: the means of production and of exchange, on whose foundation the bourgeoisie built itself
up, were generated in feudal society. At a certain stage in the development of these means of production
and of exchange, the conditions under which feudal society produced and exchanged, the feudal
organisation of agriculture and manufacturing industry, in one word, the feudal relations of property
became no longer compatible with the already developed productive forces; they became so many
fetters. They had to be burst asunder; they were burst asunder.
Into their place stepped free competition, accompanied by a social and political constitution adapted in
it, and the economic and political sway of the bourgeois class.
A similar movement is going on before our own eyes. Modern bourgeois society, with its relations of
production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of
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production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether
world whom he has called up by his spells. For many a decade past the history of industry and
commerce is but the history of the revolt of modern productive forces against modern conditions of
production, against the property relations that are the conditions for the existence of the bourgeois and of
its rule. It is enough to mention the commercial crises that by their periodical return put the existence of
the entire bourgeois society on its trial, each time more threateningly. In these crises, a great part not
only of the existing products, but also of the previously created productive forces, are periodically
destroyed. In these crises, there breaks out an epidemic that, in all earlier epochs, would have seemed an
absurdity – the epidemic of over-production. Society suddenly finds itself put back into a state of
momentary barbarism; it appears as if a famine, a universal war of devastation, had cut off the supply of
every means of subsistence; industry and commerce seem to be destroyed; and why? Because there is
too much civilisation, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce. The
productive forces at the disposal of society no longer tend to further the development of the conditions
of bourgeois property; on the contrary, they have become too powerful for these conditions, by which
they are fettered, and so soon as they overcome these fetters, they bring disorder into the whole of
bourgeois society, endanger the existence of bourgeois property. The conditions of bourgeois society are
too narrow to comprise the wealth created by them. And how does the bourgeoisie get over these crises?
On the one hand by enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of
new markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of the old ones. That is to say, by paving the way
for more extensive and more destructive crises, and by diminishing the means whereby crises are
prevented.
The weapons with which the bourgeoisie felled feudalism to the ground are now turned against the
bourgeoisie itself.
But not only has the bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself; it has also called into
existence the men who are to wield those weapons – the modern working class – the proletarians.
In proportion as the bourgeoisie, i.e., capital, is developed, in the same proportion is the proletariat, the
modern working class, developed – a class of labourers, who live only so long as they find work, and
who find work only so long as their labour increases capital. These labourers, who must sell themselves
piecemeal, are a commodity, like every other article of commerce, and are consequently exposed to all
the vicissitudes of competition, to all the fluctuations of the market.
Owing to the extensive use of machinery, and to the division of labour, the work of the proletarians has
lost all individual character, and, consequently, all charm for the workman. He becomes an appendage
of the machine, and it is only the simplest, most monotonous, and most easily acquired knack, that is
required of him. Hence, the cost of production of a workman is restricted, almost entirely, to the means
of subsistence that he requires for maintenance, and for the propagation of his race. But the price of a
commodity, and therefore also of labour, is equal to its cost of production. In proportion, therefore, as
the repulsiveness of the work increases, the wage decreases. Nay more, in proportion as the use of
machinery and division of labour increases, in the same proportion the burden of toil also increases,
whether by prolongation of the working hours, by the increase of the work exacted in each time or by
increased speed of machinery, etc.
Modern Industry has converted the little workshop of the patriarchal master into the great factory of the
industrial capitalist. Masses of labourers, crowded into the factory, are organised like soldiers. As
privates of the industrial army, they are placed under the command of a perfect hierarchy of officers and
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sergeants. Not only are they slaves of the bourgeois class, and of the bourgeois State; they are daily and
hourly enslaved by the machine, by the overlooker, and, above all, by the individual bourgeois
manufacturer himself. The more openly this despotism proclaims gain to be its end and aim, the pettier,
the more hateful and the more embittering it is.
The less the skill and exertion of strength implied in manual labour, in other words, the more modern
industry becomes developed, the more is the labour of men superseded by that of women. Differences of
age and sex have no longer any distinctive social validity for the working class. All are instruments of
labour, more or less expensive to use, according to their age and sex.
No sooner is the exploitation of the labourer by the manufacturer, so far, at an end, that he receives his
wages in cash, then he is set upon by the other portions of the bourgeoisie, the landlord, the shopkeeper,
the pawnbroker, etc.
The lower strata of the middle class – the small tradespeople, shopkeepers, and retired tradesmen
generally, the handicraftsmen and peasants – all these sinks gradually into the proletariat, partly because
their diminutive capital does not suffice for the scale on which Modern Industry is carried on and is
swamped in the competition with the large capitalists, partly because their specialised skill is rendered
worthless by new methods of production. Thus, the proletariat is recruited from all classes of the
population.
The proletariat goes through various stages of development. With its birth begins its struggle with the
bourgeoisie. At first the contest is carried on by individual labourers, then by the workpeople of a
factory, then by the operative of one trade, in one locality, against the individual bourgeois who directly
exploits them. They direct their attacks not against the bourgeois conditions of production, but against
the instruments of production themselves; they destroy imported wares that compete with their labour,
they smash to pieces machinery, they set factories ablaze, they seek to restore by force the vanished
status of the workman of the Middle Ages.
At this stage, the labourers still form an incoherent mass scattered over the whole country and broken up
by their mutual competition. If anywhere they unite to form more compact bodies, this is not yet the
consequence of their own active union, but of the union of the bourgeoisie, which class, in order to
attain its own political ends, is compelled to set the whole proletariat in motion, and is moreover yet, for
a time, able to do so. At this stage, therefore, the proletarians do not fight their enemies, but the enemies
of their enemies, the remnants of absolute monarchy, the landowners, the non-industrial bourgeois, the
petty bourgeois. Thus, the whole historical movement is concentrated in the hands of the bourgeoisie;
every victory so obtained is a victory for the bourgeoisie.
But with the development of industry, the proletariat not only increases in number; it becomes
concentrated in greater masses, its strength grows, and it feels that strength more. The various interests
and conditions of life within the ranks of the proletariat are more and more equalised, in proportion as
machinery obliterates all distinctions of labour, and nearly everywhere reduces wages to the same low
level. The growing competition among the bourgeois, and the resulting commercial crises, make the
wages of the workers ever more fluctuating. The increasing improvement of machinery, ever more
rapidly developing, makes their livelihood more and more precarious; the collisions between individual
workmen and individual bourgeois take more and more the character of collisions between two classes.
Thereupon, the workers begin to form combinations (Trades’ Unions) against the bourgeois; they club
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together to keep up the rate of wages; they found permanent associations in order to make provision
beforehand for these occasional revolts. Here and there, the contest breaks out into riots.
Now and then the workers are victorious, but only for a time. The real fruit of their battles lies, not in the
immediate result, but in the ever-expanding union of the workers. This union is helped on by the
improved means of communication that are created by modern industry, and that place the workers of
different localities in contact with one another. It was just this contact that was needed to centralise the
numerous local struggles, all the same character, into one national struggle between classes. But every
class struggle is a political struggle. And that union, to attain which the burghers of the Middle Ages,
with their miserable highways, required centuries, the modern proletarian, thanks to railways, achieve in
a few years.
This organisation of the proletarians into a class, and, consequently into a political party, is continually
being upset again by the competition between the workers themselves. But it ever rises again, stronger,
firmer, mightier. It compels legislative recognition of interests of the workers, by taking advantage of
the divisions among the bourgeoisie itself. Thus, the ten-hours’ bill in England was carried.
Altogether collisions between the classes of the old society further, in many ways, the course of
development of the proletariat. The bourgeoisie finds itself involved in a constant battle. At first with the
aristocracy, later on, with those portions of the bourgeoisie itself, whose interests have become
antagonistic to the progress of industry; at all time with the bourgeoisie of foreign countries. In all these
battles, it sees itself compelled to appeal to the proletariat, to ask for help, and thus, to drag it into the
political arena. The bourgeoisie itself, therefore, supplies the proletariat with its own elements of
political and general education, in other words, it furnishes the proletariat with weapons for fighting the
bourgeoisie.
Further, as we have already seen, entire sections of the ruling class are, by the advance of industry,
precipitated into the proletariat, or are at least threatened in their conditions of existence. These also
supply the proletariat with fresh elements of enlightenment and progress.
Finally, in times when the class struggle nears the decisive hour, the progress of dissolution going on
within the ruling class, in fact within the whole range of old society, assumes such a violent, glaring
character, that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary class, the
class that holds the future in its hands. Just as, therefore, at an earlier period, a section of the nobility
went over to the bourgeoisie, so now a portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, and in
particular, a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have raised themselves to the level of
comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole.
Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really
revolutionary class. The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of Modern Industry; the
proletariat is its special and essential product.
…In the condition of the proletariat, those of old society at large are already virtually swamped. The
proletarian is without property; his relation to his wife and children has no longer anything in common
with the bourgeois family relations; modern industry labour, modern subjection to capital, the same in
England as in France, in America as in Germany, has stripped him of every trace of national character.
Law, morality, religion, are to him so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as
many bourgeois interests.
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All the preceding classes that got the upper hand sought to fortify their already acquired status by
subjecting society at large to their conditions of appropriation. The proletarians cannot become masters
of the productive forces of society, except by abolishing their own previous mode of appropriation, and
thereby also every other previous mode of appropriation. They have nothing of their own to secure and
to fortify; their mission is to destroy all previous securities for, and insurances of, individual property.
All previous historical movements were movements of minorities, or in the interest of minorities. The
proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the
interest of the immense majority. The proletariat, the lowest stratum of our present society, cannot stir,
cannot raise itself up, without the whole superincumbent strata of official society being sprung into the
air.
Though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a
national struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own
bourgeoisie.
In depicting the most general phases of the development of the proletariat, we traced the more or less
veiled civil war, raging within existing society, up to the point where that war breaks out into open
revolution, and where the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie lays the foundation for the sway of the
proletariat.
Hitherto, every form of society has been based, as we have already seen, on the antagonism of
oppressing and oppressed classes. But in order to oppress a class, certain conditions must be assured to it
under which it can, at least, continue its slavish existence. The serf, in the period of serfdom, raised
himself to membership in the commune, just as the petty bourgeois, under the yoke of the feudal
absolutism, managed to develop into a bourgeois. The modern labourer, on the contrary, instead of
rising with the process of industry, sinks deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of his own
class. He becomes a pauper, and pauperism develops more rapidly than population and wealth. And here
it becomes evident, that the bourgeoisie is unfit any longer to be the ruling class in society, and to
impose its conditions of existence upon society as an over-riding law. It is unfit to rule because it is
incompetent to assure an existence to its slave within his slavery, because it cannot help letting him sink
into such a state, that it has to feed him, instead of being fed by him. Society can no longer live under
this bourgeoisie, in other words, its existence is no longer compatible with society.
The essential conditions for the existence and for the sway of the bourgeois class is the formation and
augmentation of capital; the condition for capital is wage-labour. Wage-labour rests exclusively on
competition between the labourers. The advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the
bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the labourers, due to competition, by the revolutionary
combination, due to association. The development of Modern Industry, therefore, cuts from under its
feet the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the
bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the
proletariat are equally inevitable.
Proletarians and Communists
…..You are horrified at our intending to do away with private property. But in your existing society,
private property is already done away with for nine-tenths of the population; its existence for the few is
solely due to its non-existence in the hands of those nine-tenths. You reproach us, therefore, with
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intending to do away with a form of property, the necessary condition for whose existence is the nonexistence of any property for the immense majority of society.
In one word, you reproach us with intending to do away with your property. Precisely so; that is just
what we intend.
From the moment when labour can no longer be converted into capital, money, or rent, into a social
power capable of being monopolised, i.e., from the moment when individual property can no longer be
transformed into bourgeois property, into capital, from that moment, you say, individuality vanishes.
You must, therefore, confess that by “individual” you mean no other person than the bourgeois, than the
middle-class owner of property. This person must, indeed, be swept out of the way, and made
impossible.
Communism deprives no man of the power to appropriate the products of society; all that it does is to
deprive him of the power to subjugate the labour of others by means of such appropriations.
It has been objected that upon the abolition of private property, all work will cease, and universal
laziness will overtake us.
According to this, bourgeois society ought long ago to have gone to the dogs through sheer idleness; for
those of its members who work, acquire nothing, and those who acquire anything do not work. The
whole of this objection is but another expression of the tautology: that there can no longer be any wagelabour when there is no longer any capital.
All objections urged against the Communistic mode of producing and appropriating material products,
have, in the same way, been urged against the Communistic mode of producing and appropriating
intellectual products. Just as, to the bourgeois, the disappearance of class property is the disappearance
of production itself, so the disappearance of class culture is to him identical with the disappearance of all
culture.
That culture, the loss of which he laments, is, for the enormous majority, a mere training to act as a
machine.
But don’t wrangle with us so long as you apply, to our intended abolition of bourgeois property, the
standard of your bourgeois notions of freedom, culture, law, &c. Your very ideas are but the outgrowth
of the conditions of your bourgeois production and bourgeois property, just as your jurisprudence is but
the will of your class made into a law for all, a will whose essential character and direction are
determined by the economical conditions of existence of your class.
The selfish misconception that induces you to transform into eternal laws of nature and of reason, the
social forms springing from your present mode of production and form of property – historical relations
that rise and disappear in the progress of production – this misconception you share with every ruling
class that has preceded you. What you see clearly in the case of ancient property, what you admit in the
case of feudal property, you are of course forbidden to admit in the case of your own bourgeois form of
property.
Abolition [of the family! Even the most radical flare up at this infamous proposal of the Communists.
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On what foundation is the present family, the bourgeois family, based? On capital, on private gain. In its
completely developed form, this family exists only among the bourgeoisie. But this state of things finds
its complement in the practical absence of the family among the proletarians, and in public prostitution.
The bourgeois family will vanish as a matter of course when its complement vanishes, and both will
vanish with the vanishing of capital.
Do you charge us with wanting to stop the exploitation of children by their parents? To this crime we
plead guilty.
But, you say, we destroy the most hallowed of relations, when we replace home education by social.
And your education! Is not that also social, and determined by the social conditions under which you
educate, by the intervention direct or indirect, of society, by means of schools, &c.? The Communists
have not invented the intervention of society in education; they do but seek to alter the character of that
intervention, and to rescue education from the influence of the ruling class.
The bourgeois clap-trap about the family and education, about the hallowed co-relation of parents and
child, becomes all the more disgusting, the more, by the action of Modern Industry, all the family ties
among the proletarians are torn asunder, and their children transformed into simple articles of commerce
and instruments of labour.
But you Communists would introduce community of women, screams the bourgeoisie in chorus.
The bourgeois sees his wife a mere instrument of production. He hears that the instruments of
production are to be exploited in common, and, naturally, can come to no other conclusion that the lot of
being common to all will likewise fall to the women.
He has not even a suspicion that the real point aimed at is to do away with the status of women as mere
instruments of production.
For the rest, nothing is more ridiculous than the virtuous indignation of our bourgeois at the community
of women which, they pretend, is to be openly and officially established by the Communists. The
Communists have no need to introduce community of women; it has existed almost from time
immemorial.
Our bourgeois, not content with having wives and daughters of their proletarians at their disposal, not to
speak of common prostitutes, take the greatest pleasure in seducing each other’s wives.
Bourgeois marriage is, in reality, a system of wives in common and thus, at the most, what the
Communists might possibly be reproached with is that they desire to introduce, in substitution for a
hypocritically concealed, an openly legalised community of women. For the rest, it is self-evident that
the abolition of the present system of production must bring with it the abolition of the community of
women springing from that system, i.e., of prostitution both public and private.
The Communists are further reproached with desiring to abolish countries and nationality.
The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the
proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation,
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must constitute itself the nation, it is so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the
word.
National differences and antagonism between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the
development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the
mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.
The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. United action, of the leading
civilised countries at least, is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat.
In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another will also be put an end to, the exploitation
of one nation by another will also be put an end to. In proportion as the antagonism between classes
within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end.
The charges against Communism made from a religious, a philosophical and, generally, from an
ideological standpoint, are not deserving of serious examination.
Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that man’s ideas, views, and conception, in one word,
man’s consciousness, changes with every change in the conditions of his material existence, in his social
relations and in his social life?
What else does the history of ideas prove, than that intellectual production changes its character in
proportion as material production is changed? The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of
its ruling class.
When people speak of the ideas that revolutionise society, they do but express that fact that within the
old society the elements of a new one have been created, and that the dissolution of the old ideas keeps
even pace with the dissolution of the old conditions of existence.
When the ancient world was in its last throes, the ancient religions were overcome by Christianity.
When Christian ideas succumbed in the 18th century to rationalist ideas, feudal society fought its death
battle with the then revolutionary bourgeoisie. The ideas of religious liberty and freedom of conscience
merely gave expression to the sway of free competition within the domain of knowledge.
“Undoubtedly,” it will be said, “religious, moral, philosophical, and juridical ideas have been modified
in the course of historical development. But religion, morality, philosophy, political science, and law,
constantly survived this change.”
“There are, besides, eternal truths, such as Freedom, Justice, etc., that are common to all states of
society. But Communism abolishes eternal truths, it abolishes all religion, and all morality, instead of
constituting them on a new basis; it therefore acts in contradiction to all past historical experience.”
What does this accusation reduce itself to? The history of all past society has consisted in the
development of class antagonisms, antagonisms that assumed different forms at different epochs.
But whatever form they may have taken, one fact is common to all past ages, viz., the exploitation of
one part of society by the other. No wonder, then, that the social consciousness of past ages, despite all
the multiplicity and variety it displays, moves within certain common forms, or general ideas, which
cannot completely vanish except with the total disappearance of class antagonisms.
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The Communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations; no wonder that
its development involved the most radical rupture with traditional ideas.
But let us have done with the bourgeois objections to Communism.
We have seen above, that the first step in the revolution by the working class is to raise the proletariat to
the position of ruling class to win the battle of democracy.
The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degree, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to
centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat organised as the
ruling class; and to increase the total productive forces as rapidly as possible.
Of course, in the beginning, this cannot be effected except by means of despotic inroads on the rights of
property, and on the conditions of bourgeois production; by means of measures, therefore, which appear
economically insufficient and untenable, but which, in the course of the movement, outstrip themselves,
necessitate further inroads upon the old social order, and are unavoidable as a means of entirely
revolutionising the mode of production.
These measures will, of course, be different in different countries.
Nevertheless, in most advanced countries, the following will be pretty generally applicable.
1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes.
2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax.
3. Abolition of all rights of inheritance.
4. Confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels.
5. Centralisation of credit in the hands of the state, by means of a national bank with State capital
and an exclusive monopoly.
6. Centralisation of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the State.
7. Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the State; the bringing into
cultivation of waste-lands, and the improvement of the soil generally in accordance with a
common plan.
8. Equal liability of all to work. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture.
9. Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual abolition of all the
distinction between town and country by a more equable distribution of the populace over the
country.
10. Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of children’s factory labour in its
present form. Combination of education with industrial production, &c, &c.
When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been
concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its
political character. Political power, properly so called, is merely the organised power of one class for
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oppressing another. If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of
circumstances, to organise itself as a class, if, by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class,
and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these
conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes
generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class.
In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an
association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.
Position of the Communists in Relation to the Various Existing Opposition Parties
….The Communists fight for the attainment of the immediate aims, for the enforcement of the
momentary interests of the working class; but in the movement of the present, they also represent and
take care of the future of that movement. In France, the Communists ally with the Social-Democrats*
against the conservative and radical bourgeoisie, reserving, however, the right to take up a critical
position in regard to phases and illusions traditionally handed down from the great Revolution.
In Switzerland, they support the Radicals, without losing sight of the fact that this party consists of
antagonistic elements, partly of Democratic Socialists, in the French sense, partly of radical bourgeois.
In Poland, they support the party that insists on an agrarian revolution as the prime condition for national
emancipation, that party which fomented the insurrection of Cracow in 1846.
In Germany, they fight with the bourgeoisie whenever it acts in a revolutionary way, against the absolute
monarchy, the feudal squirearchy, and the petty bourgeoisie.
But they never cease, for a single instant, to instil into the working class the clearest possible recognition
of the hostile antagonism between bourgeoisie and proletariat, in order that the German workers may
straightway use, as so many weapons against the bourgeoisie, the social and political conditions that the
bourgeoisie must necessarily introduce along with its supremacy, and in order that, after the fall of the
reactionary classes in Germany, the fight against the bourgeoisie itself may immediately begin.
The Communists turn their attention chiefly to Germany, because that country is on the eve of a
bourgeois revolution that is bound to be carried out under more advanced conditions of European
civilisation and with a much more developed proletariat than that of England was in the seventeenth, and
France in the eighteenth century, and because the bourgeois revolution in Germany will be but the
prelude to an immediately following proletarian revolution.
In short, the Communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the existing social
and political order of things.
In all these movements, they bring to the front, as the leading question in each, the property question, no
matter what its degree of development at the time.
Finally, they labour everywhere for the union and agreement of the democratic parties of all countries.
The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be
attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at
a Communistic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to
win. Working Men of All Countries, Unite!
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Women and Economics
Charlotte Perkins Gilman
“When the mother of the race is free, we shall have a better world.” - Gilman
NOTE ON SOURCE: This passage is from Gilman’s book, Women and Economics: A Study of the
Relation between Men and Women as a Factor in Social Evolution, published in 1898. Included here are
excerpts from the first and last chapters.
Introduction – What to Look For
Charlotte Perkins Gilman is known for her critical views on the economic dependence of women. Her
position was an unusual one at the time, linked as it was to a conception of the influence of social forces
on what seemed like individual situations (e.g., marriage). Rather than argue that women should have
the vote, Gilman argued that the gendered division of labor produced warped human beings (male and
female). It is impossible to read her without also recognizing that she wrote within a current of
eugenicist thinking, common to the period. Late nineteenth-century Reform Darwinism sought racial
improvements through improved social arrangements and, at its most pernicious, better breeding (e.g.,
mate selection). In the passages included here Gilman uses “race” to mean both “the human race” and,
sometimes, to hint at racial distinctions among humans. When reading, it may be useful to keep this
mind, and to consider the historical connections between sociology, progressive reform, and
evolutionary theory.1
Preface
This book is written to offer a simple and natural explanation of one of the most common and most
perplexing problems of human life – a problem which presents itself to almost every individual for
practical solution, and which demands the most serious attention of the moralist, the physician, and the
sociologist.
To show how some of the worst evils under which we suffer, evils long supposed to be inherent and
ineradicable in our natures, are but the result of certain arbitrary conditions of our own adoption, and
how, by removing those conditions, we may remove the evils resultant…. It is hoped that the theory
advanced will prove sufficiently suggestive to give rise to such further study and discussion as shall
prove its error or establish its truth.
Chapter I.
Since we have learned to study the development of human life as we study the evolution of species
throughout the animal kingdom, some peculiar phenomena which have puzzled the philosopher and
moralist for so long, begin to show themselves in a new light. We begin to see that, so far from being
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inscrutable problems, these sorrows and perplexities of our lives are but the natural results of natural
causes, and that, as soon as we ascertain the causes, we can do much to remove them.
In spite of the power of the individual will to struggle against conditions, to resist them for a while, and
sometimes to overcome them, it remains true that the human creature is affected by his environment, as
is every other living thing.
Without touching yet upon the influence of social factors, treating the human being merely as an
individual animal, we see that we are modified most by our economic conditions, as is every other
animal. The sheep, the cow, the deer, differ in their adaptation to the weather, their locomotive ability,
their means of defense; but they agree in main characteristics, because of their common method of
nutrition.
The human animal is no exception to this rule. Climate affects us, weather affects us, enemies affect us;
but most of all we are affected, like every other living creature, by what we do for a living.
In view of these facts, attention is now called to a certain marked and peculiar economic condition
affecting humans, and unparalleled in the organic world. We are the only animal species in which the
female depends on the male for food, the only animal species in which the sex-relations is also an
economic relation. With us an entire sex lives in a relation of economic dependence upon the other sex,
and the economic relation is combined with the sex-relation. The economic status of the human female
is relative to the sex-relation.
It is commonly assumed that this condition also obtains among other animals, but such is not the case.
In the human species the condition is permanent and general, though there are exceptions, and the
present century is witnessing the beginnings of a great change in this respect.
In studying the economic position of the sexes collectively, the difference is most marked. As a social
animal, the economic status of man rests on the combined and exchanged services of vast numbers of
progressively specialized individuals. The economic progress of the race, its maintenance at any period,
its continued advanced, involve the collective activities of all the trades, crafts, arts, manufactures,
inventions, discoveries, and all the civil and military institutions that go to maintain them. The economic
status of any race at any time, with its involved effect on all the constituent individuals, depends on their
world-wide labors and their free exchange. Economic progress, however, is almost exclusively
masculine. Such economic processes as women have been allowed to exercise are of the earliest and
most primitive kind. Were men to perform no economic services save such as are still performed by
women, our racial status in economics would be reduced to most painful limitations.
To take from any community its male workers would paralyze it economically to a far greater degree
than to remove its female workers. Men can cook, clean, and sew as well as women; but the making and
managing of the great engines of modern industry, the threading of earth and sea in our vast systems of
transportation, the handling of our elaborate machinery of trade, commerce, government – these things
could not be done so well by women in their present degree of economic development.
This is not owing to lack of the essential human faculties necessary to such achievements, nor to any
inherent disability of sex, but to the present condition of women, forbidding the development of this
degree of economic ability. The male human being is thousands of years in advance of the female in
economic status. Speaking collectively, men produce and distribute wealth; and women receive it at
their heads.
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The economic status of the human race in any nation, at any time, is governed mainly by the activities of
the male: the female obtains her share in the racial advances only through him.
Women consume economic good. What economic product do they give in exchange for what they
consume? In what way does she earn from her husband the food, clothing, and shelter she receives at his
hands? By house service, it will be instantly replied. Although not producers of wealth, women serve in
the final processes of preparation and distribution. Their labor in the household has a genuine economic
value.
For a certain percentage of persons to serve other persons, in order that the ones so served may produce
more, is a contribution not to be overlooked. The labor of women in the house, certainly, enables men to
produce more wealth than they otherwise could; and in this way women are economic factors in society.
But so are horses. The labor of horses enables men to produce more wealth than they otherwise could.
The horse is an economic factor in society. But the horse is not economically independent, nor is the
woman.
The labor which the wife performs in the household is given as part of her functional duty, not as
employment. To take this ground and hold it honestly, wives, as earners through domestic service, are
entitled to the wages of cooks, housemaids, nursemaids, seamstresses, or housekeepers, and to no more.
This would of course reduce the spending money of the wives of the rich, and put it out of the power of
the poor man to ‘support’ a wife at all. Nowhere on earth would there be “a rich woman” by these
means. Even the highest class of private housekeeper, useful as her services are, does not accumulate a
fortune.
But the salient fact in this discussion is that, whatever the economic value of the domestic industry of
women is, they do not get it. The women who do the most work get the least money, and the women
who have the most money do the least work.
Without going into either the ethics or the necessities of the case, we have reached so much common
ground: the female of the human species is supported by the male. Whereas, in other species of animals,
male and female alike graze and browse, hunt and kill, climb, swim, dig, run, and fly for their livings, in
our species the female does not seek her own living in the specific activities of our race, but is fed by the
male.
Now to the alleged necessity. Because of her maternal duties, the human female is said to be unable to
get her own living. As the maternal duties of other females do not unfit them for getting their own living
and also the livings of their young, it would seem that the human maternal duties require the segregation
of the entire energies of the mother to the service of the child during her entire adult life, or so large a
proportion of them that not enough remains to devote to the individual interests of the mother.
Such a condition, did it exist, would of course excuse and justify the pitiful development of the human
female, and her support by the male. Is this the condition of human motherhood? Does the human
mother, by her motherhood, thereby lose control of brain and body, lose power and skill and desire for
any other work? Do we see before us the human race, with all its females segregated entirely to the uses
of motherhood, consecrated, set apart, specially developed, spending every power of their nature on the
service of their children?
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We do not. We see the human mother worked far harder than a mare, laboring her life long in the
service, not of her children only, but of men: husbands, brothers, fathers, whatever male relative she has;
for mother and sister also; for the church a little, if she is allowed; for society, if she is able; for charity
and education and reform, – working in many ways that are not the ways of motherhood.
In spite of her supposed segregation to maternal duties, the human female, the world over, works at
extra- maternal duties for hours enough to provide her with an independent living, and then is denied
independence on the ground that motherhood prevents her working!
The working power of the mother has always been a prominent factor in human life. She is the worker
par excellence, but her work is not such as to affect her economic status. Her living, all that she gets –
food, clothing, ornaments, amusements, luxuries – these bear no relation to her power to produce wealth,
to her services in the house, or to her motherhood. These things bear relation only to the man she
marries, the man she depends on, – to how much he has and how much he is willing to give her. The
female of the human species is economically dependent on the male. He is her food supply.
Chapter 15
The relation of the sexes, in whatever form, has always been observed to affect strongly the moral nature
of mankind. What we call the moral sense is an intellectual recognition of the relative importance of
certain acts and their consequences.
No human distinction is more absolutely and exclusively social than the moral sense. Ethics is a social
science. There is no ethics for the individual. Taken by himself, man is but an animal; and his conduct
bears relation only to the needs of the animal – self-preservation and reproduction. Every virtue, and the
power to see and strive for it, is a social quality. The highest virtues are those wherein we serve the most
people, and their development in us keeps pace with the development of society. It is the social relation
which calls for our virtues, and which maintains them.
Every social relation has its ethics; and the general needs of society, as a whole, are the basis of ethics.
In every age and race this may be studied, and a clear connection established always between the virtues
and vices of a given people and their local conditions. The principal governing condition in the
development of ethics is the economic environment.
In the hunting and fighting period the best hunter and fighter was the best man, praised and honored by
his tribe. To be patient and self-controlled was an economic necessity to the hunter: to bear pain and
arduous exertion easily was a necessity to the fighter. Therefore, the savage, by precept and example,
cultivated these virtues.
In the long agricultural and military periods we see the same things. In the peasant the virtues of
industry and patience were extolled: it takes industry and patience to raise corn. In the soldier the virtues
of courage and obedience were extolled, and in every one the virtue of faith was the prime requisite of
the existing religion. Slowly the industrial era dawned and grew. With this change in economic
conditions has changed the scale of virtues.
Physical courage has sunk; obedience, patience, faith, and the rest do not stand as they did. We praise
and value today, as always, the virtues whereby we live. Every animal develops the virtues of his
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conditions; our human distinction is that we add the power of conscious perception and personal volition
to the action of natural force.
All our virtues can be traced and accounted for. The great main stem of them all, what we call “love,” is
merely the first condition of social existence. It is cohesion, working among us as the constituent
particles of society. Without some attraction to hold us together, we should not be able to hold together;
and this attraction, as perceived by our consciousness, we call love. The virtue of obedience consists in
the surrender of the individual will, so often necessary to the common good; and it stands highest in
military organization, wherein great numbers of men must act together against their personal interests,
even to the sacrifice of life, in the service of community.
As we have grown into fuller social life, we have slowly and experimentally, painfully and expensively,
discovered what kind of man was the best social factor. The type of satisfactory member of society
today is a man self-controlled, kind, gentle, strong, wise, brave, courteous, cheerful, true. In the Middle
Ages, strong, brave, and true would have satisfied the demands of the time. We now require for our
common good a larger rage of qualities, a more elaborate moral organization. All this is a simple,
evolutionary process.
But the moral development of humanity is a most tempestuous and contradictory field of study. [Some
virtues, like accuracy and punctuality, have been developed to suit our business activities while others
remain to be developed.]
Our condition may be described as consisting of a tenacious survival of qualities which we ought, on
every ground of social good, to have long since outgrown; and an incessant struggle between these
rudimentary survivals and the normal growth. We have felt within ourselves the pull of diverse
tendencies [and, needing an explanation for this, we made up “the devil”, or located the trouble in
“woman-kind.”]
[Because of this, women were not allowed to develop the moral qualities to advance, confined instead to
the “functional activities of her sex.”]
In keeping her on this primitive basis of economic life, we have kept half humanity tied to the startingpost, while the other half ran. We have trained and bred one kind of qualities into one-half the species,
and another kind into the other half. And then we wonder at the contradictions of human nature! For
instance, we have done all we could, in addition to natural forces, to make men brave. We have done all
we could, in addition to natural forces, to make women cowards. And, since every human creature is
born of two parents, it is not surprising that we are a little mixed.
We have trained in men the large qualities of social usefulness which the pressure of their economic
conditions was also developing. We have trained in women, by the same means, the small qualities of
personal usefulness which the pressure of their economic conditions was also developing.
By dividing the economic conditions of women and men, we have divided their psychic development,
and built into the constitution of the race the irreconcilable elements of these diverse characters.
The largest and most radical effect of restoring women to economic independence will be in its result in
clarifying and harmonizing the human soul.
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It is not alone upon woman, and, through her, upon the race, that the ill-effects may be observed. Man,
as master, has suffered from his position also. The lust for power and conquest, natural to the male of
any species, has been fostered in him to an enormous degree by this cheap and easy lordship. His
dominance is not that of one chosen as best fitted to rule or one of ruling by successful competition, but
is a sovereignty based on the accident of sex and holding over such helpless and inferior dependents as
could not question or oppose. When man’s place was maintained by brute force, it made him more
brutal; when his place was maintained by purchase, by the power of economic necessity, then he grew
into the merciless use of such power as distinguishes him today.
Another giant evil engendered by this relation is what we call selfishness. Social life tends to reduce this
feeling, but the sexual-economic relation fosters and develops it. To have a whole human creature
consecrated to his direct personal service, to pleasing and satisfying him in every way possible – this has
kept man selfish. Pride, cruelty, and selfishness are the vices of the master. No wonder that we are all
somewhat slow to rise to the full powers of democracy, to feel full social honor and social duty, while
every soul of us is reared in this stronghold of ancient and outgrown emotions – the economically
related family.
When the mother of the race is free, we shall have a better world, by the easy right of birth and by the
calm, slow, friendly forces of social evolution.
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Trade Unions and Public Duty
Jane Addams
“The habitual use of ‘the people;” as a phrase practically equivalent to the ‘working classes’ is a
constant admission of the fact that the proletariat is not, properly speaking, a ‘class’ at all, but the body
of society itself.” –Comte1
NOTE ON SOURCE: This passage is from an article published by Addams in the American Journal of
Sociology in January 1899 (volume 4, number 4, pp, 448-462). It has been edited for length here.
Introduction – What to Look For
While Jane Addams never held a position as a sociologist, she was hugely influential on sociological
thought, particularly among those who held that a primary goal of the science was to inform public
policy and promote social reform. The fact that she had articles published in the major American
sociological journal of the day is testament to this influence. When this article was published there was
no federal law regulating or prohibiting child labor. It was not uncommon for children as young as
eight to be put to work in factories and mines. Trade unions were the primary organizations pushing for
restrictions and prohibitions in this area.2
Trades Unions
In this paper I have assumed that the general organization of trades unions and their ultimate purposes
are understood, and also that we recognize that the public has a duty toward the weak and defenseless
members of the community. With these assumptions granted, two propositions are really amazing: first,
that we have turned over to those men who work with their hands the fulfillment of certain obligations
which we must acknowledge belong to all of us, such as protecting little children from premature labor,
and obtaining shorter hours for the overworked; and, second, that while the trades unions, more than any
other body, have secured orderly legislation for the defense of the feeblest, they are persistently
misunderstood and harshly criticized by many people who are themselves working for the same ends.
The first proposition may be illustrated by various instances in which measures introduced by trades
unions have first been opposed by the public, and later have been considered praise-worthy and
valuable, when the public as a whole has undertaken to establish and enforce them.
For years trades unions have endeavored to secure laws regulating the occupations in which children
may be allowed to work, the hours of labor permitted in those occupations, and the minimum age below
which children may not be employed. Workingmen have accepted women into their trades unions, as an
inevitable development of industrial conditions, but they resent the entrance of children into their trades,
not only because children bring down wages, for women do that as well, but because children are
injured by premature labor. The regulation of child labor is one of the few points in which society as a
whole has made common cause with the voluntary efforts of trades unions, but the movement was
1
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initiated and is still largely carried forward by them. It is quite possible to understand the reasons for
this.
We may imagine a row of people seated in a moving street car, into which darts a boy of eight, calling
out the details of the last murder in the hope of selling an evening newspaper. A comfortable-looking
man buys a paper from him, with no sense of moral shock; he may even be a trifle complacent that he
has helped along the little fellow who is making his way in the world. The philanthropic lady sitting next
to him may perhaps reflect that it is a pity that such a bright boy is not in school. She may make up her
mind in a moment of compunction to redouble her efforts for various newsboys’ missions and homes,
that this poor child may have better teaching and perhaps a chance of manual training. She probably is
convinced that he alone, by his unaided efforts, is supporting a widowed mother, and her heart is moved
to do all she can for him. Let us imagine that next to her sits a workingman trained in trades-union
methods. He will probably view with indignation the spectacle of a heedless child jumping on moving
cars at the risk of his limbs, shouting out facts and reports that should be unknown to him for many
years, and he may wonder for the hundredth time why it is that society allows this utter waste of its
immature members. He knows that the boy’s natural development is arrested, and that the abnormal
activity of his body and mind uses up the force which should go into growth. He is forced to these
conclusions because he has seen many a man enter the factory at eighteen and twenty so worn out by
premature work that he is laid on the shelf within ten or fifteen years. He knows very well that he can do
nothing in the way of ameliorating the lot of this particular boy; that his only possible chance is to
agitate for proper child-labor laws in order to regulate, and, if possible, prohibit, street vending by
children, so that the child of the poorest may have his school time secured to him, and may have at least
his short chance for growth.
These three people sitting in the streetcar are all honest and upright and recognize a certain duty toward
the forlorn children of the community. The self-made man is encouraging one boy’s own efforts. The
philanthropic lady is helping on a few boys. The workingman alone is obliged to include all the boys of
his class. Workingmen, in their feebleness in all but numbers, have been forced to the state to secure
protection for themselves and for their children. They cannot all rise out of their class, as the
occasionally successful man has done; some of them must be left to do the work in the factories and
mines, and they have no money to spend in ameliorating philanthropy.
In order to secure help from the state they have been obliged to agitate, and to make a moral appeal to
the community as a whole -that most successful appeal which has ever distinguished great popular
movements, but which we seem to distrust, and do not ordinarily use so often as the appeals to selfinterest, national tradition, or class prejudice. Almost all the labor legislation which has been secured in
this country to protect the workman against the harshest conditions of industry has been secured through
the efforts of trades unions, the training in which naturally leads men to appeal to the state, and to use
those tools which democracy affords.
Child-labor laws once enacted and enforced are a matter of pride to the entire community, and they even
come to be regarded as a register of the community’s humanity and enlightenment. To consider the
second proposition: For many years I have been impressed with the noble purposes of trades unions, and
the desirability of the ends which they seek; and at the same time I have been amazed at the harshness
with which their failures are judged by the public, and the undue stress which is laid upon the violence
and disorder which sometimes accompany their efforts. How far is this violence and the consequent
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condemnation of the public the result of ignoble purposes on the part of the trades unions, and how far is
it the result of the partial effort and failure which we thrust upon them, when the trades unions alone are
obliged to do what the community as a whole should undertake?
Scenes of disorder and violence are enacted because trades unions are not equipped to accomplish what
they are undertaking. The state alone could accomplish it without disorder. The public shirks its duty,
and then holds a grievance toward the men who undertake the performance of that duty. It blames the
union men for the disaster which arises from the fact that the movement is a partial one
It is easy to misjudge from the outside act. The man who reads the newspapers and has no other
acquaintance with labor organizations than the record of their outside and often unofficial acts, is almost
sure to be confused in regard to their ultimate objects. It is also difficult for the victorious side to see
fairly. There is no doubt that the employer, the man who represents vested interests, often routs and
defeats labor organizations, drives them from the field with an honest misunderstanding of what they are
trying to do, and of the principles which they represent. He is flushed with triumph and imagines a
victory which he has never achieved. We may consider half a dozen measures which trades unions have
urged and concerning which the community has often been stirred by indignation, and find that, when
the public undertakes to enforce identical, or similar, measures, they are regarded with great
complacency. The disapproval may be merely the result of the fact that the trades unions alone are doing
that which belongs to the entire public.
We hear from time to time of a strike in which men are prevented from taking the places of the strikers,
and in the ensuing struggle are beaten and injured. We call the whole affair brutal and unjustifiable, and
our sympathies are aroused for the men whom the strikers drive away from the chance to work. We
make no sincere effort to find out what principle it is that justifies the strikers to themselves in their
action. It is hardly possible that large bodies of men, all over the country, should repeat this course of
action, over and over again, without an underlying motive which seems right to them, even if they are
mistaken. An attempt to take a scholarly and fair view of life is bound to find out what this motive is. To
condemn without a hearing, to correct without an understanding, has always been the mark of the
narrow and uneducated person. It is not difficult to see the significance of a fine action; the test of our
insight comes in interpreting aright an action such as this.
Let us put ourselves in the position of the striking men who have fallen upon workmen who have taken
their places. The strikers have for years belonged to an organization devoted to securing better wages
and a higher standard of living, not only for themselves, but for all the men in that trade. To this end
they have steadily contributed from their wages. They have given their time to the study of trade
conditions, and enthusiastic and unceasing service to bettering those conditions in the only way that
seems to them possible. They have thus worked, not only for themselves and their children, but for all
their class. Every gain they have made, every advance they have secured, has been shared with the very
men who now, when these gains are at stake, range themselves on the other side. They honestly believe,
whether they are right or wrong, that their position is exactly the same which a nation, in time of war,
takes toward a traitor who has deserted his country’s camp for that of the enemy.
We condemn the boycott and say that the trades unions are bigoted in their allegiance to each other, and
harsh to those outside their membership. Within a few years, circles of women in several great cities
have formed themselves into a “consumers’ league,” because they have become uncomfortable
concerning the conditions under which clothing is manufactured and sold. The members of these little
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circles, because of a stirring of conscience in regard to social wrongs, exert themselves to buy goods
only from houses which conform to a certain required standard of sanitation, wages, and hours of work.
They are willing to submit to a certain inconvenience and to a possible loss of opportunity for
“bargains.” They naturally regard themselves as an advance guard, and if given to self-congratulation
would perhaps claim that they were recognizing a social duty which the community as a whole ignores.
The members of these consumers’ leagues are beginning to hold conventions to discuss the propriety of
a label which shall mean that those houses to which it is given provide seats for their saleswomen,
summer vacations, and so on. All this is a valuable effort in the right direction, but it has already been
initiated and sustained for many years by trades unions. So early as I885, in New York a blue label was
put upon cigars made by union men, and loyal trade-unionists were supposed to smoke no others. The
label claimed to guarantee not only the payment of union wages, but fair conditions of manufacture.
Many a workingman has spent his Saturday evening going from one store to another, until he found a
hat with the trade-union label in its lining. He might, possibly, have bought cheaper and better-looking
hats elsewhere, and it would have been easy to urge the smallness of the purchase as an excuse from the
search. In short, the advanced woman is only now reaching the point held by the trade-unionist for years.
The consumers’ league carefully avoids the boycott, as does, indeed, the trade- unionist when he
purchases only labeled goods. He is again using the method in his organization that the nation has long
used when it prohibits by high tariff the importation of certain goods in order that home products may be
purchased, which have been manufactured under better conditions. Who cannot recall the political
speech urging high tariff for the protection of the American workingmen, in their wages and standard of
living? It is singularly like the argument used by the workingman when he urges the boycott, or the
more peaceful method of purchasing labeled goods made by union workmen who have been paid union
wages. Here, again, as in the case of industrial warfare, I do not wish to commit myself to the ethics
involved, but merely to point the analogy, and call attention to the fact that the public is apt to consider
the government righteous and the trades unions unjustifiable.
For years trades unions in every country have steadily bent their efforts toward securing a shorter
working day. In many unions these persistent efforts have been crowned with success, but many others
are still making the attempt to secure the eight-hour day and have before them a long and troublous
undertaking. Here, again, trades unions are trying to do for themselves what the government should
secure for all its citizens.
The well-to-do portions of the community are prone to think of politics as something off by itself. They
may conscientiously recognize a political duty as part of good citizenship, but political effort is not the
natural expression of their moral striving. A contempt for law is almost certain to follow, when we lose
our habit of turning toward it for moral support. There is little doubt that appeals through corporation
attorneys are often made to legislative bodies solely with the view of protecting vested interests and
property rights. In their preoccupation there is no time to consider morals or the rights of the community
as a whole. This non- moral attitude, as well as the immoral one of open corruption of legislators, does
much toward destroying the foundations of democratic government.
The body of trades-unionists in America are becoming discouraged from the fact that moral appeal and
open agitation do not have fair play, because the “interests of capital” are not confined to these, but have
methods of securing legislation which are perforce denied to the workingmen. The confidence of
workingmen in the courts has been shaken by the fact that the judges have so often been trained as
corporation attorneys, and it is a common assertion which may often be heard in workingmen’s meetings
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that the militia and United States troops are almost invariably used to protect the interests of the
employer in times of strike.
Any sense of division and suspicion is fatal in a democratic form of government, for although each side
may seem to secure most for itself, when consulting only its own interests, the final test must be the
good of the community as a whole.
One might almost generalize that the trades-union movement, as such, secures its lower objects best
where there is a well-defined class feeling among the proletarians of its country, but that it accomplishes
its highest objects in proportion as it is able to break into all classes and seize upon legislative
enactment. A man who is born into his father’s trade, and who has no hope of ever entering into another,
as under the caste system of India or the guilds of Germany, is naturally most easily appealed to by the
interests within his trade- life. A workingman in America who may become a carpenter only as a
stepping-stone toward becoming a contractor and capitalist, as any ambitious scholar may teach a
country school until she shall be fitted for a college professorship, does not respond so easily to
measures intended to benefit the carpenter’s trade as he does to measures intended to benefit society as a
whole, and it is quite as important that the appeal should be made to him in his capacity of citizen as that
it should be large enough to include men outside his class.
That all its citizens may be responsible is then, perhaps, the final reason why it should be the mission of
the state to regulate the conditions of industry. The only danger in the movement, as at present
conducted, lies in the fact that it is a partial movement, and antagonizes those whom it does not include.
It may certainly be regarded as the duty of the whole to readjust the social machinery in such a way that
the issue shall be a higher type of character, and that there shall be a moral continuity to society
answering to its industrial development. This is the attempt of factory legislation. It is concerned in the
maintenance of a certain standard of life, and would exercise such social control over the conditions of
industry as to prevent the lowering of that standard. After all, society as society is interested in this, and
there is no more obligation upon workingmen to maintain a standard of living than there is upon the rest
of us. It is well, sometimes, to remind ourselves that, after all, the mass of mankind work with their
hands.
Is it too much to hope that in time other citizens, as well as trade-unionists, may be educated to ask
themselves: “Does our industrial machinery, or does it not, make for the greatest amount and the highest
quality of character?” And that when it is answered, as it must be at the present moment, that the state
does not concern itself with the character of the producer, but only with the commercial aspects of the
product, is it again too optimistic to predict that those other citizens will feel a certain sense of shame
and recognize the fact that the trades unions have undertaken a duty which the public has ignored?
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PART II

Functionalist Theory
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Timeline of Durkheim’s Life and Work1
1858

April 15

Born in Epinal, Lorraine, France

1866

Sept. 2

Birth of future wife, Louise Julie Dreyfus, in Paris, France

1875

After graduating from secondary school, moves to Paris to prepare
for entry into college

1879

Accepted to prestigious École Normale Supérieure

1883

After receiving state teaching qualification in philosophy, moves to
Sens as teacher

1887

Marries Louise Julie Dreyfus’ moves to Bourdeaux (professor of
‘social science and pedagogy’)

1888

Sept. 8

1892
1892

Birth of daughter, Maria Bella
Receives PhD

Sept. 18

Birth of son, André-Armand

1893

Publication of The Division of Labor (doctoral dissertation)

1895

Publication of The Rules of Sociological Method

1897

Publication of Suicide

1898

First issue of L’Année sociologique(Durkheim’s journal)

1902

Moves to Paris; begins teaching at Sorbonne, Paris

1912

Publication of The Elementary Forms of Religious Life

1913

Becomes Professor of “Education and Sociology” at Sorbonne

1914

France enters World War I

1916

André killed in battle; Durkheim suffers deep depression

1917

Nov. 15

Dies of complications following stroke, in Paris, France

1

Classical Sociological Theory and Foundations of American Sociology by Alison Hurst, Oregon State University
Open Textbooks. Edited here for length.
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Biography of Durkheim
NOTE ON SOURCES: The most comprehensive biography of Durkheim, by Marcel Fournier, was
published as recently as 2012. Until this publication, there were many books on Durkheim’s
contributions to sociology, but comparatively little was known about his personal and family life. In
addition to Fournier, the following recommended sources were used for compiling this biography, listed
in order from oldest to most recent: Gehlke, Émile Durkheim’s Contributions to Sociological Theory
(1915), Alpert, Émile Durkheim and His Sociology(1939); Nisbet, Émile Durkheim(1965); Bierstedt,
Émile Durkheim(1966); Lukes, Émile Durkheim, His Life and Work(1972); Giddens, Durkheim(1978),
Parkin, Durkheim(1992); Jones, The Development of Durkheim’s Social Realism(1999); Stedman
Jones, Durkheim Reconsidered(2001); Allen, Durkheim: A Critical Introduction(2017). 1
Overview
David Émile Durkheim was born in Epinal, France on April 15, 1858. Unlike Marx, whose youth was
spent during the tumultuous first half of the nineteenth century, by the time Durkheim was a young man
France was experiencing one of its longest governments, the Third Republic (1870-1940). He would
spend his entire life living and working in France. Intelligent and productive, Durkheim would do much
to create and institutionalize the new discipline of sociology in France.
Social Background/Family
Durkheim’s mother, Melanie, was the daughter of a horse merchant.2 His father Moise, was a regional
Chief Rabbi. Moise’s father and grandfather before him had been rabbis as well. As a young boy, it was
assumed that Emile would also one day be a rabbi, but it was not to be. After going to college,
Durkheim broke with religion altogether. Nevertheless, he always remained part of the Jewish
community. In 1887, he married a young embroiderer named Louise Julie Dreyfus, the daughter of a
director of a foundry, and together they had two children, Marie Bella (born 1888) and Andre-Armand
(born 1892). It is said that Louise was well-educated and helped Emile with his work. Where Emile was
austere, Louise was light-hearted. By all accounts, they had a happy marriage. Andre would die in 1915,
from an injury sustained in battle in Bulgaria. When waiting to hear news of his son, on the battlefront,
he wrote to a close friend, “The image of this exhausted child, alone at the side of a road in the midst of
night and fog ... that seizes me by the throat.”3 It is said that the death of his son precipitated Emile
Durkheim’s decline and early death, following a stroke (at age 59).

Classical Sociological Theory and Foundations of American Sociology by Alison Hurst, Oregon State University Open
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Interestingly, Melanie’s great-grandmother was a woman named Francoise Marx, born in 1758 in Lixheim, Lorraine,
France less than 100 miles from Trier, where Karl Marx was born a half-century later. It may be that the two families
(Durkheim and Marx) share a common ancestor.

3

Letter to Davy, reprinted in Lukes 1972: 555.
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Ten Things We Know about Durkheim as a Person
1. He was an outstanding student.
2. He was very close to his family and community. He worried about his family’s finances when his
father became ill while he was in college.
3. He was a good debater.
4. He was very well-known by all kinds of intelligent people, especially in circles of philosophy and
psychology.
5. He strongly supported the republican cause (against resumption of the monarchy) and admired the
reforms of the Third Republic.
6. He was a very good administrator and organizer and provided assistance to friends and supporters.
7. He was a mesmerizing lecturer and was even accused of having too much control over the minds of
his young students.
8. He often worked too hard, sometimes even into illness.
9. He stood up for the underdog.
10. He was devoted to the science of sociology.
Durkheim’s Career
Durkheim earned degrees from his local college in 1874 and 1875 (when he was only 17). At that age,
he wanted to be a college professor, and the only way to do this was to attend the École Normale
Superieure, in Paris. By all accounts, life in Paris was very difficult for him, as he did not have a lot of
money and he did not feel at home. It took him two years before he passed entrance exams necessary to
attend the prestigious institution. Once there, he considered much of what he was forced to study “sheer
poppycock.’4 Although never perhaps shaking the feeling of being an impostor, he was admitted to the
highest intellectual circles. He participated in debates. He became friends with philosophers, historians,
and psychologists (a new and exciting field at the time). After graduating in 1883 he took a teaching
post in Bourdeaux, where he lived, with his growing family, until 1902. In 1892 he briefly returned to
Paris where he earned his PhD (for The Division of Labor). In 1902, he moved to Paris permanently to
teach at the Sorbonne, where he continued until his death in 1917. He did much to create the field of
sociology in France, largely by overseeing the sociology journal, L’Année Sociologique, and by helping
advance the career of young sociologists. He was also an advisory editor on the first US sociology
journal, The American Journal of Sociology.
Durkheim’s Politics
Durkheim lived and worked during the Third Republic, a relatively stable period in France that was, in
theory, committed to parliamentary democracy (as opposed to constitutional monarchy or socialism).
We could say the Third Republic was a compromise government, and that its stability could perhaps be
attributed to its moderation. Durkheim was actively involved with supporting the Third Republic and
4

He was eager to learn useful things and did not appreciate heaving to learn Latin. He was also said to be
“disgusted by the sophisticated and shallow sarcasm” of many of his fellow students; “he hated all
affectations. Profoundly serious, he hated flightiness” (Albert 1939: 21-22).
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saw sociology as the science that could lead to better policy-making. He was also an outspoken critic of
antisemitism5 and much in sympathy with socialism. Durkheim once told a close friend “with a moving
simplicity how, at a certain moment of his spiritual life, he had had to admit to himself that he was a
socialist.6 “ During World War I, he was active in supporting France and even wrote a series of short
articles decrying the “German mind” for its tendency to militarism and overreach.
Durkheim’s Mission
“Our science came into being only yesterday. It must not be forgotten, especially in view of the
favorable reception that sociology is given now, that, properly speaking, Europe did not have as many
as ten sociologists fifteen years ago” – Durkheim (1900)
Durkheim wanted sociology recognized as an important discipline, distinct from political economy,
psychology, history, or philosophy. He devoted his career to making this happen. He saw sociology as a
science that could have practical effects (e.g., better policies).7 It was not armchair philosophizing. It
was also a moral science, whose results could advance society, taking the role that religion and other
dying traditions had played in the past. “It would be no distortion to view Durkheim’s entire
sociological career as an intransigent and relentless battle fought on two major fronts: against the dark,
unfathomable forces of mysticism and despair, on the one hand, and against the unsubstantial ethereal
forces of the dilettantic cult of superficiality on the other” (Alpert 1939: 18).
Reports by Friends and Colleagues
Durkheim was “deeply opposed to all war whether of classes or of nations; he desired change only for
the benefit of society as a whole and not that of any one of its parts, even if that latter had numbers and
force. He regarded political revolutions and parliamentary developments as superficial, costly and more
theatrical than serious. He therefore always resisted the idea of submitting himself to a party” – Marcel
Mauss (1928)8
“His adversaries, his enemies, not taking sufficient account of his personal disinteredness, considered
him, and sometimes treated him, as ambitious and as an intriguer. What an error of judgement! His ends
were noble and went beyond personal rewards, and I believe that all the steps he took, when they related
to getting people jobs – advancing some, and thwarting and excluding others – had the single objective
of the interest of science and the community” – Bourgin (1938)9
5

See the Dreyfus Affair, a national scandal in which a Jewish captain in the French army was falsely accused and convicted
of passing military secrets to the Germans. Many intellectuals at the time, led by the writer Zola, accused the government
of antisemitism. Whether one supported the government or Dreyfus said a great deal about one’s political position and
beliefs during the years the controversy raged (roughly 1894 to 1906).
6
The friend was Bourgin, the quote was reprinted from Lukes 1972: 321. Durkheim’s socialism was “abstract, intellectual,
evolutionary, reformist, optimistic, inspired by large ideals of cooperation and organization with an overriding respect for
social science” (Lukes 1972: 329).
7
“There was a hardly a social problem of the day for which Durkheim did not offer constructive suggestions.” These
included the reorganization of the educational system, the training of politicians, the separation of church and state,
divorce and marriage, suicide, the regulation of economic life, social equality, political reform, and pacifism. (Albert 1939:
58)
8
In Lukes 1972: 322.
9
In Lukes 1972: 377.

52

First-Hand Character Descriptions10
“Durkheim has a very serious and somewhat cold appearance. He is conscientious, hard-working, wellinformed and very clever...M. Durkheim is, in short, one of the most serious of our young professors of
philosophy” (1885)
“M. Durkheim, tall, thin and fair, is already bald...His voice at the start was feeble and subdued, but
gradually, under the pressure of the ideas he was expressing, it rose and grew animated and warm, until
it seemed capable of filling a vast vessel” (1892)
“He received me in his study, which was vast and simple, lacking any adornment or evidence of artistic
preoccupations. His long, thin body was enveloped by a large dressing-gown, a cassock of flannel,
which concealed his bony and muscular frame, the fragile support for this thought. The face emerged,
pale and ascetic, with its high forehead bare, a short beard, a thick moustache...One felt oneself before
the judgment and already under the authority of a man who was devoted, entirely devoted, to his task, to
his mission, and who, by admitting you to his side, along with his colleagues, delegated to you a part of
the responsibilities he had assumed” –(approx. 1903)

10

Each of the following can be found in the biography by Lukes (1972). Appended to each account is the year of its
observation.
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Division of Labor, Book I
Émile Durkheim
“Society is strong if the ideas and common tendencies are greater quantitatively and qualitatively than
those ideas and habits held by individuals.” - Durkheim
NOTE ON SOURCE: This passage comes from Durkheim’s dissertation, completed in 1893, and first
published in 1902 as De la Division du Travaile Sociale. The first English translation was done by
George Simpson in 1933, but this version was found to have several shortcomings. A more approved
translation was made in 1984 by W. D. Halls, edited by Lewis A. Coser. This translation was
republished with some improvement by Steven Lukes in 19971.
Introduction – What to Look For
The Division of Labor in Society was divided into three books. The first book examines the function of
the division of labor and introduces the distinction between societies held together by Mechanical
Solidarity and those held together by Organic Solidarity. The passages below describe those differences.
Chapter 3. Organic Solidarity Due to the Division of Labor
Part 4. Conclusion
We recognize two kinds of positive solidarity, solidarity which produces integration. The first kind
directly binds the individual to society while the second binds the individual indirectly, through reliance
on the other people who collectively make up society.
Society is not seen in the same aspect in the two cases. In the first, what we call society is more or less
composed of the beliefs and values held in common by all people. In contrast, the second case is
composed of a system of different and unique functions which are united through interdependence.
In the first case, society is strong if the ideas and common tendencies are greater quantitatively and
qualitatively than those ideas and habits held by individuals. This kind of solidarity can grow only at the
expense of individual personality. In each of us there are two consciences, one common to our group
and the other which is personal to us and distinct and that makes us an individual. Solidarity through
likeness is at its greatest when the collective conscience takes over our entire consciousness, but at that
moment we have no personality. Our personalities can only emerge if the community to which we
belong has less control of us. These are two opposing forces. If we want to think and act for ourselves,
we cannot also be strongly inclined to think and act as everyone else. So, when this form of solidarity
acts on us forcefully, our personality vanishes; we are no longer ourselves but the collective life.
The social molecules which cohere together in this way can act together only if they have no actions of
their own; they are molecules of inorganic bodies. For that reason, we propose to call this type of
1
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solidarity mechanical. This doesn’t mean it is produced by mechanical or artificial means, but only as an
analogy to the cohesion uniting an inanimate body, as opposed to elements of a living body. The
individual conscience is dependent upon the collective conscience and follows all its movements,
without a life of its own, so to speak. In societies where this type of solidarity is strong, the individual
does not really appear. Personal rights are generally not recognized.
It is utterly different when we consider the solidarity which is produced by the division of labor. While
the first type implied that individuals resemble each other, this type presumes they are differentiated.
While the first type is possible only so much as the individual personality is subsumed by the collective
personality, the second type is possible only if each individual person has a sphere of action unique to
him or her, and so an individual personality. It is necessary for the collective conscience to recede to
allow the individual conscience to operate freely. The more it does so, the stronger the cohesion which
results [as each becomes reliant on every other member fulfilling his or her unique sphere of action].
Each one depends more on society as labor is divided, and each person’s activity becomes more
specialized.
Chapter 5. Progressive Preponderance of Organic Solidarity; Its Consequences
Part 2. [Three Conditions of Mechanical Solidarity]
Not only does mechanical solidarity bind people together less strongly over time, but we find it slackens
as we progress socially.
Indeed, the strength of social links through likeness vary with respect to the following three conditions:
First, the relative proportion of collective and individual conscience. The links are stronger the more the
first overshadows the second.
Second, the average intensity of the states of the collective conscience.
Third, the distinctiveness of these states. That is, the more specifically defined are the collective beliefs
and practices, the less room there is for individualization. The more general and abstract are the rules,
however, the more individual reflection plays a role. Centrifugal tendencies multiply at the cost of social
cohesion.
Strong and defined states of the common conscious are the roots of penal law. However, the number of
such laws is less today than before, and diminish progressively as societies approach our modern type.
Chapter 6. Progressive Preponderance of Organic Solidarity, continued
Part 1. Segmental Type
So we can say it is a historical law that mechanical solidarity, which at first stood alone, progressively
loses ground and that, over time, little by little, organic solidarity predominates.
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If we were to try to imagine an ideal type of society held together exclusively by likeness, we would
have to conceive it as one wholly homogeneous, one in which none of its human members are
distinguishable from one another; there would be no real organization to speak of. It would be a social
protoplasm, a blob, a horde if you will. It is true we have yet to find any society that operates completely
in this way.
We can call these societies segmented as they are formed by the repetition of like aggregations in them,
like the rings of an earthworm. The term clan expresses the mixed nature of these segmented groups.
The clan is a family because its members are kin to one another. These familial affinities are for the
most part what keeps the group united. But these are not families the way we understand families,
because kinship need not be by blood. The clan in fact contains a great many strangers. It can comprise
several thousand persons. And it is the basic political unity as well, with the clan-heads the only social
authorities.
The main point, however, is that the clan, just as the horde, of which it is but an extension, has no other
solidarity than that derived from likeness. For segmented organization to be possible, the segments must
resemble one another; otherwise, they would not be united.
In these societies, religion pervades all of social life. This is so because social life itself is almost
exclusively composed of common beliefs and practices. Where the collective personality is the only one
in existence, property also must be collective, so we find an early form of communism operating in these
societies.
There is, then, a social structure of a specific kind which corresponds with mechanical solidarity. What
characterizes it is a system of segments homogeneous and similar to each other.
Part 2. Organized Type
Quite another thing is the structure of societies where organic solidarity is preponderant.
They are constituted by a system of different organs, each of which has a special role, and which are
themselves formed of differentiated parts. Social elements are not heaped together linearly as the rings
of an earthworm, nor are they entwined with one another, but rather they are coordinated and
subordinated to one another around a central organ which regulates the rest of the organism. Others may
depend on this central organ, but the central organ depends on the others as well. There is nothing
superhuman or timeless about this central organ. There are only differences in degree between this organ
and the others.
This social type rests on such different principles as that of the segmented type that it can develop only
so much as it erases the segmented type. In organized societies, individuals are not grouped based on
lineage or bloodline, but according to the particular nature of the social activity they engage in. Their
natural context is not that of birth but of occupation. It is no longer real or fictitious kinship which marks
the place of each, but the function which he fulfills.
No doubt, when this new organization began to appear, it tried to use the existing organization and to
assimilate it. So, functions were often allocated based on original divisions of birth. In a way, classes
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(and castes in particular) probably have their origin thusly. But this mixed arrangement cannot last for
long, because there is a fundamental contradiction between the two. It is only a very basic division of
labor which can adapt to preexisting social divisions in this way. The division of labor can only grow by
freeing itself from this confining framework. As soon as it passes a certain stage of development, there
is no longer any relation between the hereditarily fixed properties of segments and the new skills and
aptitudes called forth by the growth of functions needed in society. The social material must combine in
new ways to organize itself upon these different foundations. The old structure, so far as it persists, is
opposed to these new combinations. Which is why it must disappear.
Thus the history shows that as one type progresses, the other type fades away.
Just as we could not say there was any known wholly segmented society, we also observe that there is as
yet no wholly organized society. We do see, however, that organic solidarity is progressing, and
becoming more preponderant.
Our future investigations will show that our current occupational organization is not everything it should
be, as abnormal causes have prevented it from attaining the degree of development which our social
order now demands.
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Division of Labor, Book 2
Émile Durkheim
“Animals and plants thrive when they differ. People are the same.” -Durkheim
NOTE ON SOURCE: This passage comes from Durkheim’s dissertation, completed in 1893, and first
published in 1902 as De la Division du Travaile Sociale. The first English translation was done by
George Simpson in 1933, but this version was found to have several shortcomings. A more approved
translation was made in 1984 by W. D. Halls, edited by Lewis A. Coser. This translation was
republished with some improvement by Steven Lukes in 19972.
Introduction – What to Look For
The Division of Labor in Society was divided into three books. The second book examines the causes
and conditions of the division of labor in society. As you read, think about the implications of
Durkheim’s explanation for the shift from societies held together by a collective conscience and
societies held together by the division of labor. What is the future likely to hold? Should we worry about
a decline in shared values and beliefs? What would Durkheim think about the value of and commitment
to diversity?
Chapter 2. The Causes
Part 1. Moral/Dynamic Density
It is in certain variation of the social context that we must search for that which explains the progress of
the division of labor. The results of Book 1 allows us to immediately see what those variations are.
We have already seen how the organized structure and the division of labor developed as the segmented
structure faded away. So, it is either that this fading away is the cause of the development of the division
of labor, or that the development of the division of labor is the cause of the fading away. We know that
the latter option won’t work because segmentation is an obstacle to the division of labor, and it must
have weakened at least partially in order for the division of labor to arise. Once the division of labor
appears, it can contribute to the fading away of the segmental structure, but we only see it once the
fading away has already begun.
But the fading of the segmented structure can have this consequence for only one reason. Its waning
allows individuals who were previously separated to come into more contact with others. Social life,
instead of being concentrated in like pods, becomes generalized. Social relations multiply. The division
of labor develops when there are more individual people sufficiently in contact with each other to act
and react upon one another. We can call this relation and the active exchange resulting from it dynamic

2
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or moral density. Thus, the progress of the division of labor is in direct ratio to the moral or dynamic
density of society.
This relationship can only produce this effect if the real distance between individuals is itself diminished
in some way. Moral density cannot grow unless material density grows at the same time. We can use
material density as a measure of moral density.
The progressive condensation of societies in the course of historical development is produced in three
ways:
1. Where early groups of people were spread out over large areas relative to their small population,
population is concentrated among advanced peoples. Dispersion over a large area was necessary
for the work of nomads, hunters, and shepherds. In contrast, agriculture requires a settled life,
and presupposes a certain restriction of society in spatial terms, although there remain stretches
of land between families. As cities developed, condensation was even greater. From their origins,
European societies have seen a continuous growth in their density.
2. Thus, the formation and development of cities is key. Cities always result from the need of
individuals to be in close contact with others. It is here that the social mass can contract more
strongly than anywhere else. New recruits arrive by immigration. As long as social organization
is segmented, cities cannot truly exist. There are no cities in early-stage societies.1
3. Finally, communication and transportation are made easier and faster. By decreasing the gaps
separating segments of society, new forms of communication and transportation increase the
density of society.
If condensation of society produces more division of labor, it is because it multiplies intra-social
relations. These relations will be even more frequent if the number of population rises. In other words, if
there are both more individuals who are at the same time more intimately in contact with each other, the
effect is stronger. Both social volume (the number of people) and social density (the concentration of
people) increase the division of labor.
Part 3. Intensification of the struggle for existence
If labor becomes every more divided as societies become denser and more populous, it is not because
there are more varied external circumstances, but because the struggle for existence is more ardent.
Darwin rightly observed that the struggle between two creatures is as active as they are similar. Having
the same needs and the same objects, they are rivals. So long as there are enough resources for both,
they can live side by side, but when resources become insufficient for them both, war breaks out. It is
very different if the two creatures are of different species or variations. Since they do not eat the same
things or live the same kind of life, they do not disturb each other. The chances of conflict diminish.
Animals and plants thrive when they differ.
People are the same. In the same town, different jobs can co-exist. They each pursue different objects:
the soldier seeks glory, the priest moral authority, the politician power, the person of business wealth,
the scholar academic fame. Each can attain his end without preventing the others from attaining theirs.
The optometrist does not struggle with the psychiatrist, nor the shoemaker with the hatter, nor the
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bricklayer with the cabinetmaker, nor the physicist with the chemist. Since they each perform different
services, they can all perform then in parallel.
The closer the functions, however, the more contact and the more exposed to conflict. Just as with
animals that seek the same food, they inevitably seek to limit each other’s development. The judge may
never be in competition with the person of business, but the brewer and the vintner, the poet and the
musician, do try to supplant each other. And for those with exactly the same function? They can succeed
only to the detriment of others.
That said, it is easy now to understand how all concentration of the social mass, especially when
accompanied by an increase in population, necessarily advances the division of labor.
The division of labor is a result of the struggle for existence, but it is a relaxed end to it. Because of the
division of labor, would-be opponents are not forced to fight to death, but can instead exist beside each
other. In addition, as it develops it provides the means of maintenance and survival to a greater number
of people who, in more homogeneous societies, would be condemned to extinction.
Economists regard the division of labor differently than what we have discussed here. For them, it is
essentially about increasing production. But we have seen that greater productivity is only a necessary
consequence of the underlying phenomenon. If we specialize it is not in order to produce more but to
allow us to live under new conditions of existence.
Chapter 5. Consequences
Part 1. Suppleness of the Division of Labor
Our previous discussion now permits us to better understand the way in which the division of labor
functions in society.
The division of social labor is different from the division of physiological labor in one key way. In the
organism, each cell has its defined role, and it cannot change it. In societies, however, even where the
forms of organization are most rigid, individuals can move about with a certain freedom. As work is
divided more, this suppleness and freedom become greater. A person can raise himself from the
humblest beginning to the most important occupations. Even more frequently, a worker leaves his job
for another one close by. Today a scholar can pass from one discipline to another, from chemistry to
biology, or from psychology to sociology.
Now contrast the biological organism. If the function of each cell is fixed, it is because it is imposed by
birth. Each cell is imprisoned, if you will, in a system of hereditary customs which cannot be overcome.
The structure predetermines the cell’s life. It is not the same in society. Origins do not determine the
outcomes of individuals; his innate characteristics do not predestine him to one role only, making ho,
incapable of any other. From heredity he receives only a general disposition, one quite supple and able
to take on many different forms.
Part 2. The Development of Civilization
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In determining the principal cause of the progress of the division of labor, we have at the same stroke
determined the essential factor of what we call civilization.
Civilization is itself the necessary consequences of the changes which are produced in the volume and
density of societies. If science, art, and economic activity develop, it is out of necessity, because there is
no other way to live in the new conditions people find themselves in. From the time that the number of
individuals begins to increase, people can maintain themselves only by greater specialization, working
harder, and increasing the intensity of their abilities. From all this general stimulation there naturally
results a much higher degree of culture. From this point of view, civilization is not an end to which
people strive, not something foreseen and desired in advance, but merely the effect of a cause, the result
of a given state of population concentration. It is not the pole to which historic development is moving
us in order to seek happiness or improvement. We move towards it because we must move towards it,
and what determines the speed of our march is the amount of pressure we exercise upon each other,
according to our number.
This does not mean that civilization is useless, but only that it is not its uses that make it progress. It
develops because it cannot help but develop. We see even more clearly now how wrong it is to make
civilization the function of the division of labor when in fact it is only the consequence of it. Civilization
cannot explain the existence or the progress of the division of labor since it has no intrinsic value in
itself, but only has a reason for existing insofar as the division of labor is itself found necessary.
Still, while being a mere effect of necessary causes, civilization can become an end, an object of desire,
even an ideal. A mechanistic conception of society [as advanced here] does not preclude ideals. ... There
is and there will always be, between the extreme points at which we find ourselves and the end towards
which we are tending, a free field open to our efforts.
Part 3. The Development of Individual Personality
At the same time that societies are transformed, individuals are transformed by changes in population
concentration.
Above all, they are freer of the control of the physiological organism. Where an animal is almost
completely under the influence of its physical environment, people are dependent on social causes.
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Division of Labor, Book 3
Émile Durkheim
“Just as ancient people need a common faith to unite them, so we need justice.” - Durkheim
NOTE ON SOURCE: This passage comes from Durkheim’s dissertation, completed in 1893, and first
published in 1902 as De la Division du Travaile Sociale. The first English translation was done by
George Simpson in 1933, but this version was found to have several shortcomings. A more approved
translation was made in 1984 by W. D. Halls, edited by Lewis A. Coser. This translation was
republished with some improvement by Steven Lukes in 19973.
Introduction – What to Look For
The Division of Labor in Society was divided into three books. The third book looks at what happens
when the division of labor is not functioning properly. As you read, think about how often the division of
labor is unhealthy or “abnormal” and how often the division of labor is actually in its normal,
solidarity-producing state.
Chapter 1. The Anomic Division of Labor
Until now we have studied the division of labor as a normal phenomenon, but, like all social facts (and
biological facts as well), there are pathological forms we must analyze. If, normally, the division of
labor produces social solidarity, sometimes it does the opposite. We must find out what makes it deviate
from its natural direction. Otherwise, we are in danger of assuming the division of labor is the cause of
these un- solidaristic conflicts. In addition, studying these deviating forms will allow us to determine the
conditions of existence of the normal state a little better. When we understand the circumstances in
which the division of labor ceases to produce solidarity, we may better know what is necessary for it do
so. Here, as always, understanding pathology is a valuable aid of study.
We will explore three types of the exceptional pathological state, not because there are no others, but
because these three are the most prevalent and the most serious.
Section 2. Seriousness of the problem
What makes these facts serious is that they have at times been considered natural effects of increasing
specialization. It is said that the individual becomes so isolated in his activity that he cannot appreciate
the work of his fellows. As a result, increasing the division of labor will only lead to a breakdown of
society.
If this were true, the division of labor would, by its very nature, work to dissolve rather than bind
society.
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Section 3. Examples of Lack of Regulation leading to Conflict; Explaining Anomie
We know that wherever organic solidarity is observed, we encounter at the same time an adequately
developed regulatory system which determines the mutual relations of functions. For organic solidarity
to exist, it is not sufficient that there is a system of organs dependent upon each other, but also that the
way in which they come together be predetermined in some manner. Otherwise, new calibrations would
constantly be necessary to create an equilibrium, as one part treats another part as adversary rather than
supplementary assistance. One could hardly expect solidarity if mutual obligations had to be freshly
fought over in each particular instance of specialization.
If the division of labor does not produce solidarity in such cases [examples omitted], it is because the
relations of the organs are not regulated. Rather, they are in a state of anomie.
But where does this state of anomie come from?
We can begin by saying that the state of anomie is impossible wherever organs are sufficiently in
contact or sufficiently prolonged such that a body of rules spontaneously emerges to establish relations
between social functions.
A function can be shared between two or more parts of an organism only if these parts are more or less
contiguous. Once labor is divided, thereby creating more interdependent functions, the distance
separating organs lessens.
But a set of exceptional circumstances, as in the case we have been discussing, can work differently.
Take the case of trade. As the organized type develops, markets merge, eventually embracing the whole
of society. Borders break down. The result is that each industry produces for consumers over the whole
surface of the planet. In this circumstance, mere contact is no longer sufficient to generate regulation.
Production appears limitless, and it becomes wild and unregulated. From this come recurrent economic
crises.
As the market extends beyond the vision of any one producer (or consumer), great industries appear and,
with them, new relations between employers and employees. Machines replace people; manufacturing
replaces craftsmanship. The worker is regimented, separated from his family during the day. Unlike the
worker of the Middle Ages, which often roomed with or near their employer, workers now live very far
from their employers. These are all relatively new conditions of industrial life and demand a new
organization. The problem is, as these changes have occurred so rapidly, the potential conflicts of
interest have yet to be equilibrated.
Looking at things this way permits us to rebut one of the great charges made against the division of
labor. It has been said that the division of labor degrades the worker by making him a mere machine.
Every day he repeats the same movements with monotonous regularity, without taking any personal
interest in them, and without understanding them. He is no longer a living cell of a living organism but
merely an inert piece of machinery, a mere set of hands put to work in the same direction and in the
same way.
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As a remedy for this state of things it has sometimes been proposed that workers be given a general
education, above and beyond any technical training for work. But let us suppose that we can relieve
some of these bad effects attributed to the division of labor in this way, that is not a means of preventing
those bad effects. The division is not going to change simply because workers are better educated.
Without a doubt it is good for the worker to be interested in art, literature, etc. but none of this is going
to change the fact that he is being treated like a machine at work all day long! Such a remedy would
merely make specialization intolerable and therefore impossible.
In order for the division of labor to develop without having disastrous consequences on us, it is
sufficient for it to be wholly itself, for nothing external to temper it. Normally, the role of each special
function does not hem us in our individual siloes, but rather keeps us in constant relations with all the
neighboring functions, keeping us aware to other needs and changes. The division of labor presumes that
we do not lose sight of our collaborators, and that we act upon them and react upon them. We are not
mere machines that repeat movements without knowing their meaning, but rather are we conscious that
our movements tend, in some way, towards some ultimate goal, which we may or may not have a clear
picture of in our minds. We feel that we are serving something. As special and uniform (or monotonous
or tedious) as our activity may be, it is that of an intelligent being, for it has a direction and we know
that.
Chapter 2. The Forced Division of Labor
Section 1. Class War follows from pathological state
However, it is not enough that there be rules, for sometimes the rules themselves cause trouble. This is
what happens in the struggle between classes. While the institution of classes and castes are themselves
strictly regulated organizations within the division of labor, this strict regulation itself is a source of
disharmony. The lower classes are no longer satisfied with the role given to them by custom or law and
they wish for positions that are closed to them. Further, they seek to throw over or dispossess those
exercising those functions! In such a way do internal civil wars arise as a result of the way in which
labor is distributed.
We see nothing like this in the biological organism. No cell or organ seeks to take on a role different
from the one it is filling. The reasons for this is that each anatomic element mechanically does its job. Its
constitution and its place in the organism determines what that job is; its function results from its
essential nature. It is very different in societies. There is a great distance between the hereditary
dispositions of the individual members and the jobs they fill. One’s birth does not imply one’s vocation.
But on the other hand, this also means that there are many reasons individuals can end up in jobs to
which they do not actually fit. Although we are not predestined to some particular position from birth,
we do have tastes and abilities which limit our choice. For the division of labor to produce solidarity is
not enough that each has his particular task but also that the task be appropriate to his tastes and abilities.
In this second pathological form, this condition is not met. If a system of class or caste sometimes
produces sharp pains instead of solidarity it is because the distribution of jobs on which it rests does not
accord with the distribution of natural talents. Constraint alone, more or less violent and more or less
direct, links people to their functions. When this happens, only an imperfect and troubled solidarity is
possible.
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Class war is not a necessary consequence of the division of labor. Conflict between classes happens only
under particular circumstances, when it is an effect of a social constraint upon the choice’s individuals
make in their selection of jobs. It is very different when class systems arise spontaneously out of the
freely chosen initiative of individuals. When this happens there is harmony between individual natures
and social functions. Ideally, the only factor determining the manner in which work is divided is the
diversity of capacities. Selection is made entirely through aptitude, since there is no other viable reason
for selection.
The forced division of labor is thus our second pathological form. Force or social constraint in this case
does not mean every kind of regulation, as we have already seen that the division of labor must be
regulated in order for it to produce solidarity. Constraint only begins when regulation no longer
corresponds to the true nature of things, when it is validated through force.
We could say, conversely, that the division of labor produces solidarity only if it is spontaneous. By that
we mean the absence of everything that can even indirectly hinder the free development of the
individual’s innate abilities. There can be no obstacle, of any kind, preventing a person from occupying
a place in the social framework which is compatible with their abilities. In a word, labor is divided
spontaneously only when society is constituted in such a way that social inequalities exactly express
natural inequalities. For that to happen, natural inequalities must be neither enhanced nor lowered by
some external influence. Perfect spontaneity is a consequence of absolute equality in the external
conditions of the conflict. It consists not in a state of anarchy which would allow people to satisfy all
their good or bad tendencies, but in an organization in which each social value would be judged by its
true worth. Some might object that, even under these conditions, there are winners and losers, and that
the latter will not accept defeat except when forced to do so. But this is not really the same thing at all.
It is also true that this perfect spontaneity exists in no society anywhere. Even in places where there
remains little vestige of past castes and legal restrictions against mobility, hereditary transmission of
wealth is enough to make the external conditions very unequal, for such gives advantages to some
beyond their personal worth. Even today there are jobs and positions that are closed or very hard to enter
for those who are without money.
Society is compelled to reduce these disparities as much as possible by assisting in various ways those
who find themselves at an unnatural disadvantage, aiding them in overcoming those disadvantages. We
feel obligated to leave free space for all merits and we regard as unjust any inferiority of position which
is not personally merited. It is a widely held belief today that equality among citizens is increasing and
that it is just that this is so.
Section 2. Reasons why progress towards equality is necessary
Equality is necessary not only to bring each person together with his function but also to link functions
to one another.
Conclusion
Section 3. The necessity of justice
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It is false to believe that all regulation is the product of constraint, because liberty itself is the product of
regulation. Liberty is not antagonistic to social action but is itself a result of social action. It is not an
inherent property of the state of nature. To the contrary, it is conquest of society over nature! Naturally,
humans are unequal in physical force; naturally they are placed under external conditions that advantage
some and disadvantage others. But liberty, liberty is the subordination of external forces to social forces,
for its only in these conditions that social forces can freely develop. This is the reverse of the natural
order. We can escape nature only by creating another world where we dominate nature. That world is
society.
The task of the most advanced societies is a work of justice. Just as the ideal of less advanced societies
was to create or maintain an intense common life, one in which the individual was completely absorbed,
so our ideal is to make social relations always more equitable, so that we assure the free development of
all our socially useful forces. Because the segmental type is disappearing as the organized type of
society develops, because organic solidarity is slowly substituted for that which arises through mere
likeness, it is absolutely necessary that external conditions become equal. The harmony of functions and
of our very existence as a society is at stake. Just as ancient people need a common faith to unite them,
so we need justice.
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Rules of Method
Émile Durkheim
“Social facts are something more than the actions of individuals.” – Durkheim
NOTE ON SOURCE: These passages are from Durkheim’s Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique,
published in 1895 in Paris by Alcan Press.
Introduction – What to Look For
In this book, Durkheim sets out to establish sociology as a research discipline. In the section you have
before you, he introduces readers to sociology and its methods. In particular, he describes the proper
subject matter of sociology as “social facts,” The method presented here, analyzing social facts, is what
distinguishes sociology from other pre-existing disciplines such as history and philosophy and sets it
apart from other newly emerging disciplines of the day, such as psychology1.
Part 1: The Rules of Sociological Method (introduction)
Until recently, sociologists have little cared to explain and define the method they use to study social
facts. This shouldn’t surprise us. So far, sociologists such as Spencer, Mill, and Comte, don’t go much
farther than talking about societies very generally. We still don’t have a method for doing sociology. I
have been fortunate to have the time to think about this subject and to come up with a method that I
think will prove useful. Some of these were used and discussed in my previous book, The Division of
Social Labor, but here I make them a bit more explicit. In this way, you, the reader, can see the way we
are going in this new field of sociology.
What is a Social Fact?
Before getting to the method, we need to know what facts are “social.” This is an important question,
because we need to know what is unique about the subject matter of sociology. We all drink, sleep, eat,
and think, and perhaps society has an interest in making sure we do these things in a regular manner. But
are these really social facts? Or are they simply things individuals do? How is sociology different from,
say, biology and psychology, both of which are also interested in these things?
In reality, there is in every society a certain group of things which are different from what the natural
sciences study. When I do my duty as a brother, as a husband, or as a citizen, when I fulfill my
obligations, pay my debts, take the actions expected of me by law and custom, I am acting in ways
outside of my own creation. I might want to take care of my children, but this isn’t all up to me. I have
specific duties that I in no way created all by myself. In a way, I inherited them, through being a
member of society. You could say I was socialized into them.
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The system of signs and words that I use to communicate my thoughts to others, the form of currency I
use to pay my debts, the practices I follow in my chosen profession – all these things and many more
function independently of my use of them.
Here we have the actions, the thoughts and the beliefs which uniquely exist outside each individual’s
own consciousness, and so provide a worthy subject for the study of sociology. Not only are these types
of conduct outside the thoughts of the individual person, but they have a certain coercive power. If I try
to resist it, I notice this quite readily.
Here then are an order of facts which present a special character: They consist in ways of acting,
thinking, and feeling that are external to the individual person, and endowed with a power of coercion.
These social facts are the proper subject matter for sociologists.
To confirm these, let’s take a look at the way we raise our children. It is quite obvious that all education
has consisted of a continual effort to impose on the child manners of seeing, sensing, and acting that
they would not otherwise have acquired. From the very first hours of his birth, we force him to eat, drink
and sleep at regular times, and we train him to be neat, calm, and obedient. Later, we socialize him to be
considerate of others, teach him to respect our customs, and prepare him for work. The goal of education
is thus all about socializing each member of society to be proper members of that society.
So, we should not define a social fact as something that is universal – while everyone eats and drinks
those things are still not social facts. What makes something a social fact is the collective aspect of the
beliefs, tendencies and practices of a group.
Collective habits don’t exist only in the actions of individuals, but rather express themselves over and
over in a form passed on by word of mouth from person to person, by education, or by the written word.
Such is the origin and nature of laws, morals, aphorisms and popular sayings...all of these are still social
facts and true even when someone is not following them!
Social facts are something more than the actions of individuals.
Let’s take the examples of marriage or suicide. These are things that are done by individuals and they
can appear quite private in nature. But we also know that certain groups get married at different rates,
and that the suicide rate is higher at one point in history than other, and that it varies by age of person as
well. Statistical measures allow us a way to isolate the collective aspect from the individual case, by
comparing rates across groups and times. If we look at the averages, we get a certain state of the
collective soul.
Sociology is the study of social facts. A social fact can be recognized by the coercive power it exercises
(or is capable of exercising) on individuals. We can recognize this coercive power by the existence of
sanctions – what happens when someone doesn’t follow the rule, practice, or custom? Note that this
includes whole ways of being, not just ways of acting. Everything we do and are that is not biologically
determined can be considered a social fact.
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A social fact is every way of being and acting, fixed or not, capable of exercising an external constraint
on the individual; in other words, it is that which is general in the whole society, independent from
individual manifestations.
Part 2
Chapter 2: Rules for the Observation of Social Facts
Section 1. Treat Social Facts as Things
The first rule, and the most fundamental, is to consider social facts as things.
People inevitably think about what is going on in their environment. They form concepts about such
things as marriage, the state, the relationships between parents and children. The problem is that we can
mistake these concepts for the things themselves. Thus, two people can argue about the definition of
marriage without examining marriage in reality. Sociologists have to do better than talk about the
concepts – they have to study the actual existing social facts. This is what it means to treat social facts as
things, with their own reality, and not as concepts in our minds only.
Such it is that reflection occurs before science, while science makes use of this reflection in a methodical
manner.
The goal of the rest of this book is to describe what that methodical manner is. Up until now, sociology
has only only dealt with concepts, not with the things themselves. Anyone who looks at society
teleologically, for example, trying to discover how progress evolves, takes things quite backwardly. This
is what Comte tried to do. How can one look at a perfect future society when it doesn’t yet exist? How
can one be scientific about that? Or consider those concerned with ethics. Here, one is discussing ideas
(what is good? What is just?) but not things in reality.
Putting all that aside, I have to reiterate that social phenomena are actual things and they should be
treated as things when we study them. Social facts as things are the unique subject matter of
sociological study. They are our data.
To treat phenomena as things, as data, is the point of departure for the science of sociology.
We can’t study the idea people have of what is valuable, but we can study the values they establish. We
can’t grasp the concept of goodness or rightness in the abstract, but we can examine the rules put in
place for governing good or right behavior. We can’t study the concept of wealth itself, but we can look
at the details of how our economy is organized.
We must consider social phenomena in themselves, not the ideas people have of them; we must study
them objectively, from the outside, for it is that quality that presents itself to us as sociologists.
How do we do this? If we want to study law, we can look at the codes. If we want to understand daily
life, we can look at all the recorded facts and figures about our attitudes and behaviors. We can see and
evaluate fashion through costume, “taste” in works of art. Compared to psychology, the data we study as
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sociologists might be more difficult to analyze because of their complexity, but they are much easier to
get hold of.
Section 2. Guidelines for Sociologists
The fundamental rule for sociologists is to treat social things as things, but there are several corollary
rules and guidelines for how to do that.
First, systematically rid yourself of all preconceived ideas.
You are a human being yourself and hold ideas and prejudices about the world. When you are a
sociologist, however, you have to be objective, neutral about the facts you are studying. Really, that is
the essence of the scientific method.
Second, operationalize your data in advance and then examine all cases that fit your definition.
For example, we group together all those acts which produce a certain social reaction, punishment, and
call them crimes. We don’t pick and choose what is or is not a crime based on what we personally think
should be one. By doing this we assure ourselves that we are grounded in reality.
Third, consider social facts from a point distinct from their individual manifestations.
Section 3. Rules on the distinction between Normal and Pathological
We must be careful to distinguish between observing things that are as they ought to be and observing
things that are not as they ought to be – what I am calling “normal” and “pathological” phenomena.
Some people say that it is not the place of science to say whether something is as it ought to be or
otherwise. There is no “good and evil” in science. But if science cannot help us in selecting the best
goals to pursue, how it can it help us arrive at the goal?
Here is my solution to the problem. Just as with individual people, societies can be healthy, or they can
be sick. Sociology can help us distinguish the two. We can’t say what is healthy for any one individual,
of course, but we can find out what is healthy for society as a whole. Health, we can say, is that which is
most adaptive to the particular environment and sickness is that which upsets that adaptation. Or, health
is that state in which our chances of survival (as a society) are greatest. We do not mean the health of
any one particular individual.
Two examples: old age is not a sickness, because it is a normal stage of the species. Menstruation is not
a sickness, because it is a normal activity of women. The absence of either of these two normal
phenomena would not mark “health,” but rather sickness!
How are we to recognize sickness then? We should look for some notable external sign (again, treating
social facts as things). Those facts which appear common among a society (or a group thereof, such as
women), we shall call normal, and the rest we can call pathological. Just as the physiologist looks at the
average organism, so too does the sociologist. Furthermore, a social fact is normal in a given group in
relation to particular context (temporal and spatial).
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Why is the normal considered healthy? It would be surprising if the most widespread phenomena were
not beneficial, at least at the aggregate level. Why else would they exist and persist for so long? The
greater frequency of normal phenomena can be taken as proof of their health. During times of transition,
however, what is normal is often hard to pin down. So, it is also important to take the following steps:
(1) find a widespread social fact; (2) trace back the conditions of the past, the environmental context,
which gave birth to this fact; and (3) investigate whether the environmental context has shifted. If the
conditions that gave rise to it are still the same, and it is general, we can consider it normal. If not, it may
be maladapted to the present circumstances and in need of change.
The Example of Crime. It would seem that crime would be pathological. Who would doubt that? But let
us use our method and examine the question more closely. Crime is observed everywhere, in every
society. It would indeed be hard to find a social fact that is more general. It is thus normal, and must be
doing something for society, else it would not be normal for so long and in so many different places. It is
normal because it is absolutely impossible for a society to exist without it. Crime offends our individual
and collective notions about what is right. To have no crime means that every single person would agree
what those notions are (which seems impossible, given that we are individuals). It would also mean that
nothing would ever change, because no one would be doing anything against the collective will. To have
no crime means we would have no originality, no thinking against the herd, and we must have some of
this because nothing is good at all times without limits. Sometimes, too, crimes of today prepare the way
for moralities of the future.
Looked at this way, the criminal must be seen a playing a normal role in society. We can follow the
crime rate and be alarmed if it gets too high, or even if it gets too low – because something is out of
balance then, and we may be stifling individuals too much. It may be that we are viewing punishment all
wrong. If crime is not a sickness, then we can’t “cure” it through punishment. We have to look
elsewhere.
No longer should we desperately pursue an end which we might never grasp, but rather should we work
diligently to keep things going and to recalibrate when necessary, and to recover our health when things
change. The leader should not push us violently toward an ideal only she might hold, but be more like a
doctor, who checks in on our health, and seeks to cure our illnesses when they are discovered.
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Elementary Forms of Religious Life
Émile Durkheim
“Religious representation of the world are collective representations that express collective realities.” Durkheim
NOTE ON SOURCE: The first passage is from Durkheim’s Les Formes Elementaires de la Vie
Religieuse: le systeme totemique en Australia, published in 1912 in Paris by Alcan Press. It was first
translated as The Elementary Forms of Religious Life in 1915 by Joseph War Swain and published by
the Free Press. Additional excerpts are from Project Gutenberg archive of public domain works.
Introduction – What to Look For
Although Durkheim’s 1912 book may appear to be about religion, it is actually much more than that. As
the introduction to the book makes clear, Durkheim is interested in the very deepest elements of human
mentality and society. When reading this introduction, pay attention to the claims Durkheim makes
about the origins of human thought and the connections to his conception of people as inherently social
beingsf1.
The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (Introduction)
Part 1: The Sociological Study of Religion
In this book, we propose to study, the most primitive and the most simple religion known to us, to
analyze and explain it. What makes a religious system simple? In the first place, it is found in societies
whose social organization is simple. In the second place, we can study it without having to refer to
anything borrowed from an earlier religion.
We shall try to describe all the elements of this system with the exactitude and fidelity of an
anthropologist or a historian. But that is not all. Sociology sets for itself problems other than those faced
by the anthropologist or historian. Like all positive science, our real object is us, us as we live now. We
don’t study old religions to discover its bizarre attributes, but because we think studying it will allow us
to say something, to reveal something important, about the enduring aspects of our religious nature.
That proposition, that we study old religions to discover something about who we are today, will likely
raise objections among some of you, for various reasons. Some might say we are using these older
religions as a weapon against religion itself. One could argue that current religions, such as Christianity,
rest on the same kinds of superstitions that these earlier religions appear to do. But that is not what we
are saying here. To the sociologist, any human institution cannot survive for long if it is based on error
or lies. The most barbarous or bizarre rituals, the strangest myths, respond to some human need, some
aspect of life, individual or social. The reasons given by the believer to justify these myths and practices
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may be erroneous, but there are reasons for their existence. It is the job of science to discover these
reasons.
After all, there are no false religions. All are true in their own fashion. All are responses, in different
manners, to the human condition.2
There are several reasons to study religion in its simplest form. First, we can understand religions today
only by following how religions developed over time. Whenever we wish to understand a human thing
at a period in time, such as a religious belief, a moral regulation, a legal precepts, an aesthetic technique,
an economic regime – we must start at the beginning, when it was most simple. It is very difficult to
figure out what is fundamental in complex systems. There are simply too many variables! When
studying religion, it is hard to see what is in common to them all when we take as our object of study
modern religions, because they are so different, so complex, and often include elements that were
historically contingent.
It is very different when we look at inferior3 societies. Because these societies show less
individualization and more overall homogeneity, there are fewer variations to contend with. The group
exhibits a level of intellectual and moral uniformity rare in modern society. Everything is common to
everyone. People do the same things, in a particular manner, over and over again. Thus, “primitive”
civilizations are our best cases for finding what is common to all, because they are simple. Not only do
primitive religions allow us to separate out the constituent elements of religion, but they also help us
explain it. Because the facts are simpler, the connections between the facts are more obvious. Like the
physicist, who simplifies the laws of phenomena he studies by getting rid of secondary phenomena, we
take as our object of study early simple religions.
Part 2. Theories of Knowledge
But our study is not only of interest as a study of religion. All religions convey ideas and phenomena
that are more than merely religious. These ideas can furnish us with ways of understanding problems
that we have so far only debated philosophically.
For a long time, we have known that the first systems people devised to represent the world and
themselves arose from their religion. There is no religion which is not at the same time both a
cosmology and a speculation about divinity. If philosophy and science in general developed out of
religious thinking, it is because religion itself began as a way of knowing and thinking about the world.
For example, we can only think of time by thinking of the ways we measure it and each of those
measurements – minutes, hours, weeks, years – correspond to social arrangements. They are borrowed
from social life. A calendar expresses the rhythm of collective activity at the same time that it functions
to ensure its regularity. A similar thing is true of space. In order to arrange things spatially, we have to
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set some above, some below, some beneath, some above, some on the left, some on the right, etc. – all
of these divisions arise out of social divisions
Thus, social organization has been the model of spatial organization, which is like a tracing of the
former. There is no distinction between left and right in human nature – the distinction is in reality the
product of religious (collective) representations.
If, as we believe, these categories are essentially collective representations, they translate relations of the
collective. They depend on the way this collective is constituted and organized, on its morphology, and
its religious, moral, and economic institutions. Between these two types of representations is all the
distance that separates the individual from the social, and you can no more derive the second from the
first than society from the individual, the whole from a part, or the complex from the simple. Society is
in reality its own thing. It has its own characteristics which are not found, or not found in the same form,
in the entire rest of the universe.
Collective representations are the product of an immense cooperation that extends across time and space
– an accumulation of generations of experience and knowledge. Each of us is an individual, yes, with
our own private sensations and thoughts. But each of us is also part of society. Because we participate in
society, we naturally go beyond our individual selves when we think and when we act. Categories (of
time, space, etc.) allow us to do this. In order to work, society needs some minimal level of logical
conformity. We cannot easily slip out of these ways of understanding the world. They exert a pressure
on us, a kind of moral necessity.
Chapter I Definition of Religious Phenomena and of Religion4
This section of Elementary Forms includes several key concepts from Durkheim’s work. Specifically pay
attention to his discussion of “sacred and profane” as well as how a sense of collectiveness shapes
human behavior.
These definitions set aside, let us set ourselves before the problem.
First of all, let us remark that in all these formulae it is the nature of religion as a whole that they seek to
express. They proceed as if it were a sort of indivisible entity, while, as a matter of fact, it is made up of
parts; it is a more or less complex system of myths, dogmas, rites and ceremonies. Now a whole cannot
be defined except in relation to its parts. It will be more methodical, then, to try to characterize the
various elementary phenomena of which all religions are made up, before we at- tack the system
produced by their union. This method is imposed still more forcibly by the fact that there are religious
phenomena which be- long to no determined religion. Such are those phenomena which constitute the
matter of folklore. In general, they are the debris of passed religions, inorganized survivals; but there are
some which have been formed spontaneously under the influence of local causes. In our European
countries Christianity has forced itself to absorb and assimilate them; it has given them a Christian
colouring. Nevertheless, there are many which have persisted up until a recent date, or which still exist
with a relative autonomy: celebrations of May Day, the summer solstice or the carnival, beliefs relative
4
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to genii, local demons, etc., are cases in point. If the religious character of these facts is now
diminishing, their religious importance is nevertheless so great that they have enabled Mannhardt and
his school to revive the science of religions. A definition which did not take account of them would not
cover all that is religious.
Religious phenomena are naturally arranged in two fundamental categories: beliefs and rites. The first
are states of opinion and consist in representations; the second are determined modes of action. Between
these two classes of facts there is all the difference which separates thought from action.
The rites can be defined and distinguished from other human practices, moral practices, for example,
only by the special nature of their object. A moral rule prescribes certain manners of acting to us, just as
a rite does, but which are addressed to a different class of objects. So it is the object of the rite which
must be characterized, if we are to characterize the rite itself. Now it is in the beliefs that the special
nature of this object is expressed. It is possible to define the rite only after we have defined the belief.
All known religious beliefs, whether simple or complex, present one common characteristic: they
presuppose a classification of all the things, real and ideal, of which men think, into two classes or
opposed groups, generally designated by two distinct terms which are translated well enough by the
words profane and sacred (profane, sacré). This division of the world into two domains, the one
containing all that is sacred, the other all that is profane, is the distinctive trait of religious thought; the
beliefs, myths, dogmas and legends are either representations or systems of representations which
express the nature of sacred things, the virtues and powers which are attributed to them, or their relations
with each other and with profane things. But by sacred things one must not understand simply those
personal beings which are called gods or spirits; a rock, a tree, a spring, a pebble, a piece of wood, a
house, in a word, anything can be sacred. A rite can have this character; in fact, the rite does not exist
which does not have it to a certain degree. There are words, expressions and formulae which can be
pronounced only by the mouths of consecrated persons; there are gestures and movements which
everybody cannot perform. If the Vedic sacrifice has had such an efficacy that, according to mythology,
it was the creator of the gods, and not merely a means of winning their favour, it is because it possessed
a virtue comparable to that of the most sacred beings. The circle of sacred objects cannot be determined,
then, once for all. Its extent varies infinitely, according to the different religions
Conclusion
For our definition of the sacred is that it is something added to and above the real: now the ideal answers
to this same definition; we cannot explain one without explaining the other. In fact, we have seen that if
collective life awakens religious thought on reaching a certain degree of intensity, it is because it brings
about a state of effervescence which changes the conditions of psychic activity. Vital energies are overexcited, passions more active, sensations stronger; there are even some which are produced only at this
moment. A man does not recognize himself; he feels himself transformed and consequently he
transforms the environment which surrounds him. In order to account for the very particular impressions
which he receives, he attributes to the things with which he is in most direct contact properties which
they have not, exceptional powers and virtues which the objects of every-day experience do not possess.
In a word, above the real world where his profane life passes he has placed another which, in one sense,
does not exist except in thought, but to which he attributes a higher sort of dignity than to the first. Thus,
from a double point of view it is an ideal world.
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The formation of the ideal world is therefore not an irreducible fact which escapes science; it depends
upon conditions which observation can touch; it is a natural product of social life. For a society to
become conscious of itself and maintain at the necessary degree of intensity the sentiments which it thus
attains, it must assemble and concentrate itself. Now this concentration brings about an exaltation of the
mental life which takes form in a group of ideal conceptions where is portrayed the new life thus
awakened; they correspond to this new set of psychical forces which is added to those which we have at
our disposition for the daily tasks of existence. A society can neither create itself nor recreate itself
without at the same time creating an ideal. This creation is not a sort of work of supererogation for it, by
which it would complete itself, being already formed; it is the act by which it is periodically made and
remade. Therefore when some oppose the ideal society to the real society, like two antagonists which
would lead us in opposite directions, they materialize and oppose abstractions. The ideal society is not
out- side of the real society; it is a part of it. Far from being divided between them as between two poles
which mutually repel each other, we cannot hold to one without holding to the other. For a society is not
made up merely of the mass of individuals who compose it, the ground which they occupy, the things
which they use and the movements which they perform, but above all is the idea which it forms of itself.
It is undoubtedly true that it hesitates over the manner in which it ought to conceive itself; it feels itself
drawn in divergent directions. But these conflicts which break forth are not between the ideal and
reality, but between two different ideals, that of yesterday and that of to-day, that which has the
authority of tradition and that which has the hope of the future. There is surely a place for investigating
whence these ideals evolve; but whatever solution may be given to this problem, it still remains that all
passes in the world of the ideal.
Thus the collective ideal which religion expresses is far from being due to a vague innate power of the
individual, but it is rather at the school of collective life that the individual has learned to idealize. It is in
assimilating the ideals elaborated by society that he has become capable of conceiving the ideal. It is
society which, by leading him within its sphere of action, has made him acquire the need of raising
himself above the world of experience and has at the same time furnished him with the means of
conceiving another. For society has constructed this new world in constructing itself, since it is society
which this expresses. Thus both with the individual and in the group, the faculty of idealizing has
nothing mysterious about it. It is not a sort of luxury which a man could get along without, but a
condition of his very existence. He could not be a social being, that is to say, he could not be a man, if
he had not acquired it. It is true that in incarnating themselves in individuals, collective ideals tend to
individualize themselves. Each understands them after his own fashion and marks them with his own
stamp; he suppresses certain elements and adds others. Thus the personal ideal disengages itself from the
social ideal in proportion as the individual personality develops itself and becomes an autonomous
source of action. But if we wish to understand this aptitude, so singular in appearance, of living outside
of reality, it is enough to connect it with the social conditions upon which it depends.
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Suicide - Introduction/Book 2
Émile Durkheim
“One can only explain what can be compared.” -Durkheim
NOTE ON SOURCE: This passage is from Durkheim’s Le Suicide: Etude de Sociologie, t translated as
Suicide: A Study in Sociology in 1951 by Spaulding and Simpson and published by the Free Press.
Introduction – What to Look For
When reading an important but difficult work like Suicide, it is often useful to spend the most time
reading the introduction. Here, Durkheim, always very organized, sets forth the problem and the
methods he will use to address the problem. As always with Durkheim, he first sets out a definition of
any key concepts – here, “suicide.”1
Introduction
One hears the word suicide used many times in the course of conversation, so one could believe that
everyone knows what it means and that defining it would be unnecessary. But in reality, the usual words
used, like the concepts they express, are always ambiguous and the researcher who uses the everyday
language without further elaboration exposes him to grave confusion. Not only is the understanding of
the term so vaguely defined that it changes from one circumstance to another, but it also results in
categories of very different things being called the same thing or else things that are quite the same
being called by different names. One can only explain what can be compared. A scientific investigation
can only be successful if it deals with comparable facts. The more comparable facts, the likelier the
success of analysis. The scientist cannot use the groups of facts as categorized in everyday speech,
however. He must construct the groups that she wishes to study, in order to ensure the homogeneity and
specificity of what she is comparing.
Our first task then is to determine the order of things we propose to study under the name of ‘Suicide.”
... We arrive at our first formula: “Suicide is any death which results directly or indirectly from an act
(negative or positive) of the victim himself.”
But this definition is incomplete. What about the confused man who jumps out of a window, thinking it
is level with the ground?] Should we say that suicide is only an act resulting in death when the victim
has that result in mind? But how can we ever get into another’s mind this way and know if he or she
intended to die? Intention is a thing too intimate to be grasped by an outsider...how many times have we
ourselves mistaken the motives of our own acts! For example, when we explain what we do in terms of
generous intentions or elevated considerations when we are really inspirited by petty jealousies or blind
habit.
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Suicide is any death which results directly or indirectly from a positive or negative act by the victim and
which the victim should know will produce such a result.
But is the thing we have so defined of interest to the sociologist? Because suicide is an act of the
individual that affects the individual as such, it appears to depend exclusively on individual factors and
to be more psychological than sociological.
We can, in fact, look at this from a different perspective. Instead of seeing particular events, isolated
from one another, each suicide the result of its own individual factors, we can consider all the suicides
committed in a given society over a given period of time. By doing so, we actually arrive at something
that constitutes a new fact – not simply a sum of many parts, but a wholly new social fact to be observed
and analyzed.
Each society, at each moment of its history, has a particular aptitude towards suicide. We can measure
the relative intensity of this aptitude by figuring the total number of voluntary deaths in the population
of every age and sex. We call the resulting figure the rate of mortality-suicide for that particular society.
Our intention is not to provide a complete inventory of all the possible conditions that can give rise to
particular suicides, but to investigate what lies behind the social rate of suicide. There are surely many
individual conditions that are not general enough to affect the social rate. These individual conditions
may lead this or that isolated individual to commit suicide regardless of whether the society has a strong
or weak tendency towards suicide. Those conditions concern the psychologist, not the sociologist. What
the sociologist investigates are those causes which work not on isolated individuals, but on the group. Of
all possible causes of suicide, only those which have an effect on the whole of society are of interest to
us. The suicide rate is the product of these factors, which is why we must consider them.
That is the aim of the present work, which consists of three parts.
FIRST, the phenomenon we are trying to explain must result from extra-social causes, generally
speaking, or specifically social ones. In the first section we ask what is the influence of the former, and
see that it is almost nothing, or very little.
SECOND, we determine the nature of the social causes, the way they produce their effects, and the
relationship with the individual states that accompany the different kinds of suicide.
THIRD, we will be able to state with more clarity of what consists the social element of suicide, that is
to say, the collective tendency of which we have spoken, how it is connected to other social facts and the
means by which it is possible to act upon it.
Book TWO: Social Causes and Social Types
Chapter 1: Method of Determining Them
We have established that there exists for each social group a specific tendency towards suicide that is
explained by neither the physiological makeup of individuals nor the physical environment. After
eliminating these extra-social factors, we see that the rate of suicide must depend upon social causes and
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itself exist as a collective phenomenon. This collective tendency toward suicide is what we now must
study.
To this end, leaving aside the individual as individual, with her motives and her ideas, we will ask what
it is about different social walks of life (religious, family, political, professional) that cause the rate of
suicide to vary. It is only after doing this, coming back to individuals, that we can discover how these
general causes are individualized to produce murderous results.
Chapter 2. Egotistical Suicide
Let us first observe in what way the different religious faiths affect suicide.
Although some might point out the prohibition against suicide as a reason for the lower suicide rate
among Catholics, this does not really explain things. Why? Because Protestants also forbid suicide and
the prohibition is the least important among Jews, who have the lowest rate.
If Protestantism favors the development of suicide, it is not because it views it more tolerably than
Catholicism. If the two religions both prohibit suicide, then their unequal effect on suicide must lie
somewhere else, in one of the more general characteristics that differentiate the two. The only essential
difference between these two religions is that Protestantism admits much more free inquiry than
Catholicism....We are now reaching our first conclusion, that the greater tendency towards suicide
among Protestants must be related to the spirit of free inquiry that animates this religion. But free
inquiry itself is the result of a previous cause.
The more ways there are to act and think that are marked as religious and thus removed from free
inquiry, the more the very idea of God will be present in every aspect of life and thus make individual
wills converge toward a single end. On the other hand, the greater the religious group abandons
judgment on particulars, the more it will be absent in the lives of its members, and the less cohesion and
vitality it will retain. We have thus arrived at the conclusion that the greater rate of suicide among
Protestants is due to its being less strongly integrated than the Catholic church. Two important
conclusions have emerged from this chapter.
ONE, we see why, generally speaking, suicide increases along with scientific knowledge. It is not that
science is causing more suicide – it is in itself innocent and nothing is more unjust than this accusation.
Rather, these two facts (more suicide and scientific progress) are the result of a single general state.
People search for science and people kill themselves at greater rates because religion has lost its
cohesion. It is not that science undermines religion but rather that, because religion is falling apart, our
thirst for knowledge is awakened. Science is not sought as a way to destroy accepted ideas, but because
those ideas are no longer accepted. Far from being the source of the problem, science is the only remedy
we now have. Once established beliefs have been cleared away by time, they cannot be reestablished
artificially. It is only reflection that can guide our lives. Once the social instinct is deadened, intelligence
is the only guide we can depend upon to refashion our moral conscience. However perilous the
enterprise, we cannot hesitate, because we have no other choice. Let those who look on the collapse of
old beliefs with anxiety and sadness stop blaming science of an evil it has not caused, for it is science,
on the contrary, which can provide our only cure! Do not treat science like the enemy! Science is the
only weapon we have to permit us to struggle against the dissolution which itself has produced science.
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It is not by gagging science that one can restore authority to disappearing traditions: we will only render
ourselves impotent to replace them.
TWO, we can see why, generally speaking, religion has a prophylactic effect on suicide. This is not, as
sometimes said, because it prohibits suicide. Protestants believe in God and in the immortality of the
soul no less than do Catholics. It is not the special nature of religions concepts that explains the
beneficial influence of religion. If religion protects one against the desire to commit suicide, is it is not
because it preaches respect for the person but because religion is a community. It is because the
Protestant community does not have the same degree of consistency as the others that it cannot moderate
suicide as well.
Chapter 3. Egotistical Suicide, continued
But if religion protects against suicide because and to the extent that it is a society, it is probable that
other social groups produce the same effect….
We have now established the three propositions:
•
•
•

Suicide varies with the degree of integration of religious society
Suicide varies with the degree of integration of domestic society
Suicide varies with the degree of integration of political society

This similarity in our three propositions shows that, while these different communities have a
moderating effect on suicide, it is not because of characteristics peculiar to them but for some reason
common to them all. There must be a single property shared by all these group, albeit in different
degrees. And the only quality that satisfies this condition is that they are all strongly integrated social
groups. So, we arrive at this general conclusion: Suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration
of the social groups to which the individual belongs. The more the groups to which a person belong are
weakened, the less the person depends upon them and the more he depends upon herself. He recognizes
no other rules of conduct than those based on his own individual interests. If we call this state in which
the individual affirms himself more than the social self and depends upon the former more than latter,
“egoism,” then we might call the type of suicide that results from excessive individualization “egoistic
suicide.”
Chapter 5. Anomic Suicide
Society is not only an object that attracts to it the feelings and actions of people, but also a force that
directs them. There is a relationship between the operation of this regulatory action and the social rate of
suicide.
First, it is in that economic crises aggravate the suicide rate. [Interestingly, both increases in prosperity
and economic crises that lead to poverty have the same result.] It is because they are critical,
disturbances in the collective order, that we see more suicide. Whenever serious rearrangements take
place in society, whether due to sudden growth or unanticipated disaster, people are more inclined to kill
themselves. Why? A few preliminary considerations are necessary before we can properly address this
question.
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Nobody can be happy or alive, really, unless their needs are adjusted to their means. That is, if they
demand more than they can be provided with, or desire something that is unavailable to them, they will
be constantly frustrated and unable to function without suffering. Any action that cannot be done
without suffering tends not to be repeated. Thus, unsatisfied aptitudes atrophy, including the general
appetite for life.
In non-human animals, the balance between needs and means occurs somewhat spontaneously, because
it depends on material conditions alone. Their reflective abilities are so low that they cannot imagine any
ends except those dependent on physical nature. They do not want more than what they can achieve.
But the same is not true for non-human animals, most of whose needs are not dependent on the body
alone. There seems never an end to the amount of well-being, comfort, and luxury that a human being
can legitimately seek. There is nothing in our make-up that marks a limit to our desires. Our sensibility
is a bottomless pit that nothing can fill.
If this is the case, that our desires can only be a source of torment for us. Unlimited desires, by
definition, do not satisfy.
For things to be otherwise, it is necessary that passions should be limited. It is only in this way that they
can be in line with our actual abilities and so satisfied. But since there is nothing in the individual person
that can limit desires, this limitation must come from some other sources: a regulatory force for nonphysical desires, a moral force. Only society can play this moderating role, because it is the only moral
power above it accepted by the individual. Society alone has the necessary authority to state the law and
to set the point beyond which the passions may not go.
So, at every historical moment, there is a vague feeling in the moral conscience of societies of the
relative worth of each job, what is owed to each person for the work they do [e.g., financial analyst,
ditch digger, politician, minister]. The different jobs are, in a way, hierarchized in public opinion and a
certain level of well-being is attributed to each according to the place it occupies in this hierarchy. For
example, in the common view there is a certain standard of living that is regarded as the upper limit of
which a day laborer can reasonably aspire to, and also a lower limit below which it is considered he
should not be allowed to fall, absent some serious failure in his duties.
Everyone has a vague idea, in their particular sphere, of the limit towards which their ambition may
reach, and does not aspire beyond that limit. A goal and a limit are thus set for desires. There is nothing
rigid or absolute about this, of course. There is a lot of wiggle room within those set limits. In general,
each person is in harmony with her condition and wants only what he can legitimately wish for as the
normal reward for his activity. The balance of his happiness is stable because it is defined.
However, if we did not consider the way jobs were allocated in the first place as fair, none of this would
work. The worker is not in harmony with his social position if hs is not convinced that this position is
the one that he deserves! If he considers that he deserves another, then the one that he has cannot
possibly satisfy him, (even if the standard of living for that job is reasonably set).
There is no society that has ever existed that has not a set of rules settling the way in which different
social conditions (e.g., laborer or owner? ditch-digger or financial analyst?) are open to individuals,
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although these rules have varied across time and place. In the past, birth was the almost exclusive
principle of social classification, while today we accept inherited wealth and merit up to a point, but not
“birth” alone.
Today, some have argued that we are approaching a situation where each person can enter life with the
same resources, and the struggle between competitors happens on conditions of perfect equality, and
thus no one can consider the results unfair. Everyone should feel spontaneously that things are as they
should be. There is no doubt that as we approach such an ideal of equality, there will be less social
constraint needed, but it is only a matter of degree because there will always be some things, such as
natural gifts, that are inherited. So, we will always need a moral discipline to make those whom nature
has least favored accept the more lowly position that they owe to the chance of their birth.
Yet even this regime can only work if it is considered fair by the people subjected to it. When it is no
longer maintained except by custom and by force, peace and harmony cannot exist. A spirit of anxiety
and discontent lurks beneath the surface, and appetites which cannot be satisfied break out. This is what
happened in Rome and Ancient Greece and recently in our day when aristocratic prejudices started to
lose their old ascendancy. But such states of disruption are exceptional and only take place when society
is in crisis. Normally, the collective order seems fair by the great majority of its subjects.
When we say that authority is necessary, we do not mean violence is the only means it can be
established. People should follow authority out of respect and not fear. It is not true that human activity
can be freed from all restraints. There is nothing in the world that can enjoy such a state of things, since
each creature on the planet exists in relation to all others. Its nature depends not only on itself but on
other creatures. It is only a matter of degree the difference between a mineral and a thinking subject.
What is peculiar to human creatures is that the restraint we find ourselves in is not physical but moral,
which is to say, social. We receive our laws not from a material environment which is brutally imposed
on us, but from a conscience which is greater than our own. Because the greater and best part of our life
goes beyond the body, we escape from the yoke of the body, but bow beneath that of society.
However, when society is disturbed, either by a painful crisis or by a fortunate but too-sudden
transformation, it cannot exercise this constraining function; as a result, we see a rise in the suicide rate.
If anomie [the state of unregulation] were to occur only in occasional bursts and in the form of acute
crises, it might from time to time vary the social rate of suicide, but it would not be a regular constant
factor. However, there is one area of social life in which we find a chronic state of anomie... the world of
trade and industry.
For more than a century, economic progress has consisted primarily in deregulating industry. Until
modern times, a whole system of moral powers was in place to discipline industrial relations (religion,
custom, government power).
Now, the state of crisis and anomie is constant – the new normal, one could say. From top to bottom,
desires and wants are aroused that cannot be satisfied. The real seems worthless beside what is seen as
possible by fevered imaginations. One thirsts for novelty. These circumstances are so well established
that society has got used to them. People constantly say that it is part of human nature to be constantly

82

discontented, to keep wanting more, pressing forward, to some indeterminate goal. The doctrine of
progress no matter what and as fast as possible has become our article of faith.
Industrial and commercial professions are among the most suicide-prone of all professions, much more
so than agriculture, for example.
Anomie is therefore a regular and specific factor in suicide in our modern societies. This form of suicide
depends not on the way in which people are attached to society but on the way in which it controls them
(or fails to do so). Egotistical suicide happens when people no longer see any sense in living; altruistic
suicide from the fact that this sense appears to them to be situated beyond life itself; and the third kind,
anomic suicide, from their activity being disrupted and from their suffering as a result.
Anomic suicide is not unrelated to egotistical suicide. Both occur when society is not sufficiently present
for individuals. But whereas in egotistical suicide society is lacking in collective activity, leaving it
deprived of object and meaning, in anomic suicide society is absent as a brake to control individual
passions. Though the two are related, they are interdependent. These two kinds of suicide do not recruit
their victims from the same social contexts: the first recruits from the world of thinking people; the
second from the industrial and commercial field.
Economic anomie is not the only kind of anomie that can produce suicide, however. A few other noneconomic cases include: widowhood, divorce. Marriage appears to favor the wife in respect of suicide to
the extent that divorce is more common (with fewer suicides when less common). We here reach a
conclusion that is at odds with some commonly held beliefs about marriage. It is thought that marriage
benefits the wife, protecting her from sexual attacks of men in general. Monogamy is often presented as
a sacrifice that men make to their polygamous instincts in order to raise and improve the condition of
woman through marriage. In reality, whatever the historical causes that made men decide to impose this
restriction on himself, it is the man who most benefits from it. The freedom which he has given up could
only be a source of torment for him. Women are a different matter. One can say that, by submitting
herself to the same regime, she is the one who truly makes the sacrifice.
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Social Consciousness
Charles Horton Cooley
“Self and society go together, as phases of a common whole.” - Cooley
NOTE ON SOURCE: This passage is from an article published by Charles Horton Cooley in 1907. The
entire article is entitled “was published in the American Journal of Sociology in March 1907 (volume
12, number 5, pp, 675-694). It has been abbreviated for publication here.
Introduction – What to Look For
Cooley is well-known as the originator of the concept of the “looking glass self,” the idea that our
notions of our individual selves are formed by observing how others perceive and respond to us. In this
article, Cooley describes the existence of the “social mind.” When reading, think about how Cooley
connects this with the issue of social reform. Compare him to Durkheim in both respects.1
Social Mind in General
Mind is an organic whole made up of co-operating individualities, in somewhat the same way that the
music of an orchestra is made up of divergent but related sounds. No one would think it necessary or
reasonable to divide the music into two kinds— that made by the whole and that of particular
instruments; and no more are there two› kinds of mind—the social mind and the individual mind. When
we study the social mind, we merely fix our attention on larger aspects and relations, rather than on the
narrower ones of ordinary psychology.
The unity of the social mind consists, not in agreement, but in organization, in the fact of reciprocal
influence or causation among its parts, by virtue of which everything that takes place in it is connected
with everything else, and so is an outcome of the whole. Whether, like the orchestra, it gives forth
harmony may be a matter of dispute, but that its sound, pleasing or otherwise, is the expression of a vital
cooperation, cannot well be denied.
Social and Individual Aspects of Consciousness
In the social mind we may distinguish – very roughly, of course, – conscious and unconscious relations.
The unconscious relations are those of which we are not aware; which, in one way or another escape our
notice. A great part of the influences at work upon us are of this character. Our language, our
mechanical arts, our government and other institutions, we derive chiefly from people to whom we are
but indirectly and unconsciously related. And although the growth of social consciousness is perhaps the
greatest fact of history, it has still but a narrow and fallible grasp of human life. Social consciousness, or
awareness of society, is inseparable from self-consciousness, because we can hardly think of ourselves
excepting with reference to a social group of some sort, nor of the group except with reference to
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ourselves. The two things go together, and what we are really aware of is a, more or less complex
personal or social whole, of which now the particular, now the general aspect is emphasized.
The “I”-consciousness does not explicitly appear until a child is about two years old, and, when it does
appear, it comes in inseparable conjunction with the consciousness of other persons and of those
relations which make up a social group. It is, in fact, simply one phase of a body of personal thought
which is self- consciousness in one aspect and social consciousness in another.
Self and society go together. as phases of a common whole. I am aware of the social groups in which I
live as immediately and authentically as I am aware of myself; and Descartes might have said “you
think” or “we think,” on as good grounds as he said “I think therefore I am”.
But it may be said this very consciousness that you are considering is, after all, located in a particular
person, and so are all similar consciousness, so that what we see, if we take an objective view of the
matter, is merely an aggregate of individualities, however social those individualities may be. Commonsense, most people think, assures us that the separate person is the primary fact of life.
If so, it is because common-sense has been trained by custom to look at one aspect of things and not
another. Common-sense, moderately informed, assures us that the individual has her being only as a part
of a whole. What does not come by heredity comes by communication and intercourse; and the more
closely we look, the more apparent it is that separateness is an illusion of the eye, and community the
inner truth. “Social organism”— using the term in no technical sense, but merely to mean a vital unity in
human life—is a fact as obvious to enlightened common- sense as individuality.
There is, then, no mystery about social consciousness. The view that there is something recondite about
it, and that it must be dug for with metaphysics and drawn forth from the depths of speculation, springs
from a failure to grasp adequately the social nature of all higher consciousness. What we need in this
connection is only a better seeing and understanding of rather ordinary and familiar facts.
Social Will
Social will differs from public opinion only in implying a more continuous and efficient organization. It
is merely public opinion become an effective guide to social development.
It is quite plain that the development of the past has been mostly blind and without human intention.
Any page of history shows that men have been unable to foresee, much less to control, the larger
movements of life. Statesmen have lived in the present, having no purpose beyond the aggrandizement
of their own country, their order, or their family. Such partial exceptions as the American Constitution
are confined to recent times and excite a special wonder. Will has been alive only in details, in the
smaller courses of life, while the larger structure and movement has been subconscious, erratic, and
wasteful. The very idea of progress, of orderly development on a great scale, is of recent origin and
diffusion.
At the present day, also, social phenomena of a large sort are for the most part not willed at all, but are
the unforeseen result of diverse and partial endeavors. It is seldom that any large plan of social action is
intelligently drawn up and followed out. Each interest works along in a somewhat blind and selfish
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manner, grasping, fighting, and groping. As regards general ends most of the energy is wasted; and yet a
sort of advance takes place, more like the surging of a throng than the orderly movement of troops. Who
can pretend that the American people, for example, are guided by any clear and rational plan in their
economic, social, and religious development? They have glimpses and impulses, but hardly a will,
except on a few matters of near and urgent interest.
In the same way, the ills that afflict society are seldom will by any one or any group but are the products
of acts of will having other objects: they are done, as someone has said, rather with the elbows than with
the fists. There is surprisingly little ill-intent, and the more one looms into wrong-doing, the less he finds
of that vivid chiaroscuro of conscious goodness and badness her childish teaching has led her to expect.
Take, for instance, a conspicuous evil like the sweating system in the garment trades of New York and
London. Here are people, largely women and children, forced to work twelve, fourteen, sometimes
sixteen, hours a day, in the midst of dirt, bad air, and contagion, suffering the destruction of home life
and decent nurture; and all for a wage insufficient to buy the bare necessities of life. But if you look for
sin dark enough to cast such a shadow, you will scarcely find it. The “sweater” or immediate employer,
to whom we first turn, is commonly himself a workman, not much raised above the rest and making but
little profit on his transactions. Beyond him is the large dealer, usually a well-intentioned man, quite
willing that things should be better, if they can be made so without too much trouble or pecuniary loss to
himself. He is only dosing what others do and what, in his view, the conditions of trade require. And so
on; the closer one gets to the facts, the more evident it is that nowhere is the indubitable wickedness our
feelings have pictured. It is quite the same with political corruption and the venal alliance between
wealth and party management. The men and women who control wealthy interests are probably no
worse intentioned than the rest of us; they only do what they think they are forced to do in order to hold
their own. And so with the politician: he finds that others are selling their power, and easily comes to
think of it as a matter of course. In truth, the consciously, flagrantly wicked person is, and perhaps
always has been, for the most part, a fiction of denunciation.
Thus it is not bad will, but lack of will, that is mainly the cause of evil things; they exist outside the
sphere of choice. We lack rational self-direction and suffer not so much from our sins as from our
blindness, weakness, and confusion.
It is true, then, as socialists tell us, that the need of society is rational organization, a more effectual
social will. But we shall not agree with the narrowness of this or of any other sect as to the kind of
organization that is to be sought. The true will of society is not concentrated in the government or any
other single agent but works itself out through many instruments. It would simplify matters, no doubt, if
a single, definite, and coercive institution, like the socialist state, could embrace and execute all right
purposes; but I doubt whether life can be organized in that way.
The real ground for expecting a more rational existence and growth is in the increasing efficiency of the
intellectual and moral process as a whole, not, peculiarly, in the greater activity of government.
In every province of life, a multiform social knowledge is arising and, mingling with the moral impulse,
is forming a system of rational ideals which, through leadership and emulation, gradually work their
way into practice.

86

The striving of our democracy toward clearer consciousness is too evident to escape any observer.
Compare, for example, the place now taken in our universities by history, economics, political science,
sociology, statistics, and the like, with the attention given them, say, in 1823, when, in fact, some of
these studies had no place at all. Or consider the multiplication, since the same date, of government
bureaus—federal, state, and local—whose main function is to collect, arrange, and disseminate social
knowledge. It is not too much to say that governments are becoming, more and more, vast laboratories
of social science. Consider also the number of books and periodicals seriously devoted to these subjects.
No doubt much of this work is feverish and shallow, but this is incidental to all rapid change. There is,
on the whole, nothing more certain or more hopeful than the advance in the larger self-knowledge of
mankind.
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Timeline of Weber’s Life and Work1

1864

April 21

Born in Erfurt, Saxony, Prussia

1889

PhD, University of Berlin

1893

Married Marianne Schnitger (a second cousin)

1894

Appointed Professor of Economics, University of Freiburg

1896

Appointed Professor, University of Heidelberg

1897

Death of Max Weber, Sr.

1899

Left work for five years, following depression and insomnia

1903

Formally resigned professorship

1904

Publication of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism;
Visits United States

1907

Inheritance; becomes financially independent

1909

Co-founded the German Sociological Association (served as
treasurer)

1916
1920

Publication of The Religion of China and The Religion of India
June 14

Dies in Munich, Bavaria, Germany (of the flu)

1
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Biography of Weber
NOTE ON SOURCES: We are fortunate to have a comprehensive biography of Max Weber written by
his wife, Marianne, first published six years after his death, in 1926. For decades, this was the primary
source of information about Weber’s life. Recently, however, our knowledge in this area has been
greatly supplemented by Joachim Radkau’s Max Weber: A Biography, published in English in 2009.
Radkau’s sympathetic portrait nevertheless includes several less flattering details of Weber’s
personality and character, not included in his wife’s biography. For more on Weber’s intellectual
development, and less about his personal life, read Fritz Ringer’s Max Weber: An Intellectual
Biography, published in 2004.1
Overview
Max, full name Maximilian Karl Emil, Weber was born in Erfurt, a bustling commercial city in what is
now central Germany, on April 21, 1864. Weber spent his life in a rapidly industrializing and increasing
militaristic Germany, living through the devastations of the first World War, and witnessing the rise of
fascism during the early years of the Weimar Republic. Like many writers and thinkers of his day, he
was interested in how this new industrial society came to be. His most famous work, The Protestant
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, was a partial answer to that question. Weber would also come to
create a particular approach to sociological inquiry, more focused on interpretation and less focused on
policy proposals than Durkheim’s.
Social Background/Family
Weber was the first of eight children, born to a wealthy statesman (Max Weber, Sr.) and his somewhat
devout wife Helene (Fallenstein). The Webers had been a prosperous family for many generations,
making their money in the linen trade. Max grew up in bourgeois comfort, in a home devoted to politics
and intellectual pursuits. In fact, Weber’s younger brother, Alfred, would also become a sociologist.
Education and Training
In 1882, Max earned his high school diploma and, according to his wife’s biography, “also helped his
friends to cheat their way through.” His teachers, she claimed expressed some doubts about his moral
maturity, finding him a troublesome if intelligent student. At age 18, he enrolled at the University of
Heidelberg, where he followed in his father’s footsteps by studying law. He also took up fencing at his
father’s fraternity house. By all accounts he led an active social life in college, visiting other bourgeois
families, drinking, fencing, and even dueling (from which he suffered a distinctive scar on his face for
the rest of his life). Marianne tells us he had no talent for saving money and would often ask for
increases to his allowance.
In his second year, he took time off to serve in the military, but found military life difficult. Despite
becoming a squad leader, he complained in a letter home that “the military existence is gradually getting
1
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too stupid and loathsome, especially since in recent weeks it has left no room whatsoever for anything
else.” He liked the military much more after entering into officer’s training, and he left the following
year with admiration of the “machine” and a greater sense of patriotism.
He returned to university and eventually earned a law degree in 1889, with a dissertation on the history
of trading companies in the Middle Ages. For seven years he lived in the family home, studying further
and teaching classes when he could. He did not leave home until his marriage in 1893, to his cousin
Marianne Schnitger. During this time, Marianne tells us, he felt oppressed by his father, who ran his
house with strong authority, requiring obedience of his children and his wife, who suffered a great deal.
Max, she says, “was reserved and never asked relieved himself by a frank discussion of the problems.
He repressed everything.” He urgently wanted to leave.
When his cousin came to visit, moving from the country to the city, they quickly became attached. Here
is how Marianne tells the story of their engagement:
The seriousness of their relationship was lightened by their sparkling humor and impish banter. The
engagement was still supposed to be kept secret, but as Weber remarked, “Every jackass here gives me a
meaningful look and asks me whether something has happened to me. I would never have thought I was
beaming so.”
Career
In 1894, the newly married couple moved to Freiburg, where Weber was appointed Professor of
Economics. In 1896, they moved to the Heidelberg, where Weber continued as an Economics Professor.
He spent his time researching and writing on economics and legal history. Max and Marianne had no
children. Instead, they maintained a vibrant social circle of intellectuals.
In 1897, Max’s father died. Max and his father had quarreled two months before, particularly about his
father’s treatment of his mother, and every biographer points out that the death hit Max very hard. He
became depressed and suffered insomnia. Eventually, he had to leave teaching altogether to spend some
time in recovery. He made one brief foray back into teaching in 1902 but left again in 1903 and would
not return to an official posting until 1919, one year before his death. During that time, he wrote much
that would be published after his death, on matters sociological and political.
He spent much of 1904 touring the United States. Given the importance of Benjamin Franklin to his own
understanding of the development of the spirit of capitalism, visiting the United States was an important
chapter in his life. Weber took many notes on what he witnessed there. When visiting upstate New York,
he observed,
My trip to Buffalo yesterday was very pleasant, even though all the walking around along
lengthy streets was fairly strenuous. Despite the magnificent buildings, the shopping
streets as a whole look no more inviting than those in New York: Everything is obscured
with a black sooty haze, windows are sometimes dirty- in short, new and yet already
falling into disrepair, somewhat like our own suburbs., By contrast, the residential district
is the world of elegance, nothing but tree-lined green streets with charming wood- frame
houses that look as if someone had just taken them out of the toy box and placed them on
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the velvety green lawn. They are the only completely new and original architecture that
I’ve seen here so far, and aesthetically far more satisfying than the imposing stone
palaces in New York (September 9th).2
In contrast to this pleasant scene, Weber was struck by the dirty sootiness of Chicago, the fifth largest
city in the world at the time,
Chicago is one of the most unbelievable cities. In the city among the skyscrapers, the
condition of the streets is utterly hair-raising. Soft coal is burned there. When the hot dry
wind off the wastelands to the southwest blows through the streets, and especially when
the dark yellow sunsets, the city looks fantastic.... Everything is mist and think haze, and
the whole lake is covered by a purple pall of smoke...It is an endless human desert....[In
the stockyards], for as far as one can see from the Armour firm’s clock tower there is
nothing but herds of cattle, lowing, bleating, endless filth. But on the horizon, all around
– for the city continues for miles and miles until it melts into the multitude of the suburbs
– there are churches and chapels, grain elevators, smoking chimneys, and houses of every
size (September 19th).
In 1907, he received an inheritance that allowed him to put off paid employment. He and Marianne lived
well and continued to host intellectual parties and discussions. They experimented (disastrously says
Radkau) with an open marriage. In 1909 Weber helped found the German Sociological Association,
serving as its first treasurer. In 1912, he tried to organize a leftist political party, but was ultimately
unsuccessful. When World War I began, in 1914, Weber volunteered and was appointed as a reserve
officer. Weber would eventually become a strong critic of Germany’s nationalist expansionism and
called for the expansion of suffrage. He was one of the advisers to the committee that drafted the
Weimar Constitution. He unsuccessfully ran for a seat in parliament. It was at this time that he returned
to the university, where he gave a famous lecture criticizing opportunistic politicians. The lectures from
his last year of life were written down and have circulated as important Weberian texts for years. At the
time of his death, he was working on what he considered his masterwork, Economy and Society.
Marianne would continue the work and publish it as Max’s own in 1922. Marianne continued to work
his notes and half-finished manuscripts into books and publish them for the next several years.
His Work
In the early years, Weber wrote mostly on legal history and economics. He was very productive during
this time and published his dissertation on trading companies in the Middle Ages in 1889, a book on
Roman agrarian history in 1891, a book on farm labor in Eastern Germany in 1892, a book on the stock
exchange in 1894, and a book on the state and economic policy in 1895. After his father’s death, it was
several years before he could work again. He wrote The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,
first published as an essay in 1904. This work marks his turn to more sociological writing. Although he
continued to write and lecture in these later years, almost everything was left unfinished at his death.
Marianne Weber did much to compile and publish this later work, including his famous Economy and
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Society (1922) and General Economic History (1924). The English-speaking world knows Weber
primarily through translation, and most of these translations were completed in the 1940s and 1950s,
many by Talcott Parsons, the great mid-century American sociologist working out of Harvard
University.
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The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism
Max Weber
“Time is money.” – Benjamin Franklin
NOTE ON SOURCE: These passages are from Weber’s most known and influential work, first
published in German in 1905. It was first translated into English by the sociologist Talcott
Parsons and published in 1930 as The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism by Allen and
Unwin. Parsons‘ translation was reprinted in 1958 by Scribner’s. This translation is probably
the one most English-speaking sociologists have read.
Introduction – What to Look For
In this book, Weber offers a culturalist (or idealist) interpretation of history, counter to the
historical materialist approach taken by Marx. In an ingenious argument, he demonstrates how
particular beliefs (in this case, beliefs associated with some strains of the Protestant religion) led
to particular kinds of conduct (the “work ethic” and disposition to save and invest rather than
spend) which eventually helped produce capitalism as we know it today. This is not a book about
religion, but rather a book that uses religion and religious ideas as an example of how change
happens, through a chain of unintended consequences. What you have here is a much-abridged
form of the first of two parts.1
Part 1: The Problem
Chapter 1. Religious Belief and Social Layering
A look at the occupational statistics quickly shows us that many business owners and capitalists
are Protestant rather than Catholic. This is also true for more higher skilled workers in industry.
While it is true that this may be for historical reasons, as more industries developed in regions in
Europe that were Protestant, that merely begs the question. We could ask, why was it that areas
that saw industrial development were also the same areas in which Protestantism took hold?
Once we look at details of the Protestant reformation movement, we also note that it was not
every variant of Protestantism that seemed to have a connection to habits and practices
conducive to industrial development. Calvinism, for example, seems to be more strongly
correlated with these habits and practices.
This spirit of hard work, of progress, or whatever else we want to call it, which we are linking to
Protestantism and its particular beliefs, should not be understood as a joy of living or desire for
progress. These early Calvinists had little interest in either. If we are going to trace back the
1
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cause, we have to look more deeply, at the religious beliefs themselves, and see what it was that
induced these early industrialists to work hard and invest their capital.
Chapter 2. The “Spirit” of Capitalism
“Time is money.” That is the spirit of capitalism. We hear it in the aphorisms of Benjamin
Franklin. It is very different from the case of Jacob Fugger, the early wealthy industrialist of
Germany, who, when asked why he didn’t retire, as he had enough money and then some, replied
that he could always make even more. In the case of Fugger, working to make more money was
about enrichment; in the case of Franklin, it is a moral duty. This is what we mean by “spirit of
capitalism.” Or, to be clear, modern capitalism, which exists in America and Europe. Capitalism
has existed elsewhere, in China, India, Babylon, and at other times, in Rome and in the Middle
Ages, but never with this moral maxim to work hard for the sake of working hard.
This has nothing at all do with enjoyment or wanting to be able to buy things with the money
you make. The highest good of this Protestant work ethic is to earn more and more money. One
works to make more money, not to enjoy it. Acquisition of money becomes the ultimate purpose
of life.
A way of life suited to the development of capitalism had to begin somewhere, not just for one
person alone but for a community of people. This origin is what needs explaining. The fact that
in America, New England developed more industry than the South even though the South was
settled by would-be capitalists and New England by religious persons is the opposite of what
materialist thinkers propose.
The origin and history of ideas is much more complex than those who theorize that a
“superstructure” is built on a pre-existing material base. In reality, the spirit of capitalism had to
fight its way to acceptance against great hostility.
Chapter 3. Understanding Luther’s Conception of Beruf (Calling)
In the German word beruf2 but even more in the English “calling” there can be a religious sense,
a suggestion of a task set by God. In neither the Catholic nor Classical culture do we find a
similar sense, a sense which is common to all Protestant peoples. Like the word itself the idea is
new and comes out of the Protestant reformation, from German translations that were made
during this period. The concept of the calling was what was used to differentiate Protestants from
Catholics. Rather than monastic ascetism, the way to live acceptably to God was by fulfilling
one’s worldly obligations. This was the notion of the calling or vocation. In contrast, Luther saw
withdrawing from the world, in monastic isolation, as a selfish turning away from one’s
2
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obligations. God summons everyone to his or her appointed task. Every vocation has the same
worth in the sight of God. This meant that as a consequence of the Protestant Reformation was,
the moral emphasis on worldly labor and the religious approval of such increased.
Religious influence played the largest part in creating the differences of which we are aware
today. Since that is the case, we start our investigation of the relationship between the Protestant
ethic and the spirit of capitalism in those religious differences, in the works of Calvin, Calvinism,
and the other Puritan denominations. For these groups, the soul’s salvation was the center of
their life and work. Their ethics and practices were all based on that alone and were the
consequences of purely religious motives. And so, we must also admit that the cultural
consequences of the Protestant Reformation were actually unforeseen and unintended by those
early Reformers.
This study is a contribution to the understanding of the way in which ideas become effective
forces in history. We will try to clarify the part religious forces played in forming our
specifically worldly modern culture. At the same time, we are not saying that the spirit of
capitalism could only have arisen as a result of the Reformation. Instead, we want to know
whether and to what extent religious forces have taken part in the growth and expansion of that
spirit over the world. What concrete aspects of our current capitalistic culture can be traced back
to these religious ideas? We will look for correlations between particular religious beliefs and the
practical ethics that follow from these beliefs. We will try to clarify the means and direction in
which religious movements and ideas have influenced the development of material culture.
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Part 2
Part 2: The Vocational Ethic of the Ascetic Branches of Protestantism
Chapter 4. The Religious Foundations of Worldly Ascetism
The greatest political and cultural struggles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries fought in
the highly developed regions of Northern Europe (the Netherlands, England, France), were over
Calvinism. Then, as now, its most characteristic belief was the doctrine of predestination. To
understand this, let us turn to the Westminster Confession of 1647 (in which early Calvinists
described their faith). Here are the relevant passages:
Chapter IX (of Free Will), Number 3: Man, by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all
ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation: so as, a natural man, being
altogether averse from that good, and dead in sin, is not able, by his own strength, to convert
himself, or to prepare himself thereunto.
Chapter III (of God’s Eternal Decree), Number 3; By the decree of God, for the manifestation of
His glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others fore-ordained
to everlasting death.
Number 5: Those of mankind that are predestinated unto life, God, before the foundation of the
world was laid, according to His eternal and immutable purpose, and the secret counsel and good

96

pleasure of His will, hath chosen, in Christ, unto everlasting glory, out of His mere free grace
and love, without any foresight of faith or good works, or perseverance in either of them, or any
other thing in the creature, as conditions, or causes moving Him thereunto: and all to the praise
of His glorious grace.
Number 7: The rest of mankind God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of His
own will, whereby He extendeth or withholdeth mercy, as He pleaseth, for the glory of His
sovereign power over His creatures, to pass by; and to ordain them to dishonour and wrath, for
their sin, to the praise of His glorious justice.
Chapter X (of Effectual Calling), Number 1: All those whom God hath predestinated unto life,
and those only, He is pleased in His appointed and accepted time effectually to call, by His Word
and Spirit, out of that state of sin and death, in which they are by nature, to grace and salvation
by Jesus Christ; enlightening their minds spiritually and savingly to understand the things of
God; taking away their heart of stone, and giving unto them a heart of flesh; renewing their wills,
and by His almighty power determining them to that which is good, and effectually drawing
them to Jesus Christ: yet so, as they come most freely, being made willing by His grace.
Chapter V (of Providence), Number 6: As for those wicked and ungodly men whom God, as a
righteous Judge, for former sins doth blind and harden, from them He not only withholdeth His
grace, whereby they might have been enlightened in their understandings, and wrought upon in
their hearts; but sometimes also withdraweth the gifts which they had, and exposeth them to such
objects as their corruption makes occasions of sin; and, withal, gives them over to their own
lusts, the temptations of the world, and the power of Satan: whereby it comes to pass that they
harden themselves, even under those means which God useth for the softening of others.
We can briefly tell the story of how the doctrine originated and how it fit into Calvinist theology.
While for Luther the doctrine’s significance decreased over time, for Calvin, it increased. It
derives from the logical necessity of his thought. The interest of it lies in God, not in human
beings; God does not exist for people, but people for the sake of God. Everything other than
God, including the meaning of our individual lives and destinies, is shrouded in a mystery that
would be both impossible and presumptuous to discern. We only know that some are saved, most
are damned. To think that human merit, deservingness or undeservingess, plays in part in
determining our fate would be to think God’s decrees, which have been settled for eternity, are
subject to change by human influence. This is an impossible belief.
In its emotional inhumanity this belief must have instilled a feeling of extreme loneliness in the
individual who accepted it. No one could help her. No priest...No Church...No God, for even
Jesus Christ had died only for the elect. This is what set Protestants apart from Catholics – the
complete elimination of salvation through the Church and its sacraments. You were really all
alone.
As all religions develop, they turn away from magic. Here we see this development coming to its
logical conclusion. Puritans even rejected all signs of religious ceremony, burying their dead
with neither song nor ritual, so that no superstitious belief should creep in. Not only was there no
magical way of attaining God’s grace, making you one of the Elect, but there was no way at all.
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It was out of your hands entirely. This helps explain the totally negative view of anything that
would give pleasure or solace, as such was of no use to salvation and could promote illusions or
superstition.
The world exists to serve God, to promote God’s glory, and for nothing else. That means that the
Elect were in the world only to increase God’s glory by fulfilling His commandments.
Everything done by a good Christian was for God and God alone, including his vocation, another
way of saying what he was called to do to increase God’s glory on earth.
Now, sooner or later, the question must arise to every person following this doctrine, “Am I one
of the elect?” And more, “how can I find out?” Calvin apparently was never bothered by these
questions, but he was an unusually confident man. For everyone else, the questions were
important ones. Two different sets of pastoral advice arose to help parishioners. First, people
were told it was an absolute duty to consider one’s self as one of the elect, and to regard any
doubts or anxiety as tricks of the devil. In contrast to the first, and perhaps more helpful, it was
recommended that people work hard in their calling as a way of boosting their assuredness of
being one of the elect. Work and work alone dispels doubt and gives the certainty of grace.
We can now ask further by what fruits the Calvinist could identify having been saved, and the
answer would be fruits of labor which serves to increase the glory of God. In practice this means
that God helps those who help themselves. The Calvinist creates his own salvation, or at least,
the conviction of his own salvation. The God of Calvinism demanded a lifetime of good works,
rather than single good acts scattered here and there. This meant that Calvinists were subjected to
a consistent and constant method of work/life. Only a life guided by constant thought, constant
planning, constant adhesion to one’s vocation, could pull the Elect out of the state of nature into
the state of grace. Active self-control was the most important practical ideal of Puritanism.
Like ascetics before him, the puritan tried to act rationally at all times, suppressing all emotions.
The goal of this ascetism was to lead an alert, intelligent life and to reject all spontaneous,
impulsive enjoyment. But the Puritan ascetic was different from the medieval ascetics in that the
Puritan did not live outside of the world but very much within it. Medieval monks were driven
farther away from everyday life through their ascetism. In contrast, by founding its ethic in the
doctrine of predestination, the Puritans created their form of a spiritual aristocracy not outside
the world but within it, as the predestined elected saints of God within the world. The
consciousness of divine grace was often accompanied by an attitude of sin toward one’s
neighbor, of hatred and contempt for her as an enemy of God bearing the signs of eternal
damnation....
Chapter 5. Ascetism and the Spirit of Capitalism
In Baxter, wealth is a great danger and temptation. But the real objection is to its enjoyment and
the consequent temptation to idleness and pleasure. Above all, wealth can be a distraction from
the pursuit of a righteous life. It is really only because having wealth can make us relax that it is
objectionable. Remember, only activity that serves to increase the glory of God, through one’s
called-to occupation, is sanctioned. Leisure and enjoyment are proscribed.
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Wasting time is above all the deadliest of sins. Losing time through socializing, idle talk, even
sleeping more than is necessary is worthy of moral condemnation. Life is too short to do
anything other than making sure of one’s election. Every hour lost is lost to work for the glory of
God. Sexual intercourse is permitted, within marriage, only as the means to “be fruitful and
multiply.”
Unwillingness to work is a sign that one is damned. God has called each and every person to a
particular task or profession. These are not equal tasks in terms of reward or skill. Classification
into social positions and occupations is a direct result of God’s will. It is a religious duty to
persevere in one’s assigned lot. The world must be accepted as it is. As an added benefit, the
specialization of occupations, the increased division of labor, makes possible a quantitative and
qualitative improvement in production, which thus magnifies God’s glory.
It isn’t enough just to work hard, however. God demands that one work methodically and
purposely in his or her calling.
Wealth is ethically bad only as a temptation to idleness and enjoyment. Unlike earlier (medieval)
ethicists, Puritans saw nothing wrong with wealth in itself. In fact, as a performance of duty in a
calling amassing wealth is not only morally permissible, but morally desirable. To wish to be
poor was the same as wishing to be unhealthy. Seeing profit-making as a sign of God’s
providence had the effect of justifying the activities of businessmen, a relatively novel
phenomenon in the world.
In many ways, then, the Puritan idea of vocation and the emphasis placed on worldly ascetism
was bound to directly influence the development of a capitalist way of life. The Puritan’s
ascetism was directed against the spontaneous enjoyment of life. For example, sport was
accepted if it served a rational purpose (improving physical efficiency through recreation), but
prohibited if conducted for enjoyment, pride, or gambling. Anything appearing to be
superstitious – Christmas festivities, the May Pole, even some religious art – was banned. The
theatre was morally suspect. So was idle talk, vain ostentation, personal decorations, especially
in clothing. Interestingly, that tendency towards uniformity, which today aids in the capitalistic
standardization of production, had its roots in this rejection of all idolatry of the body.
When we combine this limitation of consumption with the moral approbation of acquisitive
profit-making behavior, the inevitable result should be obvious: capital accumulation through an
ascetic compulsion to invest (save). The Puritan outlook favored the development of rational
bourgeois economic life. It helped birth modern economic man.
Now, the Puritan’s ideals also tended to give way, over time, under extreme pressure from the
temptations of wealth. They were not unaware of this tendency.
A specifically bourgeois economic ethic had grown up. The bourgeois businessman, so long as
he remained within the law and conducted his life and business correctly, could amass as much
money as possible and feel that he was but following his duty. The power of religious ascetism
also provided him with sober, conscientious, and unusually hard-working employees, who also
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saw their vocation as a calling from God. Last but not least, he had the comforting assurance that
the unequal distribution of goods in the world was God’s divine will.
Thus was born one of the fundamental elements of the spirit of modern capitalism – systematic
rational conduct in one’s vocation. But with the withering away of the religious ideal we are left
with the product, not the impetus. Where the Puritan wanted to work in a calling, we are forced
to do so. By turning their ascetic impulses into the world, Puritans helped create the modern
economic order, with its machine production which today determines all of our lives, even those
who are not directly concerned with business. Perhaps it will continue to do so until the last ton
of fossilized coal is burnt. Baxter had though that care for external goods should lie lightly on
our shoulders, like a cloak that could be cast aside at will. Today that cloak is wrapped around us
like an iron cage.
We are far now from the world of the Puritans. In the US, which is the most highly developed
capitalist region today, the pursuit of wealth is stripped of all religious or ethical meaning, and is
practiced almost as a sport. No one knows what the future will bring – if new prophets will arise,
or old ideas will have a resurgence, or if the machine will keep fast. But we can say of these, our
“Last Humans,” that they are now “specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart.”
Well, that brings us to judgements and values that are perhaps not appropriate here. Here we
have merely attempted to trace and describe the influence of the worldly ascetism of the
Protestants. It is also necessary to see what in turn influenced this-worldly ascetism, to examine
the totality of the social conditions of its birth, even the economic. It hasn’t been my aim to
substitute simplistic one-sided materialist explanations for the development of capitalism with
simplistic one-sided culturalist explanations, but only to show that each is equally possible.
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Methodological Foundations of Sociology
Max Weber
“To explain, we must first understand.” - Weber
NOTE ON SOURCE: This passage is from the posthumous 1921 collection of essays, Wirtschaft und
Gesellschaft, first translated into English by Talcott Parsons in 1947 as The Theory of Social and
Economic Organizations.). The passage here is a loose translation of the original German, condensed
for easier reading.
Introduction – What to Look For
Weber belonged to the generation, along with Durkheim, that championed and defined the new
discipline of sociology. It is thus useful to compare Weber’s definitions of sociology with Durkheim’s.
Although they share a general interest in understanding and analyzing “society,”, the way they set up
doing so is quite different. For Weber, an empathetic understanding of the meanings human actors bring
to their interactions with one another was key, as the following passage explains.1
Methodological Foundations of Sociology
Sociology, in the sense we adopt here, is a science that interprets the meaning of social action and
through that interpretation clarifies the causal procedures and effects of those actions. Actions here are
those acts, whether active, refraining from action, or allowing actions to take place, when and only when
done with subjective intent. They are “social” actions when they involve the subjective intentions
relative to another person’s actions and when that social relation orients the action.
Point 1. Meanings are Empirically Situated
The meaning may either refer to the meaning of a particular individual on a particular occasion or as an
average meaning in a given set of cases or even a typical meaning attributed in the abstract (e.g.,
“capitalists replace workers with machinery with the intention of increasing profits”). It does not signify
that the intended meaning is true or correct. Herein lies the difference between the empirical sciences of
sociology (and history) and disciplines such as jurisprudence, logic, ethics, or aesthetics that seek the
“correct” rule or meaning from their objects of study.
Point 2. We cannot always find the intentions of the actors; the line between intentional and reactive
behavior is blurred
There is not a sharp line between meaningful action and reactive action, actions for which actors do not
intend a meaning. A great deal of interesting and important behavior for the sociologist to study,
especially when we talk about traditional actions, lies between intentional and reactive action. In some
cases, such as mystical experiences, we cannot hope to understand the meanings of the action because
1
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the actors do not understand the actions themselves. It is often necessary to separate out those aspects
which can be understood from those elements which cannot.
Point 3. The goal of interpretation is to generate evidence about the world, and we can do this both
rationally and empathetically
The goal of all our interpretations is to find evidence. This evidence can take a rational or an empathetic
form. Rational evidence is obtained in the case of actions in which the intended meanings can be
intellectually understood wholly and clearly. Empathetic evidence is obtained when actions and their
attendant feelings and lived experience are completely relived in the sociological imagination. For the
first, every interpretation of a rationally directed purposive action, is quite clearly evidence.
But even of the second, we can learn almost as much about the world from this empathetic
understanding. For example, we can try to relive empathetically actions of extreme religious devotion,
even as they go against our own beliefs. We can gain some understanding of the intended meanings
through empathy, allowing for the influence of various emotions (anxiety, anger, ambition, envy,
jealousy, love, pride, lust, etc.) on the course of the action and the means used to perform the action. It is
even possible to understand many irrational and emotional actions as deviations from pure types of
action that would happen if everything proceeded in a
Point 4. Meaningless actions are still important insofar they impact social actions
Operations and actions which are meaningless must still be taken into account if they cause or are
caused by, promote or place obstacles in the way of, social actions. Even inanimate objects, such as
machines, can have meanings related to their use by humans in social interactions. The flooding of a
river may be a natural occurrence, but the way humans respond (for example, by moving away from
areas likely to flood) is an important object of sociological study. Or take the way we deal with death,
and entire cycle of life, from infancy to old age. In all cases, the sociologists; task is to interpret the
meanings humans give to their actions and by doing so to understand the actions themselves.
Point 5. Sociological understanding is explanatory
Understanding can mean two things. In the first, direct understanding, we comprehend the meaning an
actor gives. For example, we understand an outburst of anger, seeing evidence of it in a red face or
exclamation. We can directly understand the action of aiming a gun. But understanding can be more
than direct; it can be explanatory. We understand something aiming a gun not merely directly but also
more deeply in terms of motive, if we know other facts about why the person is aiming the gun. If he has
been ordered to do so in battle, for example, that is a rational motive; on the other hand, if he is aiming
at someone out of fear, this is an irrational motive. To understand sociologically means to grasp the
complex of meanings surrounding the specific observed action.
Point 6. Sociological understanding is hypothetical
The goal of every interpretation is the creation of evident facts about the world. But all of our
interpretations are hypotheses about the world. We cannot know for sure if our interpretation is correct.
As with all hypotheses, it is crucial to have some way of checking our interpretation. The best way to do
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this would be by experiment, using the scientific method. Statistical methods can give some approximate
results, but only in cases that are measurable in which numerical relationships are possible to establish.
Apart from these methods, then, the best option is to compare as many events as possible, keeping as
many things similar as possible and investigating one particular point, motive or cause.
Point 7. Motives of actions are crucial to sociological interpretation because they are related to
causality
A motive is a set of meanings which prompts the actor to act in a certain way (either from her
perspective, or the sociological observer’s perspective). To give a correct causal interpretation of a
particular act is to see the action and the motive for the action as related to each other in a way whose
meaning can be understood. Sociological laws only exist where statistical generalization fit our
interpretation of the intended meaning of a social action. Sociology proceeds by constructing models of
intelligible action which apply to real-world situations. Note the difference between meaningless and
meaningful (hence, sociological) statistics. Death rates, or the output of machinery are examples of the
former. Crime rates and occupational distributions are examples of the latter.
Point 8. Meaningless actions are not unimportant, but they are not sociological facts
Certain facts of life, such as birth and death or the flooding of a river, do not count as sociological
because they lack the meaningfulness derived from motives described above. This does not mean they
are less important, however. But they do operate in an area distinct from that of meaningful social
action. They are conditions of action, or obstacles to action, or promoters of action, but not social
actions themselves.
Point 9. Individuals, and individuals alone, are the intelligible performers of meaningful actions
Action for our purposes must refer only to the behavior of one or more individuals. Other disciplines
may refer to states or whole societies as individual cases and actors, but from the standpoint of
sociological understanding of the meaning of actions we must see these systems as the outcomes of
interactions between individuals. For the sociologist, individual human beings are the only intelligible
performers of meaningful actions. When a sociologist does speak of something like “the state” or “the
family” or any other collectivity, she means a structured outcome of the social actions of individuals,
either in actual reality or ideally constructed.
This way of proceeding is quite different from the “organic sociology” proposed by others. In this view,
the sociologist is like a natural scientist who examines individuals as so many cells in the body of
society. The methods of sociology we present here are quite different. The sociologist does not work like
a biologist, who observes organisms at the cellular level. A biologist may observe cells and make
inferences about the way they operate in functional terms (e.g. the spleen filters blood), but the biologist
cannot interpret the action of the cells involved in the spleen. In contrast, the sociologist can understand
the behavior of the individuals involved in a way that simply cannot be done by natural scientists. This
interpretation comes with a cost, however. Our interpretations of the social actions of individuals are by
nature more hypothetical and partial than those of direct observation of action/function. But this is
exactly what sets sociology apart from the natural sciences.
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Point 10. Sociology is distinct from psychology
Sociological laws are but theories generated by interpretative sociology. They are observationally
verified statements of the likelihood of an expectation of a certain outcome from a particular social
action. Sociological laws are most intelligible when the outcome results from a rational pursuit of a clear
goal and when the means-end context is clear.
Psychology would add nothing to our sociological interpretation here. When a capitalist deliberates in a
rational way whether his profits would increase by replacing workers with machinery, thinking
rationally in terms of likely consequences of this action, and comes to the conclusion that, yes, he thinks
he will make more money this way, then there is nothing that ‘psychology’ will add to our
understanding. Now, when the sociologist attempts to explain irrational elements in action (e.g., the
panicked capitalist who sells off his machinery during an economic crisis), she can learn a thing or two
from psychology, based on its keener understanding of such irrational elements.
Point 11. Sociology is distinct from the discipline of history
The sociologist seeks to formulate general statements about what happens. This is in contrast with
historians, who seek to provide a causal analysis of a specific historic event.
There are pros and cons to this approach. As with any generalizing science, the abstract nature of the
concepts of sociology means that there is relatively less content here than in historical analyses. In
return, sociology offers greater conceptual clarity. Sociology abstracts from reality. She does this often
by creating “ideal types”, stripped of their historical particularities.
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The Rational State
Max Weber
“The state in the sense of the rational state has existed only in the western world.” - Weber
NOTE ON SOURCE: This passage is from Wirtschaftsgeschicte, a collection of Weber’s lecture notes,
first published after his death in 1923. The first English translation (General Economic History) was
made in 1927, by Frank Knight, an American professor of political economy. It is known as the source
of Weber’s institutionalist theory of capitalism. The selection below is direct from the Knight
translation.
Introduction – What to Look For
This selection is from Part 4, “The Origin of Modern Capitalism” and follows closely the 29th chapter,
entitled “the Rational State.” It is here that Weber articulates the political foundations of modern
capitalism. Read this in conjunction with the following section, “Evolution of the Capitalist Spirit,”
which focuses on the cultural foundations of modern capitalism. This section is also a useful
introduction to Weber’s theory of politics and the state.1
The Rational State
A. The State Itself; Law and Officialdom
The state in the sense of the rational state has existed only in the western world. Under the old regime in
China, a thin stratum of so-called officials, the mandarins, existed above the unbroken power of the
clans and commercial and industrial guilds. The mandarin is primarily a humanistically educated scholar
in the possession of an administrative position but not in the least trained for administration; he knows
no jurisprudence but is a fine writer, can make verses, knows the age-old literature of the Chinese and
can interpret it. In the way of political service, no importance is attached to him. Such an official
performs no administrative work himself; administration lies rather in the hands of petty officials. A
state with such officials is something different from the Western rational state.
Very different is the rational state in which alone modern capitalism can flourish. Its basis is an expert
officialdom and rational law.
The rational law of the modern Western state, on the basis of which the trained official renders his
decisions, arose on its formal side, though not as to its content, out of Roman law. The latter was to
begin with a product of the Roman city-state, which never witnessed the dominion of democracy and its
justice in the same form as the Greek city. Under Justinian, the Byzantine bureaucracy brought order and
system into this rational law, in consequence of the natural interest of the official in a law which could
be systematic and fixed and hence easier to learn.

1
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With the fall of the Roman empire in the west, law came into the hands of the Italian notaries. These,
and secondarily the universities, revived Roman law. The notaries adhered to the old contractual forms
of the Roman empire and reinterpreted them according to the needs of the time. At the same time a
systematic legal doctrine was developed in the universities. The essential feature in the development was
the rationalization of procedure. The magnificent administrative organization of the church required
fixed forms for its disciplinary ends in relation to the laity and for its own internal discipline. The
businessman could not permit commercial claims to be decided by a competition in reciting formulas.
This two-fold rationalization of procedure from the profane and the spiritual sides spread over the
western world.
Although some see the revival of the Roman law as the basis for the downfall of the peasant class and
the development of capitalism, all the characteristic institutions of modern capitalism have other origins
than Roman law. The stock certificate comes from medieval law. The bill of exchange comes from
Arabic, Italian, German and English law. The commercial company is a medieval product. So also the
mortgage, and the deed of trust, as well as the power of attorney. None of these go back to the Romans.
The reception of the Roman law was crucial only in the sense that it created formal juristic thinking. In
its structure every legal system is based either on formal-legalistic or on substantive-material principles.
By the latter are to be understood utilitarian and economic considerations. In every theocracy and every
absolutism justice is materially directed as by contrast in every bureaucracy it is formal-legalistic.
Formalistic law is calculable. In China it may happen that a man who has sold a house to another may
later come to him and ask to be taken in because in the meantime he has been impoverished. If the
purchaser refused to heed the ancient Chinese command to help a brother, the spirits will be disturbed;
hence the impoverished seller comes into the house as a renter who pays no rent. Capitalism cannot
operate on the basis of a law so constituted. What it requires is law which can be counted upon, like a
machine; ritualistic- religious and magical considerations must be excluded.
The creation of such a body of law was achieved through the alliance between the modern state and the
jurists for the purpose of making good its claims to power. In contrast to other areas of the world, the
west had at its disposal a formally organized legal system, the product of Roman culture, and officials
trained in this law were superior to all others as technical administrators. From the standpoint of
economic history this fact is significant in that the alliance between the state and formal jurisprudence
was indirectly favorable to capitalism.
B. The Economic Policy of the Rational State
For the state to have an economic policy worthy of the name, one which is continuous and consistent, is
an institution of exclusively modern origin. The first system which it brought forth is mercantilism.
C. Mercantilism
The essence of mercantilism consists in carrying the point of view of capitalistic industry into politics:
the state is handled as if it consisted exclusively of capitalistic entrepreneurs. External economic policy
rests on the principle of taking every advantage of the opponent, importing at the lowest price and
selling much higher. The purpose is to strengthen the hand of the government in its external relations.
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Hence mercantilism signifies the development of the state as a political power, which is to be done
directly by increasing the taxpaying power of the population.
England is distinctively the original home of Mercantilism. The first traces of the application of
mercantilistic principles are to be found there in the year 1381. In England it finally disappeared when
free trade was established, an achievement of Puritan dissenters in league with industrial interests.
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Bureaucracy
Max Weber
“The idea that the bureau activities of the state are intrinsically different in character from the
management of private economic offices is a continental European notion and, by way of
contrast, is totally foreign to the American way.” – Weber
NOTE ON SOURCE: This passage is from Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, a collection of Weber’s
writings on economy and society, first published after his death in 1921. Parts were translated
into English and published as The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations in 1947 by
Talcott Parsons.
Introduction – What to Look For
This selection is a short piece, in outline form, defining and describing the characteristics of
bureaucracy, one of the three legitimating forms of authority Think about the institutional
connections between bureaucratic authority and rational-formal law, and how both work
together to support rational Western capitalism.1
Part 3, Chapter 6, Section 7. Bureaucracy
Characteristics of Bureaucracy
Modern officialdom functions in the following manner:
I. Fixed and official jurisdictional areas generally ordered by rules (laws or administrative
regulations).
1. The regular activities required for the purposes of the bureaucratically governed structure
are distributed in a fixed way as official duties.
2. The authority to give the commands required for the discharge of these duties is
distributed in a stable way and is strictly delimited by rules concerning the coercive
means, physical, symbolic, or otherwise, which may be placed at the disposal of officials.
3. Methodical provision is made for the regular and continuous fulfillment of these duties
and for the execution of the corresponding rights; only persons who have the generally
regulated qualifications to serve are employed.
In public and lawful government these three elements constitute ‘bureaucratic authority.’ In
private economic domination, they constitute bureaucratic ‘management.’ Bureaucracy, thus
understood, is fully developed in political and ecclesiastical communities only in the modern
state, and, in the private economy, only in the most advanced institutions of capitalism.
Permanent and public office authority, with fixed jurisdiction, is not the historical rule but rather
1
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the exception. This is so even in large political structures such as those of the ancient Orient, the
Germanic and Mongolian empires of conquest, or of many feudal structures of state. In all these
cases, the ruler executes the most important measures through personal trustees, companions, or
court-servants. Their commissions and authority are not precisely delimited and are temporarily
called into being for each case.
II. The principles of office hierarchy and of levels of graded authority mean a firmly ordered
system of super- and subordination in which there is a supervision of the lower offices by the
higher ones. Such a system offers the governed the possibility of appealing the decision of a
lower office to its higher authority, in a definitely regulated manner. With the full development
of the bureaucratic type, the office hierarchy is monocratically organized. The principle of
hierarchical office authority is found in all bureaucratic structures: in state and ecclesiastical
structures as well as in large party organizations and private enterprises. It does not matter for the
character of bureaucracy whether its authority is called ‘private’ or ‘public.’
When the principle of jurisdictional ‘competency’ is fully carried through, hierarchical
subordination–at least in public office–does not mean that the ‘higher’ authority is simply
authorized to take over the business of the ‘lower.’ Indeed, the opposite is the rule. Once
established and having fulfilled its task, an office tends to continue in existence and be held by
another incumbent.
III. The management of the modern office is based upon written documents (‘files’ or ‘records’),
which are preserved in their original or draft form. There is, therefore, a staff of subaltern
officials and scribes of all sorts. The body of officials actively engaged in a ‘public’ office, along
with the respective apparatus of material implements and the files, make up a ‘bureau.’ In private
enterprise, ‘the bureau’ is often called ‘the office.’
In principle, the modern organization of the civil service separates the bureau from the private
residence of the official, and, in general, bureaucracy segregates official activity as something
distinct from the sphere of private life. Public money and equipment are divorced from the
private property of the official. This condition is everywhere the product of a long development.
Nowadays, it is found in public as well as in private enterprises; in the latter, the principle
extends even to the leading entrepreneur. In principle, the executive office is separated from the
household, business from private correspondence, and business assets from private fortunes. The
more consistently the modern type of business management has been carried through the more
are these separations the case. The beginnings of this process are to be found as early as the
Middle Ages.
It is the peculiarity of the modern entrepreneur that he conducts himself as the ‘first official’ of
his enterprise, in the very same way in which the ruler of a specifically modern bureaucratic state
spoke of herself as ‘the first servant’ of the state. The idea that the bureau activities of the state
are intrinsically different in character from the management of private economic offices is a
continental European notion and, by way of contrast, is totally foreign to the American way.
IV. Office management, at least all specialized office management– and such management is
distinctly modern–usually presupposes thorough and expert training. This increasingly holds for
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the modern executive and employee of private enterprises, in the same manner as it holds for the
state official.
V. When the office is fully developed, official activity demands the full working capacity of the
official, irrespective of the fact that his obligatory time in the bureau may be firmly delimited. In
the normal case, this is only the product of a long development, in the public as well as in the
private office. Formerly, in all cases, the normal state of affairs was reversed: official business
was discharged as a secondary activity.
VI. The management of the office follows general rules, more or less stable, more or less
exhaustive, which can be learned. Knowledge of these rules represents a special technical
learning which the officials possess. It involves jurisprudence, or administrative or business
management.
The reduction of modern office management to rules is deeply embedded in its very nature. The
theory of modern public administration, for instance, assumes that the authority to order certain
matters by decree–which has been legally granted to public authorities–does not entitle the
bureau to regulate the matter by commands given for each case, but only to regulate the matter
abstractly. This stands in extreme contrast to the regulation of all relationships through individual
privileges and bestowals of favor, which is absolutely dominant in patrimonialism, at least in so
far as such relationships are not fixed by sacred tradition.
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The Souls of Black Folk, Excerpts
W. E. B. Du Bois
Three centuries’ thought has been the raising and unveiling of that bowed human heart, and now behold
a century new for the duty and the deed. The problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the
color-line. – Du Bois
NOTES ON SOURCES: The Souls of Black Folk was published in 1903 and is one of the most
important works in sociology and African American literature. The excerpts below are from the eBook
version provided by Project Gutenberg, www.gutenberg.org.

Introduction – What to Look For
This work provides insight into the social world at the end of the nineteenth century in the US. Du Bois
was a sociologist historian and civil rights activist who lived for 1868-1963, and produced a huge
number of essays, books and other works. This text focuses on his own lived experience as an African
American man and as an activist and educator. Pay careful attention to his concepts of “double
consciousness” and “the Veil.” These concepts are central to understanding his work and his
contributions to sociological thought.
The Forethought
Herein lie buried many things which if read with patience may show the strange meaning of being
black here at the dawning of the Twentieth Century. This meaning is not without interest to you, Gentle
Reader; for the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color line. I pray you, then,
receive my little book in all charity, studying my words with me, forgiving mistake and foible for sake
of the faith and passion that is in me, and seeking the grain of truth hidden there.
I have sought here to sketch, in vague, uncertain outline, the spiritual world in which ten thousand
thousand Americans live and strive. First, in two chapters I have tried to show what Emancipation meant
to them, and what was its aftermath. In a third chapter I have pointed out the slow rise of personal
leadership and criticized candidly the leader who bears the chief burden of his race to-day. Then, in two
other chapters I have sketched in swift outline the two worlds within and without the Veil, and thus have
come to the central problem of training men for life. Venturing now into deeper detail, I have in two
chapters studied the struggles of the massed millions of the black peasantry, and in another have sought
to make clear the present relations of the sons of master and man. Leaving, then, the white world, I have
stepped within the Veil, raising it that you may view faintly its deeper recesses,—the meaning of its
religion, the passion of its human sorrow, and the struggle of its greater souls. All this I have ended with
a tale twice told but seldom written, and a chapter of song.
Some of these thoughts of mine have seen the light before in other guise. For kindly consenting to
their republication here, in altered and extended form, I must thank the publishers of the Atlantic
Monthly, The World’s Work, the Dial, The New World, and the Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science. Before each chapter, as now printed, stands a bar of the Sorrow Songs,—
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some echo of haunting melody from the only American music which welled up from black souls in the
dark past. And, finally, need I add that I who speak here am bone of the bone and flesh of the flesh of
them that live within the Veil?
Of Our Spiritual Strivings
O water, voice of my heart, crying in the sand,
All night long crying with a mournful cry,
As I lie and listen, and cannot understand
The voice of my heart in my side or the voice of the sea,
O water, crying for rest, is it I, is it I?
All night long the water is crying to me.
Unresting water, there shall never be rest
Till the last moon droop and the last tide fail,
And the fire of the end begin to burn in the west;
And the heart shall be weary and wonder and cry like the sea,
All life long crying without avail,
As the water all night long is crying to me.
ARTHUR SYMONS.

Between me and the other world there is ever an unasked question: unasked by some through feelings
of delicacy; by others through the difficulty of rightly framing it. All, nevertheless, flutter round it. They
approach me in a half-hesitant sort of way, eye me curiously or compassionately, and then, instead of
saying directly, How does it feel to be a problem? they say, I know an excellent colored man in my
town; or, I fought at Mechanicsville; or, Do not these Southern outrages make your blood boil? At these
I smile, or am interested, or reduce the boiling to a simmer, as the occasion may require. To the real
question, How does it feel to be a problem? I answer seldom a word.
And yet, being a problem is a strange experience,—peculiar even for one who has never been
anything else, save perhaps in babyhood and in Europe. It is in the early days of rollicking boyhood that
the revelation first bursts upon one, all in a day, as it were. I remember well when the shadow swept
across me. I was a little thing, away up in the hills of New England, where the dark Housatonic winds
between Hoosac and Taghkanic to the sea. In a wee wooden schoolhouse, something put it into the
boys’ and girls’ heads to buy gorgeous visiting-cards—ten cents a package—and exchange. The
exchange was merry, till one girl, a tall newcomer, refused my card,—refused it peremptorily, with a
glance. Then it dawned upon me with a certain suddenness that I was different from the others; or like,
mayhap, in heart and life and longing, but shut out from their world by a vast veil. I had thereafter no
desire to tear down that veil, to creep through; I held all beyond it in common contempt, and lived above
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it in a region of blue sky and great wandering shadows. That sky was bluest when I could beat my mates
at examination-time, or beat them at a foot-race, or even beat their stringy heads. Alas, with the years all
this fine contempt began to fade; for the words I longed for, and all their dazzling opportunities, were
theirs, not mine. But they should not keep these prizes, I said; some, all, I would wrest from them. Just
how I would do it I could never decide: by reading law, by healing the sick, by telling the wonderful
tales that swam in my head,—some way. With other black boys the strife was not so fiercely sunny:
their youth shrunk into tasteless sycophancy, or into silent hatred of the pale world about them and
mocking distrust of everything white; or wasted itself in a bitter cry, Why did God make me an outcast
and a stranger in mine own house? The shades of the prison-house closed round about us all: walls strait
and stubborn to the whitest, but relentlessly narrow, tall, and unscalable to sons of night who must plod
darkly on in resignation, or beat unavailing palms against the stone, or steadily, half hopelessly, watch
the streak of blue above.
After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the Negro1 is a sort
of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American world,—a world which
yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other
world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self
through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused
contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness,—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two
unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from
being torn asunder.
The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife,—this longing to attain self-conscious
manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self. In this merging he wishes neither of the
older selves to be lost. He would not Africanize America, for America has too much to teach the world
and Africa. He would not bleach his Negro soul in a flood of white Americanism, for he knows that
Negro blood has a message for the world. He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a
Negro and an American, without being cursed and spit upon by his fellows, without having the doors of
Opportunity closed roughly in his face.
This, then, is the end of his striving: to be a co-worker in the kingdom of culture, to escape both death
and isolation, to husband and use his best powers and his latent genius. These powers of body and mind
have in the past been strangely wasted, dispersed, or forgotten. The shadow of a mighty Negro past flits
through the tale of Ethiopia the Shadowy and of Egypt the Sphinx. Through history, the powers of single
black men flash here and there like falling stars, and die sometimes before the world has rightly gauged
their brightness. Here in America, in the few days since Emancipation, the black man’s turning hither
and thither in hesitant and doubtful striving has often made his very strength to lose effectiveness, to
seem like absence of power, like weakness. And yet it is not weakness,—it is the contradiction of double
aims. The double-aimed struggle of the black artisan—on the one hand to escape white contempt for a
nation of mere hewers of wood and drawers of water, and on the other hand to plough and nail and dig
for a poverty-stricken horde—could only result in making him a poor craftsman, for he had but half a
heart in either cause. By the poverty and ignorance of his people, the Negro minister or doctor was
tempted toward quackery and demagogy; and by the criticism of the other world, toward ideals that
1
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said, in his era the terms he used were considered respectful and appropriate. His use of capitalization here is of particular
note.
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made him ashamed of his lowly tasks. The would-be black savant was confronted by the paradox that
the knowledge his people needed was a twice-told tale to his white neighbors, while the knowledge
which would teach the white world was Greek to his own flesh and blood. The innate love of harmony
and beauty that set the ruder souls of his people a-dancing and a-singing raised but confusion and doubt
in the soul of the black artist; for the beauty revealed to him was the soul-beauty of a race which his
larger audience despised, and he could not articulate the message of another people. This waste of
double aims, this seeking to satisfy two unreconciled ideals, has wrought sad havoc with the courage and
faith and deeds of ten thousand thousand people,—has sent them often wooing false gods and invoking
false means of salvation, and at times has even seemed about to make them ashamed of themselves.
Away back in the days of bondage they thought to see in one divine event the end of all doubt and
disappointment; few men ever worshipped Freedom with half such unquestioning faith as did the
American Negro for two centuries. To him, so far as he thought and dreamed, slavery was indeed the
sum of all villainies, the cause of all sorrow, the root of all prejudice; Emancipation was the key to a
promised land of sweeter beauty than ever stretched before the eyes of wearied Israelites. In song and
exhortation swelled one refrain—Liberty; in his tears and curses the God he implored had Freedom in
his right hand. At last it came,—suddenly, fearfully, like a dream. With one wild carnival of blood and
passion came the message in his own plaintive cadences:—
“Shout, O children!
Shout, you’re free!
For God has bought your liberty!”
Years have passed away since then,—ten, twenty, forty; forty years of national life, forty years of
renewal and development, and yet the swarthy spectre sits in its accustomed seat at the Nation’s feast. In
vain do we cry to this our vastest social problem:—
“Take any shape but that, and my firm nerves
Shall never tremble!”
The Nation has not yet found peace from its sins; the freedman has not yet found in freedom his
promised land. Whatever of good may have come in these years of change, the shadow of a deep
disappointment rests upon the Negro people,—a disappointment all the more bitter because the
unattained ideal was unbounded save by the simple ignorance of a lowly people.
The first decade was merely a prolongation of the vain search for freedom, the boon that seemed ever
barely to elude their grasp,—like a tantalizing will-o’-the-wisp, maddening and misleading the headless
host. The holocaust of war, the terrors of the Ku-Klux Klan, the lies of carpet-baggers, the
disorganization of industry, and the contradictory advice of friends and foes, left the bewildered serf
with no new watchword beyond the old cry for freedom. As the time flew, however, he began to grasp a
new idea. The ideal of liberty demanded for its attainment powerful means, and these the Fifteenth
Amendment gave him. The ballot, which before he had looked upon as a visible sign of freedom, he
now regarded as the chief means of gaining and perfecting the liberty with which war had partially
endowed him. And why not? Had not votes made war and emancipated millions? Had not votes
enfranchised the freedmen? Was anything impossible to a power that had done all this? A million black
men started with renewed zeal to vote themselves into the kingdom. So the decade flew away, the
revolution of 1876 came, and left the half-free serf weary, wondering, but still inspired. Slowly but
steadily, in the following years, a new vision began gradually to replace the dream of political power,—
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a powerful movement, the rise of another ideal to guide the unguided, another pillar of fire by night after
a clouded day. It was the ideal of “book-learning”; the curiosity, born of compulsory ignorance, to know
and test the power of the cabalistic letters of the white man, the longing to know. Here at last seemed to
have been discovered the mountain path to Canaan; longer than the highway of Emancipation and law,
steep and rugged, but straight, leading to heights high enough to overlook life.
Up the new path the advance guard toiled, slowly, heavily, doggedly; only those who have watched
and guided the faltering feet, the misty minds, the dull understandings, of the dark pupils of these
schools know how faithfully, how piteously, this people strove to learn. It was weary work. The cold
statistician wrote down the inches of progress here and there, noted also where here and there a foot had
slipped or some one had fallen. To the tired climbers, the horizon was ever dark, the mists were often
cold, the Canaan was always dim and far away. If, however, the vistas disclosed as yet no goal, no
resting-place, little but flattery and criticism, the journey at least gave leisure for reflection and selfexamination; it changed the child of Emancipation to the youth with dawning self-consciousness, selfrealization, self-respect. In those sombre forests of his striving his own soul rose before him, and he saw
himself,—darkly as through a veil; and yet he saw in himself some faint revelation of his power, of his
mission. He began to have a dim feeling that, to attain his place in the world, he must be himself, and
not another. For the first time he sought to analyze the burden he bore upon his back, that dead-weight
of social degradation partially masked behind a half-named Negro problem. He felt his poverty; without
a cent, without a home, without land, tools, or savings, he had entered into competition with rich,
landed, skilled neighbors. To be a poor man is hard, but to be a poor race in a land of dollars is the very
bottom of hardships. He felt the weight of his ignorance,—not simply of letters, but of life, of business,
of the humanities; the accumulated sloth and shirking and awkwardness of decades and centuries
shackled his hands and feet. Nor was his burden all poverty and ignorance. The red stain of bastardy,
which two centuries of systematic legal defilement of Negro women had stamped upon his race, meant
not only the loss of ancient African chastity, but also the hereditary weight of a mass of corruption from
white adulterers, threatening almost the obliteration of the Negro home.
A people thus handicapped ought not to be asked to race with the world, but rather allowed to give all
its time and thought to its own social problems. But alas! while sociologists gleefully count his bastards
and his prostitutes, the very soul of the toiling, sweating black man is darkened by the shadow of a vast
despair. Men call the shadow prejudice, and learnedly explain it as the natural defence of culture against
barbarism, learning against ignorance, purity against crime, the “higher” against the “lower” races. To
which the Negro cries Amen! and swears that to so much of this strange prejudice as is founded on just
homage to civilization, culture, righteousness, and progress, he humbly bows and meekly does
obeisance. But before that nameless prejudice that leaps beyond all this he stands helpless, dismayed,
and well-nigh speechless; before that personal disrespect and mockery, the ridicule and systematic
humiliation, the distortion of fact and wanton license of fancy, the cynical ignoring of the better and the
boisterous welcoming of the worse, the all-pervading desire to inculcate disdain for everything black,
from Toussaint to the devil,—before this there rises a sickening despair that would disarm and
discourage any nation save that black host to whom “discouragement” is an unwritten word.
But the facing of so vast a prejudice could not but bring the inevitable self-questioning, selfdisparagement, and lowering of ideals which ever accompany repression and breed in an atmosphere of
contempt and hate. Whisperings and portents came home upon the four winds: Lo! we are diseased and
dying, cried the dark hosts; we cannot write, our voting is vain; what need of education, since we must
always cook and serve? And the Nation echoed and enforced this self-criticism, saying: Be content to be
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servants, and nothing more; what need of higher culture for half-men? Away with the black man’s
ballot, by force or fraud,—and behold the suicide of a race! Nevertheless, out of the evil came
something of good,—the more careful adjustment of education to real life, the clearer perception of the
Negroes’ social responsibilities, and the sobering realization of the meaning of progress.
So dawned the time of Sturm und Drang: storm and stress to-day rocks our little boat on the mad
waters of the world-sea; there is within and without the sound of conflict, the burning of body and
rending of soul; inspiration strives with doubt, and faith with vain questionings. The bright ideals of the
past,—physical freedom, political power, the training of brains and the training of hands,—all these in
turn have waxed and waned, until even the last grows dim and overcast. Are they all wrong,—all false?
No, not that, but each alone was over-simple and incomplete,—the dreams of a credulous racechildhood, or the fond imaginings of the other world which does not know and does not want to know
our power. To be really true, all these ideals must be melted and welded into one. The training of the
schools we need to-day more than ever,—the training of deft hands, quick eyes and ears, and above all
the broader, deeper, higher culture of gifted minds and pure hearts. The power of the ballot we need in
sheer self-defence,—else what shall save us from a second slavery? Freedom, too, the long-sought, we
still seek,—the freedom of life and limb, the freedom to work and think, the freedom to love and aspire.
Work, culture, liberty,—all these we need, not singly but together, not successively but together, each
growing and aiding each, and all striving toward that vaster ideal that swims before the Negro people,
the ideal of human brotherhood, gained through the unifying ideal of Race; the ideal of fostering and
developing the traits and talents of the Negro, not in opposition to or contempt for other races, but rather
in large conformity to the greater ideals of the American Republic, in order that some day on American
soil two world-races may give each to each those characteristics both so sadly lack. We the darker ones
come even now not altogether empty-handed: there are to-day no truer exponents of the pure human
spirit of the Declaration of Independence than the American Negroes; there is no true American music
but the wild sweet melodies of the Negro slave; the American fairy tales and folklore are Indian and
African; and, all in all, we black men seem the sole oasis of simple faith and reverence in a dusty desert
of dollars and smartness. Will America be poorer if she replace her brutal dyspeptic blundering with
light-hearted but determined Negro humility? or her coarse and cruel wit with loving jovial goodhumor? or her vulgar music with the soul of the Sorrow Songs?
Merely a concrete test of the underlying principles of the great republic is the Negro Problem, and the
spiritual striving of the freedmen’s sons is the travail of souls whose burden is almost beyond the
measure of their strength, but who bear it in the name of an historic race, in the name of this the land of
their fathers’ fathers, and in the name of human opportunity.
And now what I have briefly sketched in large outline let me on coming pages tell again in many
ways, with loving emphasis and deeper detail, that men may listen to the striving in the souls of black
folk.
Of the Dawn of Freedom
Careless seems the great Avenger;
History’s lessons but record
One death-grapple in the darkness
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’Twixt old systems and the Word;
Truth forever on the scaffold,
Wrong forever on the throne;
Yet that scaffold sways the future,
And behind the dim unknown
Standeth God within the shadow
Keeping watch above His own.
LOWELL.

The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line,—the relation of the darker to
the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea. It was a phase of this
problem that caused the Civil War; and however much they who marched South and North in 1861 may
have fixed on the technical points, of union and local autonomy as a shibboleth, all nevertheless knew,
as we know, that the question of Negro slavery was the real cause of the conflict. Curious it was, too,
how this deeper question ever forced itself to the surface despite effort and disclaimer. No sooner had
Northern armies touched Southern soil than this old question, newly guised, sprang from the earth,—
What shall be done with Negroes? Peremptory military commands this way and that, could not answer
the query; the Emancipation Proclamation seemed but to broaden and intensify the difficulties; and the
War Amendments made the Negro problems of to-day.
It is the aim of this essay to study the period of history from 1861 to 1872 so far as it relates to the
American Negro. In effect, this tale of the dawn of Freedom is an account of that government of men
called the Freedmen’s Bureau,—one of the most singular and interesting of the attempts made by a great
nation to grapple with vast problems of race and social condition.
The war has naught to do with slaves, cried Congress, the President, and the Nation; and yet no
sooner had the armies, East and West, penetrated Virginia and Tennessee than fugitive slaves appeared
within their lines. They came at night, when the flickering camp-fires shone like vast unsteady stars
along the black horizon: old men and thin, with gray and tufted hair; women with frightened eyes,
dragging whimpering hungry children; men and girls, stalwart and gaunt,—a horde of starving
vagabonds, homeless, helpless, and pitiable, in their dark distress. Two methods of treating these
newcomers seemed equally logical to opposite sorts of minds. Ben Butler, in Virginia, quickly declared
slave property contraband of war, and put the fugitives to work; while Fremont, in Missouri, declared
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the slaves free under martial law. Butler’s action was approved, but Fremont’s was hastily
countermanded, and his successor, Halleck, saw things differently. “Hereafter,” he commanded, “no
slaves should be allowed to come into your lines at all; if any come without your knowledge, when
owners call for them deliver them.” Such a policy was difficult to enforce; some of the black refugees
declared themselves freemen, others showed that their masters had deserted them, and still others were
captured with forts and plantations. Evidently, too, slaves were a source of strength to the Confederacy,
and were being used as laborers and producers. “They constitute a military resource,” wrote Secretary
Cameron, late in 1861; “and being such, that they should not be turned over to the enemy is too plain to
discuss.” So gradually the tone of the army chiefs changed; Congress forbade the rendition of fugitives,
and Butler’s “contrabands” were welcomed as military laborers. This complicated rather than solved the
problem, for now the scattering fugitives became a steady stream, which flowed faster as the armies
marched.
Then the long-headed man with care-chiselled face who sat in the White House saw the inevitable,
and emancipated the slaves of rebels on New Year’s, 1863. A month later Congress called earnestly for
the Negro soldiers whom the act of July, 1862, had half grudgingly allowed to enlist. Thus the barriers
were levelled and the deed was done. The stream of fugitives swelled to a flood, and anxious army
officers kept inquiring: “What must be done with slaves, arriving almost daily? Are we to find food and
shelter for women and children?”
It was a Pierce of Boston who pointed out the way, and thus became in a sense the founder of the
Freedmen’s Bureau. He was a firm friend of Secretary Chase; and when, in 1861, the care of slaves and
abandoned lands devolved upon the Treasury officials, Pierce was specially detailed from the ranks to
study the conditions. First, he cared for the refugees at Fortress Monroe; and then, after Sherman had
captured Hilton Head, Pierce was sent there to found his Port Royal experiment of making free
workingmen out of slaves. Before his experiment was barely started, however, the problem of the
fugitives had assumed such proportions that it was taken from the hands of the over-burdened Treasury
Department and given to the army officials. Already centres of massed freedmen were forming at
Fortress Monroe, Washington, New Orleans, Vicksburg and Corinth, Columbus, Ky., and Cairo, Ill., as
well as at Port Royal. Army chaplains found here new and fruitful fields; “superintendents of
contrabands” multiplied, and some attempt at systematic work was made by enlisting the able-bodied
men and giving work to the others.
Then came the Freedmen’s Aid societies, born of the touching appeals from Pierce and from these
other centres of distress. There was the American Missionary Association, sprung from the Amistad, and
now full-grown for work; the various church organizations, the National Freedmen’s Relief Association,
the American Freedmen’s Union, the Western Freedmen’s Aid Commission,—in all fifty or more active
organizations, which sent clothes, money, school-books, and teachers southward. All they did was
needed, for the destitution of the freedmen was often reported as “too appalling for belief,” and the
situation was daily growing worse rather than better.
And daily, too, it seemed more plain that this was no ordinary matter of temporary relief, but a
national crisis; for here loomed a labor problem of vast dimensions. Masses of Negroes stood idle, or, if
they worked spasmodically, were never sure of pay; and if perchance they received pay, squandered the
new thing thoughtlessly. In these and other ways were camp-life and the new liberty demoralizing the
freedmen. The broader economic organization thus clearly demanded sprang up here and there as
accident and local conditions determined. Here it was that Pierce’s Port Royal plan of leased plantations
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and guided workmen pointed out the rough way. In Washington the military governor, at the urgent
appeal of the superintendent, opened confiscated estates to the cultivation of the fugitives, and there in
the shadow of the dome gathered black farm villages. General Dix gave over estates to the freedmen of
Fortress Monroe, and so on, South and West. The government and benevolent societies furnished the
means of cultivation, and the Negro turned again slowly to work. The systems of control, thus started,
rapidly grew, here and there, into strange little governments, like that of General Banks in Louisiana,
with its ninety thousand black subjects, its fifty thousand guided laborers, and its annual budget of one
hundred thousand dollars and more. It made out four thousand pay-rolls a year, registered all freedmen,
inquired into grievances and redressed them, laid and collected taxes, and established a system of public
schools. So, too, Colonel Eaton, the superintendent of Tennessee and Arkansas, ruled over one hundred
thousand freedmen, leased and cultivated seven thousand acres of cotton land, and fed ten thousand
paupers a year. In South Carolina was General Saxton, with his deep interest in black folk. He succeeded
Pierce and the Treasury officials, and sold forfeited estates, leased abandoned plantations, encouraged
schools, and received from Sherman, after that terribly picturesque march to the sea, thousands of the
wretched camp followers.
Three characteristic things one might have seen in Sherman’s raid through Georgia, which threw the
new situation in shadowy relief: the Conqueror, the Conquered, and the Negro. Some see all significance
in the grim front of the destroyer, and some in the bitter sufferers of the Lost Cause. But to me neither
soldier nor fugitive speaks with so deep a meaning as that dark human cloud that clung like remorse on
the rear of those swift columns, swelling at times to half their size, almost engulfing and choking them.
In vain were they ordered back, in vain were bridges hewn from beneath their feet; on they trudged and
writhed and surged, until they rolled into Savannah, a starved and naked horde of tens of thousands.
There too came the characteristic military remedy: “The islands from Charleston south, the abandoned
rice-fields along the rivers for thirty miles back from the sea, and the country bordering the St. John’s
River, Florida, are reserved and set apart for the settlement of Negroes now made free by act of war.” So
read the celebrated “Field-order Number Fifteen.”
All these experiments, orders, and systems were bound to attract and perplex the government and the
nation. Directly after the Emancipation Proclamation, Representative Eliot had introduced a bill creating
a Bureau of Emancipation; but it was never reported. The following June a committee of inquiry,
appointed by the Secretary of War, reported in favor of a temporary bureau for the “improvement,
protection, and employment of refugee freedmen,” on much the same lines as were afterwards followed.
Petitions came in to President Lincoln from distinguished citizens and organizations, strongly urging a
comprehensive and unified plan of dealing with the freedmen, under a bureau which should be “charged
with the study of plans and execution of measures for easily guiding, and in every way judiciously and
humanely aiding, the passage of our emancipated and yet to be emancipated blacks from the old
condition of forced labor to their new state of voluntary industry.”
Some half-hearted steps were taken to accomplish this, in part, by putting the whole matter again in
charge of the special Treasury agents. Laws of 1863 and 1864 directed them to take charge of and lease
abandoned lands for periods not exceeding twelve months, and to “provide in such leases, or otherwise,
for the employment and general welfare” of the freedmen. Most of the army officers greeted this as a
welcome relief from perplexing “Negro affairs,” and Secretary Fessenden, July 29, 1864, issued an
excellent system of regulations, which were afterward closely followed by General Howard. Under
Treasury agents, large quantities of land were leased in the Mississippi Valley, and many Negroes were
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employed; but in August, 1864, the new regulations were suspended for reasons of “public policy,” and
the army was again in control.
Meanwhile Congress had turned its attention to the subject; and in March the House passed a bill by a
majority of two establishing a Bureau for Freedmen in the War Department. Charles Sumner, who had
charge of the bill in the Senate, argued that freedmen and abandoned lands ought to be under the same
department, and reported a substitute for the House bill attaching the Bureau to the Treasury
Department. This bill passed, but too late for action by the House. The debates wandered over the whole
policy of the administration and the general question of slavery, without touching very closely the
specific merits of the measure in hand. Then the national election took place; and the administration,
with a vote of renewed confidence from the country, addressed itself to the matter more seriously. A
conference between the two branches of Congress agreed upon a carefully drawn measure which
contained the chief provisions of Sumner’s bill, but made the proposed organization a department
independent of both the War and the Treasury officials. The bill was conservative, giving the new
department “general superintendence of all freedmen.” Its purpose was to “establish regulations” for
them, protect them, lease them lands, adjust their wages, and appear in civil and military courts as their
“next friend.” There were many limitations attached to the powers thus granted, and the organization
was made permanent. Nevertheless, the Senate defeated the bill, and a new conference committee was
appointed. This committee reported a new bill, February 28, which was whirled through just as the
session closed, and became the act of 1865 establishing in the War Department a “Bureau of Refugees,
Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands.”
This last compromise was a hasty bit of legislation, vague and uncertain in outline. A Bureau was
created, “to continue during the present War of Rebellion, and for one year thereafter,” to which was
given “the supervision and management of all abandoned lands and the control of all subjects relating to
refugees and freedmen,” under “such rules and regulations as may be presented by the head of the
Bureau and approved by the President.” A Commissioner, appointed by the President and Senate, was to
control the Bureau, with an office force not exceeding ten clerks. The President might also appoint
assistant commissioners in the seceded States, and to all these offices military officials might be detailed
at regular pay. The Secretary of War could issue rations, clothing, and fuel to the destitute, and all
abandoned property was placed in the hands of the Bureau for eventual lease and sale to ex-slaves in
forty-acre parcels.
Thus did the United States government definitely assume charge of the emancipated Negro as the
ward of the nation. It was a tremendous undertaking. Here at a stroke of the pen was erected a
government of millions of men,—and not ordinary men either, but black men emasculated by a
peculiarly complete system of slavery, centuries old; and now, suddenly, violently, they come into a new
birthright, at a time of war and passion, in the midst of the stricken and embittered population of their
former masters. Any man might well have hesitated to assume charge of such a work, with vast
responsibilities, indefinite powers, and limited resources. Probably no one but a soldier would have
answered such a call promptly; and, indeed, no one but a soldier could be called, for Congress had
appropriated no money for salaries and expenses.
Less than a month after the weary Emancipator passed to his rest, his successor assigned Major-Gen.
Oliver O. Howard to duty as Commissioner of the new Bureau. He was a Maine man, then only thirtyfive years of age. He had marched with Sherman to the sea, had fought well at Gettysburg, and but the
year before had been assigned to the command of the Department of Tennessee. An honest man, with
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too much faith in human nature, little aptitude for business and intricate detail, he had had large
opportunity of becoming acquainted at first hand with much of the work before him. And of that work it
has been truly said that “no approximately correct history of civilization can ever be written which does
not throw out in bold relief, as one of the great landmarks of political and social progress, the
organization and administration of the Freedmen’s Bureau.”
On May 12, 1865, Howard was appointed; and he assumed the duties of his office promptly on the
15th, and began examining the field of work. A curious mess he looked upon: little despotisms,
communistic experiments, slavery, peonage, business speculations, organized charity, unorganized
almsgiving,—all reeling on under the guise of helping the freedmen, and all enshrined in the smoke and
blood of the war and the cursing and silence of angry men. On May 19 the new government—for a
government it really was—issued its constitution; commissioners were to be appointed in each of the
seceded states, who were to take charge of “all subjects relating to refugees and freedmen,” and all relief
and rations were to be given by their consent alone. The Bureau invited continued cooperation with
benevolent societies, and declared: “It will be the object of all commissioners to introduce practicable
systems of compensated labor,” and to establish schools. Forthwith nine assistant commissioners were
appointed. They were to hasten to their fields of work; seek gradually to close relief establishments, and
make the destitute self-supporting; act as courts of law where there were no courts, or where Negroes
were not recognized in them as free; establish the institution of marriage among ex-slaves, and keep
records; see that freedmen were free to choose their employers, and help in making fair contracts for
them; and finally, the circular said: “Simple good faith, for which we hope on all hands for those
concerned in the passing away of slavery, will especially relieve the assistant commissioners in the
discharge of their duties toward the freedmen, as well as promote the general welfare.”
No sooner was the work thus started, and the general system and local organization in some measure
begun, than two grave difficulties appeared which changed largely the theory and outcome of Bureau
work. First, there were the abandoned lands of the South. It had long been the more or less definitely
expressed theory of the North that all the chief problems of Emancipation might be settled by
establishing the slaves on the forfeited lands of their masters,—a sort of poetic justice, said some. But
this poetry done into solemn prose meant either wholesale confiscation of private property in the South,
or vast appropriations. Now Congress had not appropriated a cent, and no sooner did the proclamations
of general amnesty appear than the eight hundred thousand acres of abandoned lands in the hands of the
Freedmen’s Bureau melted quickly away. The second difficulty lay in perfecting the local organization
of the Bureau throughout the wide field of work. Making a new machine and sending out officials of
duly ascertained fitness for a great work of social reform is no child’s task; but this task was even
harder, for a new central organization had to be fitted on a heterogeneous and confused but already
existing system of relief and control of ex-slaves; and the agents available for this work must be sought
for in an army still busy with war operations,—men in the very nature of the case ill fitted for delicate
social work,—or among the questionable camp followers of an invading host. Thus, after a year’s work,
vigorously as it was pushed, the problem looked even more difficult to grasp and solve than at the
beginning. Nevertheless, three things that year’s work did, well worth the doing: it relieved a vast
amount of physical suffering; it transported seven thousand fugitives from congested centres back to the
farm; and, best of all, it inaugurated the crusade of the New England school ma’am.
The annals of this Ninth Crusade are yet to be written,—the tale of a mission that seemed to our age
far more quixotic than the quest of St. Louis seemed to his. Behind the mists of ruin and rapine waved
the calico dresses of women who dared, and after the hoarse mouthings of the field guns rang the rhythm
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of the alphabet. Rich and poor they were, serious and curious. Bereaved now of a father, now of a
brother, now of more than these, they came seeking a life work in planting New England schoolhouses
among the white and black of the South. They did their work well. In that first year they taught one
hundred thousand souls, and more.
Evidently, Congress must soon legislate again on the hastily organized Bureau, which had so quickly
grown into wide significance and vast possibilities. An institution such as that was well-nigh as difficult
to end as to begin. Early in 1866 Congress took up the matter, when Senator Trumbull, of Illinois,
introduced a bill to extend the Bureau and enlarge its powers. This measure received, at the hands of
Congress, far more thorough discussion and attention than its predecessor. The war cloud had thinned
enough to allow a clearer conception of the work of Emancipation. The champions of the bill argued that
the strengthening of the Freedmen’s Bureau was still a military necessity; that it was needed for the
proper carrying out of the Thirteenth Amendment, and was a work of sheer justice to the ex-slave, at a
trifling cost to the government. The opponents of the measure declared that the war was over, and the
necessity for war measures past; that the Bureau, by reason of its extraordinary powers, was clearly
unconstitutional in time of peace, and was destined to irritate the South and pauperize the freedmen, at a
final cost of possibly hundreds of millions. These two arguments were unanswered, and indeed
unanswerable: the one that the extraordinary powers of the Bureau threatened the civil rights of all
citizens; and the other that the government must have power to do what manifestly must be done, and
that present abandonment of the freedmen meant their practical reenslavement. The bill which finally
passed enlarged and made permanent the Freedmen’s Bureau. It was promptly vetoed by President
Johnson as “unconstitutional,” “unnecessary,” and “extrajudicial,” and failed of passage over the veto.
Meantime, however, the breach between Congress and the President began to broaden, and a modified
form of the lost bill was finally passed over the President’s second veto, July 16.
The act of 1866 gave the Freedmen’s Bureau its final form,—the form by which it will be known to
posterity and judged of men. It extended the existence of the Bureau to July, 1868; it authorized
additional assistant commissioners, the retention of army officers mustered out of regular service, the
sale of certain forfeited lands to freedmen on nominal terms, the sale of Confederate public property for
Negro schools, and a wider field of judicial interpretation and cognizance. The government of the
unreconstructed South was thus put very largely in the hands of the Freedmen’s Bureau, especially as in
many cases the departmental military commander was now made also assistant commissioner. It was
thus that the Freedmen’s Bureau became a full-fledged government of men. It made laws, executed them
and interpreted them; it laid and collected taxes, defined and punished crime, maintained and used
military force, and dictated such measures as it thought necessary and proper for the accomplishment of
its varied ends. Naturally, all these powers were not exercised continuously nor to their fullest extent;
and yet, as General Howard has said, “scarcely any subject that has to be legislated upon in civil society
failed, at one time or another, to demand the action of this singular Bureau.”
To understand and criticise intelligently so vast a work, one must not forget an instant the drift of
things in the later sixties. Lee had surrendered, Lincoln was dead, and Johnson and Congress were at
loggerheads; the Thirteenth Amendment was adopted, the Fourteenth pending, and the Fifteenth
declared in force in 1870. Guerrilla raiding, the ever-present flickering after-flame of war, was spending
its forces against the Negroes, and all the Southern land was awakening as from some wild dream to
poverty and social revolution. In a time of perfect calm, amid willing neighbors and streaming wealth,
the social uplifting of four million slaves to an assured and self-sustaining place in the body politic and
economic would have been a herculean task; but when to the inherent difficulties of so delicate and nice
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a social operation were added the spite and hate of conflict, the hell of war; when suspicion and cruelty
were rife, and gaunt Hunger wept beside Bereavement,—in such a case, the work of any instrument of
social regeneration was in large part foredoomed to failure. The very name of the Bureau stood for a
thing in the South which for two centuries and better men had refused even to argue,—that life amid free
Negroes was simply unthinkable, the maddest of experiments.
The agents that the Bureau could command varied all the way from unselfish philanthropists to
narrow-minded busybodies and thieves; and even though it be true that the average was far better than
the worst, it was the occasional fly that helped spoil the ointment.
Then amid all crouched the freed slave, bewildered between friend and foe. He had emerged from
slavery,—not the worst slavery in the world, not a slavery that made all life unbearable, rather a slavery
that had here and there something of kindliness, fidelity, and happiness,—but withal slavery, which, so
far as human aspiration and desert were concerned, classed the black man and the ox together. And the
Negro knew full well that, whatever their deeper convictions may have been, Southern men had fought
with desperate energy to perpetuate this slavery under which the black masses, with half-articulate
thought, had writhed and shivered. They welcomed freedom with a cry. They shrank from the master
who still strove for their chains; they fled to the friends that had freed them, even though those friends
stood ready to use them as a club for driving the recalcitrant South back into loyalty. So the cleft
between the white and black South grew. Idle to say it never should have been; it was as inevitable as its
results were pitiable. Curiously incongruous elements were left arrayed against each other,—the North,
the government, the carpet-bagger, and the slave, here; and there, all the South that was white, whether
gentleman or vagabond, honest man or rascal, lawless murderer or martyr to duty.
Thus it is doubly difficult to write of this period calmly, so intense was the feeling, so mighty the
human passions that swayed and blinded men. Amid it all, two figures ever stand to typify that day to
coming ages,—the one, a gray-haired gentleman, whose fathers had quit themselves like men, whose
sons lay in nameless graves; who bowed to the evil of slavery because its abolition threatened untold ill
to all; who stood at last, in the evening of life, a blighted, ruined form, with hate in his eyes;—and the
other, a form hovering dark and mother-like, her awful face black with the mists of centuries, had
aforetime quailed at that white master’s command, had bent in love over the cradles of his sons and
daughters, and closed in death the sunken eyes of his wife,—aye, too, at his behest had laid herself low
to his lust, and borne a tawny man-child to the world, only to see her dark boy’s limbs scattered to the
winds by midnight marauders riding after “damned Niggers.” These were the saddest sights of that
woful day; and no man clasped the hands of these two passing figures of the present-past; but, hating,
they went to their long home, and, hating, their children’s children live today.
Here, then, was the field of work for the Freedmen’s Bureau; and since, with some hesitation, it was
continued by the act of 1868 until 1869, let us look upon four years of its work as a whole. There were,
in 1868, nine hundred Bureau officials scattered from Washington to Texas, ruling, directly and
indirectly, many millions of men. The deeds of these rulers fall mainly under seven heads: the relief of
physical suffering, the overseeing of the beginnings of free labor, the buying and selling of land, the
establishment of schools, the paying of bounties, the administration of justice, and the financiering of all
these activities.
Up to June, 1869, over half a million patients had been treated by Bureau physicians and surgeons,
and sixty hospitals and asylums had been in operation. In fifty months twenty-one million free rations
were distributed at a cost of over four million dollars. Next came the difficult question of labor. First,
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thirty thousand black men were transported from the refuges and relief stations back to the farms, back
to the critical trial of a new way of working. Plain instructions went out from Washington: the laborers
must be free to choose their employers, no fixed rate of wages was prescribed, and there was to be no
peonage or forced labor. So far, so good; but where local agents differed toto cælo in capacity and
character, where the personnel was continually changing, the outcome was necessarily varied. The
largest element of success lay in the fact that the majority of the freedmen were willing, even eager, to
work. So labor contracts were written,—fifty thousand in a single State,—laborers advised, wages
guaranteed, and employers supplied. In truth, the organization became a vast labor bureau,—not perfect,
indeed, notably defective here and there, but on the whole successful beyond the dreams of thoughtful
men. The two great obstacles which confronted the officials were the tyrant and the idler,—the
slaveholder who was determined to perpetuate slavery under another name; and, the freedman who
regarded freedom as perpetual rest,—the Devil and the Deep Sea.
In the work of establishing the Negroes as peasant proprietors, the Bureau was from the first
handicapped and at last absolutely checked. Something was done, and larger things were planned;
abandoned lands were leased so long as they remained in the hands of the Bureau, and a total revenue of
nearly half a million dollars derived from black tenants. Some other lands to which the nation had
gained title were sold on easy terms, and public lands were opened for settlement to the very few
freedmen who had tools and capital. But the vision of “forty acres and a mule’—the righteous and
reasonable ambition to become a landholder, which the nation had all but categorically promised the
freedmen—was destined in most cases to bitter disappointment. And those men of marvelous hindsight
who are today seeking to preach the Negro back to the present peonage of the soil know well, or ought
to know, that the opportunity of binding the Negro peasant willingly to the soil was lost on that day
when the Commissioner of the Freedmen’s Bureau had to go to South Carolina and tell the weeping
freedmen, after their years of toil, that their land was not theirs, that there was a mistake—somewhere. If
by 1874 the Georgia Negro alone owned three hundred and fifty thousand acres of land, it was by grace
of his thrift rather than by bounty of the government.
The greatest success of the Freedmen’s Bureau lay in the planting of the free school among Negroes,
and the idea of free elementary education among all classes in the South. It not only called the schoolmistresses through the benevolent agencies and built them schoolhouses, but it helped discover and
support such apostles of human culture as Edmund Ware, Samuel Armstrong, and Erastus Cravath. The
opposition to Negro education in the South was at first bitter, and showed itself in ashes, insult, and
blood; for the South believed an educated Negro to be a dangerous Negro. And the South was not
wholly wrong; for education among all kinds of men always has had, and always will have, an element
of danger and revolution, of dissatisfaction and discontent. Nevertheless, men strive to know. Perhaps
some inkling of this paradox, even in the unquiet days of the Bureau, helped the bayonets allay an
opposition to human training which still to-day lies smouldering in the South, but not flaming. Fisk,
Atlanta, Howard, and Hampton were founded in these days, and six million dollars were expended for
educational work, seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars of which the freedmen themselves gave of
their poverty.
Such contributions, together with the buying of land and various other enterprises, showed that the exslave was handling some free capital already. The chief initial source of this was labor in the army, and
his pay and bounty as a soldier. Payments to Negro soldiers were at first complicated by the ignorance
of the recipients, and the fact that the quotas of colored regiments from Northern States were largely
filled by recruits from the South, unknown to their fellow soldiers. Consequently, payments were
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accompanied by such frauds that Congress, by joint resolution in 1867, put the whole matter in the
hands of the Freedmen’s Bureau. In two years six million dollars was thus distributed to five thousand
claimants, and in the end the sum exceeded eight million dollars. Even in this system fraud was
frequent; but still the work put needed capital in the hands of practical paupers, and some, at least, was
well spent.
The most perplexing and least successful part of the Bureau’s work lay in the exercise of its judicial
functions. The regular Bureau court consisted of one representative of the employer, one of the Negro,
and one of the Bureau. If the Bureau could have maintained a perfectly judicial attitude, this
arrangement would have been ideal, and must in time have gained confidence; but the nature of its other
activities and the character of its personnel prejudiced the Bureau in favor of the black litigants, and led
without doubt to much injustice and annoyance. On the other hand, to leave the Negro in the hands of
Southern courts was impossible. In a distracted land where slavery had hardly fallen, to keep the strong
from wanton abuse of the weak, and the weak from gloating insolently over the half-shorn strength of
the strong, was a thankless, hopeless task. The former masters of the land were peremptorily ordered
about, seized, and imprisoned, and punished over and again, with scant courtesy from army officers. The
former slaves were intimidated, beaten, raped, and butchered by angry and revengeful men. Bureau
courts tended to become centres simply for punishing whites, while the regular civil courts tended to
become solely institutions for perpetuating the slavery of blacks. Almost every law and method
ingenuity could devise was employed by the legislatures to reduce the Negroes to serfdom,—to make
them the slaves of the State, if not of individual owners; while the Bureau officials too often were found
striving to put the “bottom rail on top,” and gave the freedmen a power and independence which they
could not yet use. It is all well enough for us of another generation to wax wise with advice to those who
bore the burden in the heat of the day. It is full easy now to see that the man who lost home, fortune, and
family at a stroke, and saw his land ruled by “mules and niggers,” was really benefited by the passing of
slavery. It is not difficult now to say to the young freedman, cheated and cuffed about who has seen his
father’s head beaten to a jelly and his own mother namelessly assaulted, that the meek shall inherit the
earth. Above all, nothing is more convenient than to heap on the Freedmen’s Bureau all the evils of that
evil day, and damn it utterly for every mistake and blunder that was made.
All this is easy, but it is neither sensible nor just. Someone had blundered, but that was long before
Oliver Howard was born; there was criminal aggression and heedless neglect, but without some system
of control there would have been far more than there was. Had that control been from within, the Negro
would have been re-enslaved, to all intents and purposes. Coming as the control did from without,
perfect men and methods would have bettered all things; and even with imperfect agents and
questionable methods, the work accomplished was not undeserving of commendation.
Such was the dawn of Freedom; such was the work of the Freedmen’s Bureau, which, summed up in
brief, may be epitomized thus: for some fifteen million dollars, beside the sums spent before 1865, and
the dole of benevolent societies, this Bureau set going a system of free labor, established a beginning of
peasant proprietorship, secured the recognition of black freedmen before courts of law, and founded the
free common school in the South. On the other hand, it failed to begin the establishment of good-will
between ex-masters and freedmen, to guard its work wholly from paternalistic methods which
discouraged self-reliance, and to carry out to any considerable extent its implied promises to furnish the
freedmen with land. Its successes were the result of hard work, supplemented by the aid of
philanthropists and the eager striving of black men. Its failures were the result of bad local agents, the
inherent difficulties of the work, and national neglect.
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Such an institution, from its wide powers, great responsibilities, large control of moneys, and
generally conspicuous position, was naturally open to repeated and bitter attack. It sustained a searching
Congressional investigation at the instance of Fernando Wood in 1870. Its archives and few remaining
functions were with blunt discourtesy transferred from Howard’s control, in his absence, to the
supervision of Secretary of War Belknap in 1872, on the Secretary’s recommendation. Finally, in
consequence of grave intimations of wrong-doing made by the Secretary and his subordinates, General
Howard was court-martialed in 1874. In both of these trials the Commissioner of the Freedmen’s Bureau
was officially exonerated from any wilful misdoing, and his work commended. Nevertheless, many
unpleasant things were brought to light,—the methods of transacting the business of the Bureau were
faulty; several cases of defalcation were proved, and other frauds strongly suspected; there were some
business transactions which savored of dangerous speculation, if not dishonesty; and around it all lay the
smirch of the Freedmen’s Bank.
Morally and practically, the Freedmen’s Bank was part of the Freedmen’s Bureau, although it had no
legal connection with it. With the prestige of the government back of it, and a directing board of unusual
respectability and national reputation, this banking institution had made a remarkable start in the
development of that thrift among black folk which slavery had kept them from knowing. Then in one
sad day came the crash,—all the hard-earned dollars of the freedmen disappeared; but that was the least
of the loss,—all the faith in saving went too, and much of the faith in men; and that was a loss that a
Nation which to-day sneers at Negro shiftlessness has never yet made good. Not even ten additional
years of slavery could have done so much to throttle the thrift of the freedmen as the mismanagement
and bankruptcy of the series of savings banks chartered by the Nation for their especial aid. Where all
the blame should rest, it is hard to say; whether the Bureau and the Bank died chiefly by reason of the
blows of its selfish friends or the dark machinations of its foes, perhaps even time will never reveal, for
here lies unwritten history.
Of the foes without the Bureau, the bitterest were those who attacked not so much its conduct or
policy under the law as the necessity for any such institution at all. Such attacks came primarily from the
Border States and the South; and they were summed up by Senator Davis, of Kentucky, when he moved
to entitle the act of 1866 a bill “to promote strife and conflict between the white and black races… by a
grant of unconstitutional power.” The argument gathered tremendous strength South and North; but its
very strength was its weakness. For, argued the plain common-sense of the nation, if it is
unconstitutional, unpractical, and futile for the nation to stand guardian over its helpless wards, then
there is left but one alternative,—to make those wards their own guardians by arming them with the
ballot. Moreover, the path of the practical politician pointed the same way; for, argued this opportunist,
if we cannot peacefully reconstruct the South with white votes, we certainly can with black votes. So
justice and force joined hands.
The alternative thus offered the nation was not between full and restricted Negro suffrage; else every
sensible man, black and white, would easily have chosen the latter. It was rather a choice between
suffrage and slavery, after endless blood and gold had flowed to sweep human bondage away. Not a
single Southern legislature stood ready to admit a Negro, under any conditions, to the polls; not a single
Southern legislature believed free Negro labor was possible without a system of restrictions that took all
its freedom away; there was scarcely a white man in the South who did not honestly regard
Emancipation as a crime, and its practical nullification as a duty. In such a situation, the granting of the
ballot to the black man was a necessity, the very least a guilty nation could grant a wronged race, and the
only method of compelling the South to accept the results of the war. Thus Negro suffrage ended a civil
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war by beginning a race feud. And some felt gratitude toward the race thus sacrificed in its swaddling
clothes on the altar of national integrity; and some felt and feel only indifference and contempt.
Had political exigencies been less pressing, the opposition to government guardianship of Negroes
less bitter, and the attachment to the slave system less strong, the social seer can well imagine a far
better policy,—a permanent Freedmen’s Bureau, with a national system of Negro schools; a carefully
supervised employment and labor office; a system of impartial protection before the regular courts; and
such institutions for social betterment as savings-banks, land and building associations, and social
settlements. All this vast expenditure of money and brains might have formed a great school of
prospective citizenship, and solved in a way we have not yet solved the most perplexing and persistent
of the Negro problems.
That such an institution was unthinkable in 1870 was due in part to certain acts of the Freedmen’s
Bureau itself. It came to regard its work as merely temporary, and Negro suffrage as a final answer to all
present perplexities. The political ambition of many of its agents and protégés led it far afield into
questionable activities, until the South, nursing its own deep prejudices, came easily to ignore all the
good deeds of the Bureau and hate its very name with perfect hatred. So the Freedmen’s Bureau died,
and its child was the Fifteenth Amendment.
The passing of a great human institution before its work is done, like the untimely passing of a single
soul, but leaves a legacy of striving for other men. The legacy of the Freedmen’s Bureau is the heavy
heritage of this generation. To-day, when new and vaster problems are destined to strain every fibre of
the national mind and soul, would it not be well to count this legacy honestly and carefully? For this
much all men know: despite compromise, war, and struggle, the Negro is not free. In the backwoods of
the Gulf States, for miles and miles, he may not leave the plantation of his birth; in well-nigh the whole
rural South the black farmers are peons, bound by law and custom to an economic slavery, from which
the only escape is death or the penitentiary. In the most cultured sections and cities of the South the
Negroes are a segregated servile caste, with restricted rights and privileges. Before the courts, both in
law and custom, they stand on a different and peculiar basis. Taxation without representation is the rule
of their political life. And the result of all this is, and in nature must have been, lawlessness and crime.
That is the large legacy of the Freedmen’s Bureau, the work it did not do because it could not.
I have seen a land right merry with the sun, where children sing, and rolling hills lie like passioned
women wanton with harvest. And there in the King’s Highways sat and sits a figure veiled and bowed,
by which the traveller’s footsteps hasten as they go. On the tainted air broods fear. Three centuries’
thought has been the raising and unveiling of that bowed human heart, and now behold a century new
for the duty and the deed. The problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color-line.
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